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ABSTRACT
Attempts have been made to explain the Fiscal Strain
experienced by large American cities in terms of the chang-
ing demographic patterns of urban residents and the shift in
tax bases of cities. These approaches explain the problems
of Fiscal Strain in terms of uncontrollable expenses. An
accounting approach to the study of Fiscal Strain, however,
suggests that the problem is more likely to be on the rev-
enue side. Case studies of Detroit and Boston bear out this
hypothesis. Tax deficits and deficits in intergovernmental
transfers create short-term cash-flow problems that even-
tually evolve into serious long-term Fiscal Strains. An
accounting approach that disaggregates the Current Account
of a city provides an effective way of identifying the
sources of Fiscal Strain and, ultimately, testing solutions
to the deficit problem.
Thesis Supervisor: Lawrence Susskind
Title: Associate Professor of Urban Studies
and Planning
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INTRODUCTION
Concept of Fiscal Strain
During the New York City fiscal crises in the mid-
1970s, the term "Fiscal Strain" was created to describe the
financial problems plaguing large cities in the United
States. This term was loosely understood to represent an
imbalance between revenues and expenses. New York's declin-
ing fiscal resources were no longer able to support its
ambitious level of welfare programs. Additionally, the
level of welfare programs could not be reduced to match the
loss of industry. Political bargaining among New York's
vast network of union, ethnic, and minority groups main-
tained the level of service demands without an adequate
match in funds. Thus, New York's problem of imbalance
between revenues and expenses was political as much as
financial. Because of this, the belief that city deficits
are associated with large welfare programs became the basis
for a great deal of essay and research focusing on Fiscal
Strain.
The one indicator generally accepted as the barom-
eter of Fiscal Strain is the balance of a city's Current
Account. This balance is calculated by subtracting all
1
actual expenses from revenues for the current fiscal year.
1Municipal Finance Officers' Association of the
7
8A financially sound city should be able to provide services,
pay employees, and fund self-initiated social programs from
monies collected through the city's mix of revenues, all of
which are accounted for in the Current Account. When an
imbalance between revenues and expenses occurs and is not
due to seasonal fluctuations in tax receipts, a city is liv-
ing beyond its means and can be said to be fiscally strained.
Bankers who loan the city money to cover seasonal
fluctuations in revenues allegedly refuse money to cover
current, daily operations. In order to circumvent this,
cities sometimes inflate assets on financial statements
claiming that more money is coming in than is truthfully
expected. The bank now loans that money to the city, and a
deficit is created that will not be recognized for many
years. Thus, the imbalance between revenues and expenses
is covered up by an accounting technique as opposed to an
increase in revenues or a decrease in expenses. The bal-
ance in the Current Account shows no sign of a deteriorat-
ing fiscal position. As a barometer of Fiscal Strain, the
Current Account balance is misleading, revealing no deficit
United States and Canada, Governmental Accounting, Auditing,
and Financial Reporting (Chicago, Illinois: National Com-
mittee on Governmental Accounting, 1976), pp. 157, 161.
Funds in the Current Account are expended for operating pur-
poses during the current fiscal period. The Current fund
is synonymous with the General Fund, which is further
defined as accounting for the ordinary operations of a
governmental unit that are financed from taxes and other
general revenues.
9or acts of accounting impropriety. Thus, the concept of
Fiscal Strain should focus on how the financial system
structurally creates and covers up deficits. The conven-
tional wisdom, however, simplistically depicts Fiscal Strain
as the outgrowth of political demands and the burgeoning
level of welfare and social programs.
Objective
The objective of this dissertation is to expand the
present concept of Fiscal Strain by creating and testing a
method for the evaluation of Fiscal Strain in large American
cities. The mechanics of this method trace the flow of
municipal funds beginning with the creation of a budget
through the resolution of any deficit. This process not
only locates where strain begins, but also illustrates how
strain builds and manifests itself in other areas of the
budget. The evaluation of this development process is
crucial in determining the severity of strain and the cre-
ation of strategies to overcome these fiscal problems.
This method is vastly different from other quanti-
tative studies because it assesses Fiscal Strain through an
accounting treatment and not econometric modelling. While
models associate operating deficits with socio-economic
variables, this thesis discredits the use of models for
Fiscal Strain analysis and focuses on the financial state-
ments alone to detect fiscal problems. The purpose of this
10
method is to construct an early warning system, which is
based on the disaggregation of the Current Account into four
separate budget statistics. Once these sources of Fiscal
Strain have been located, it is possible to create strate-
gies to overcome them. The objective of strategy develop-
ment is admittedly too large to be completed here. What is
attempted is the creation of a method to analyze the munici-
pal budget and Fiscal Strain.
This type of analysis is useful to both public and
private sectors. The public sector must learn to manage
funds without running a deficit and how to overcome a defi-
cit when running one. Private financiers can use this
research to learn how to evaluate quickly the creditworthi-
ness of a municipality. Bankers can assess risk of short-
or long-term loans by this historical tracing of funds.
Thus, the disaggregating of the Current Account into four
components aids both public and private sectors,
Organization
The organization of this thesis is somewhat uncon-
ventional. The basis of this research lies in Appendices
A and B. These studies were first initiated several years
ago as an outgrowth of the literature on Fiscal Strain. I,
quite honestly, felt that the econometric model built in
Appendix A, A Fresh Look at the Alleged Socio-Economic
Correlations of Fiscal Strain, would become the thrust of
11
the thesis. But by simulating an econometric model in the
literature, I was able to retest the significance of indi-
vidual variables and evaluate the predictive capacity of
the model.
The tests did not agree with the literature that
large operating deficits are associated with large welfare
programs, blacks, or low-income population. The only sig-
nificant regressors were the level of disposable income and
the amount of debt per capita. The results of this research
cast doubt on the conventional wisdom. There were also
several indications in the data analysis that the actual
dataset may be poorly constructed.
Because of these results, I felt I needed to do
basic research in municipal finance to find out what was
going wrong. Since the language of municipal budgets is
accounting, I studied the theory of municipal accounting
and report on it in Appendix B, Overview of Municipal
Accounting. This is a dry study of the accounting tech-
niques underlying municipal accounting. Through a network
of funds, cities account for all financial transactions.
Only one, the General Fund, measures the financial solvency
of a city and is looked to as the measure of Fiscal Strain.
This study enabled me to understand the accounting struc-
turetand its complexities. In combination with the study in
Appendix A, these studies gave me the knowledge and perspec-
tive to create the framework of analysis that is presented
12
as a preface to the case studies.
Chapter 2, Case Study: Detroit, Michigan, finds,
after applying the framework to Detroit, that, at the basis
of Detroit's annual deficit, there is a budget that projects
Expenses greater than Revenues, thus automatically creating
a deficit at the start of the fiscal year. A severe deficit
in intergovernmental transfers on the Revenue side worsens
the original deficit as does the underreserving of Contin-
gent Liabilities on the Expense side.
Chapter 3, Case Study: Boston, Massachusetts, finds
Boston suffering from a very large deficit in the Revenue
side's tax component. Underreserving of delinquencies and
abatements creates this deficit and is caused by poor fore-
casting of Revenues and an antiquated statute requiring Bos-
ton to limit its reserves. With the information from both
Boston and Detroit, all four types of deficits as defined
by the framework in Exhibit #2.0 appear.
Chapter 4, Incongruities Between Census and Audit
Data, compares data sources for their accuracy, consistency,
and adequacy. The startling finding here is that the Census
data are not valid for Fiscal Strain research, thus casting
doubt on all previous studies. Although the Audit data are
usable, corrections are made to build a more accurate data-
set., Attempts to make the Census data usable are impossible
because there is no consistency in collecting statistics
across cities.
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Chapter 5, Findings and Recommendations, reviews the
material and makes recommendations as to how to overcome the
problems that emerged in both Detroit and Boston. It was
found in both cities that deficits arise from poor forecast-
ing of revenues. This finding discredits most studies in
the literature because only Expense-side problems are ever
discussed as the cause for large operating deficits. Thus,
the framework for analysis as shown in Exhibit #2.0 is
proved to be useful for Fiscal Strain analysis.
CHAPTER 1
LITERATURE REVIEW
Many scholars have tried to identify the sources of
Fiscal Strain. While reading the literature on Fiscal
Strain, I found three different approaches to the study of
this area: (1) qualitative studies that offer descriptive
explanations of the causes of Fiscal Strain, based on the
authors' perceptions of how New York City went broke;
(2) numerical analyses, usually written by municipal ana-
lysts Cof investment banks, commercial banks, and mutual
funds), enumerating the rules of thumb they use for assess-
ing the creditworthiness of a city; C3) quantitative studies
that use econometric models to explain Fiscal Strain rela-
tive to the socio-economic, fiscal, and demographic charac-
teristics of the population. This section departs from con-
vention by including work I did in preparation for this
thesis. Results from these econometric models change the
research design, methodology, and data source usually seen
in Fiscal Strain studies. The totally unexpected results
thus change the entire nature of Fiscal Strain research.
Descriptive Qualitative Studies
Most qualitative studies are in agreement as to the
underlying causes of Fiscal Strain: (1) changing socio-
14
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economic characteristics in cities; (2) national economic
difficulties; (3) inequitable fiscal federalism; (4) oppor-
tunistic political bargaining; and (5) unions and collective
bargaining. 1
The traditional argument in this group of studies
centers on the flight of the middle class to the suburbs,
leaving the center city with lower-income residents, who
have high demands for services, and a deteriorating tax
base. Industries relocated to find land to build larger
plants. Some relocated to the south and west because of
cheap land and lower labor costs. Fiscal Strain, to the
analysts who espouse this argument, is caused by the chang-
ing socio-economic character of urban populations.
The impact of cyclical variations in employment and
inflation has been hardest in large cities. New York City,
which relies on sales and income taxes more than on property
taxes, loses substantial revenue during a recession but must
maintain even greater service levels. From this standpoint,
1Roger E. Alcaly and Helen Bodian, "New York's Fis-
cal Crisis and the Economy"; George Steinlieb and James W.
Hughes, "Metropolitan Decline and Inter-Regional Job Shifts";
Congressional Budget Office, "New York City's Fiscal Prob-
lems"; Eli B. Silverman, "New York City Revenues: The Fed-
eral and State Role" in Fiscal Crisis of American Cities,
eds. Roger E. Alcaly and David Mermelstein (New York:
Vintage Books, 1977), pp. 30, 145, 285, and 339, respec-
tively; Archibald Robertson and Lucian Vecchio, "A Legal
History of Expense Budgeting in New York City," Fordham
Urban Law Journal IV (1975):1; Colin Blaydon and Steven
Gilford, "Financing the Cities: An Issue Agenda," Duke Law
Journal (1976):1057; Roger Starr, "New York's Crisis--and
Washington's," 66 Commentary 6 (December 1978):49-57.
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Fiscal Strain in cities can be blamed on national economic
difficulties. All descriptive studies are set against this
background.
Revenue-sharing and other matching federal grants
benefit some cities more than others. For example, New York
City receives less aid per person than the rest of the State
of New York. 2 From this standpoint, Fiscal Strain is the
product of unfair design of our intergovernmental fiscal aid
system. This explanation has been appearing more frequently
in recent years.
The election of political candidates requires coali-
tions of voters with a mix of different needs. When a city
has been abandoned by the middle class and is populated pri-
marily by low-income persons, politicians must cater to the
needs of the electoral majority. Promises are made many of
which either create new programs for the majority or upgrade
existing ones even though the tax base may remain at the
same level or deteriorate. An imbalance of funds occurs,
the. cause seeming to be bargains aimed at achieving short-
term political gains.
Some of the literature on Fiscal Strain places blame
on the unions for demanding higher wages from the city. A
different view is given by William Tabb.3 He suggests that
2Donna Shalala and Carol Bellamy, "A State Saves a
City," Duke Law Journal (1976):1119.
3William Tabb, "Blaming the Victim" in Fiscal Crisis
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the city has robbed the unions by underfunding pensions.
The city uses the money for other projects but provides
little security for pensions. In either case, collective
bargaining or the demands of public employee unions are
blamed for Fiscal Strain.
Investment Analysis Research
Investment banking houses, commercial banks, and
mutual funds are fairly consistent in the variables they use
as indicators of Fiscal Strain. When analyzing any munici-
pality, bankers collect statistics for a particular city
and then compare statistics across cities. Each financial
institution determines what rules of thumb its analysts use.
Because bankers are leery of making trade secrets public,
only a partial list of variables follows. 4 The only
of American Cities, eds. Roger E. Alcaly and David Mermel-
stein (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), p. 137.
4Dell H. Stevens, "An Approach to the Evaluation of
Tax Free Bonds," notes prepared for lectures at L. F. Roth-
schild, Unterberg, Towbin, New York, 2 November 1977; The
First National Bank of Boston and Touche Ross & Co., Urban
Fiscal Stress: A Comparative Analysis of Sixty-Six United
States Cities (New York: Touche Ross & Co., 1979); inter-
views with: Joel Mandelbaum, Investment Banker, Lehman Kuhn
Loeb, New York, March 1977; Ruth Corson, Assistant Vice
President, Municipal Bond Analyst, E. F. Hutton & Co., Bos-
ton, Massachusetts, January 1978; Donna Simonetti, Municipal
Bond Analyst, Fidelity Municipal Bond Fund Inc., Boston,
Massachusetts, January 1978; Linda E. Demkovich and Neal R.
Pierce, "Urban Report/New York's Fiscal Woes May be Catch-
ing,' National Journal, 8 November 1975; Charles T. Noona,
"Municipal Bond Analysis and Establishing a Municipal Filing
System," Journal of Commercial Bank Lending 60 (February
1978) :40-46.
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Variables
Economic Conditions
Change in Population
-Percentage change in single-family housing starts
Manufacturing capital spending
Change in manufacturing employment ratio
Percentage change in manufacturing capital spending
Median family income
Social Conditions
Percentage minority population
Percentage families below low-income level
Unemployment rate
Percentage pre-1939 housing stock
Structural Conditions
Population density
Financial Variables
Revenue
Ratio of local taxes to per-
sonal income (tax effort)
Local taxes per capita
Intergovernmental revenue as
percentage of total revenue
Debt
Total debt per capita
Interest per capita
Municipal capital spending
per capita, five-year
average, 1971-1975
Expenses
Fire expense per capita
Education expenses per capita
(total from all sources)
Health expenses per capita
(total from all sources)
Welfare expenses per capita
(total from all sources)
Ratio of city full-time-
equivalent employment to
total local employment
Average city employee
annual income
Current operating
expenses per capita
Mean
Value
5.65%
$265.02
a
34.60%
$516.86
$ 23.19
$ 82.73
$ 29.55
$236.94
$ 7.56
$ 5.52
3.98%
$7,746
$484.61
Standard
Deviation
2.26%
$106.41
12.24%
$268. 59
$ 14.30
$ 48.47
$ 10.32
$ 60.24
$ 9.07
$ 14.81
2.23%
$1,606
$120.27
Lowest Highest
Value Value
1.92%
$ 98.76
5.02%
13.42%
$556.36
64. 00%
$121.66 $1,193.84
$ 5.32 $ 89.69
$ 20.55 $223.25
$ 9.48 $ 56.42
$120.45 $395.08
$ 0.00* $ 47.11
$ 0.00* $ 92.22
0.95% 10.58%
$4,158 $12,319
$270.40 $928.39
*) A ziro value for health and welfare means that the entire expenses of these
programs are borne by other levels of government.
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category for which statistics are published is Financial.
These averages and other statistics were processed from a
survey of sixty-six cities by the First National Bank of
Boston.5
The major contribution bankers and municipal ana-
lysts make to the literature is the specification or cali-
bration of the descriptive reasons given for Fiscal Strain.
For example, the concept of changing populations is defined
by analysts. First, what does "changing" mean? Which
groups and how many people are moving, who and how many
people are staying? How is this seen in employment and
income statistics? These statistics become barometers of a
deteriorating tax base. Some may be experienced before
others; knowledge of these patterns based on data from other
cities with stressed economies allows the municipal analyst
to assess not only present conditions, but also to predict
what may happen, given historical precedent. The statistics
give a clearer picture of the "changing" demography. A
feeling about or a perception of "changing" is pinned down
and defined. It is important to do so as it enables a com-
parison of all cities across the nation to be drawn.
The financial variables illustrate this best. An
analyst is always concerned about the amount of debt out-
standing. This represents fixed costs of repayment over the
5First National Bank et al., Urban Fiscal Stress.
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next years. The absolute values of some may seem large, but
the per capita rate first makes it comparable to other cit-
ies when it is then compared to the average and range. As
displayed in the chart, the mean value of total debt per
capita is $516.86. If the city is within the standard devi-
ation of $14.30, it is undertaking debt at an "average" rate
--the accepted "normal" rate for all cities. The assessment
of risk involves comparative analysis, comparison of which
can only be done by quantifying descriptive reasons.
Muller further attempts to correlate fiscal factors
to Fiscal Strain by assessing and quantifying the direction
of change--growing or declining--a city is experiencing. 6
Characteristics that distinguish growing cities from declin-
ing cities include patterns of migration, spatial expansion,
and their changes in employment. Muller explains that large
cities, at some point, stop growing, and, without further
potential of annexation, the process of aging catches up
with the city, and the undesirable characteristics observed
in declining areas begin to appear. The biggest problem
within these characteristics is the situation of providing
human services equal to those that have been incrementally
established on a tax base that can no longer support them.
Muller finds that a declining city can only
6Thomas Muller, Growing and Declining Urban Areas:
A Fiscal Comparison, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: The
Urban Institute, 1976).
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stabilize by annexing other tax bases. Because of the
declining city's high service costs, contiguous tax bases
are reluctant to annex. Muller concludes that, while a loss
in population by itself does not necessarily point to severe
fiscal difficulties, it appears to be an indicator of future
problems. As a danger signal, Muller uses a 10 percent
increase in net out-migration over a five-year period.
Since Muller correlates the cost of public services with the
degree of the decline in cities, there is an automatic prob-
lem with out-migration since the tax base decreases.
Because of Muller's excellent research design and
appropriate statistical analyses, his above-mentioned book tests
well the qualitative arguments of Fiscal Strain in a fashion
acceptable to statistical analysts. What these statistics
and "rules of thumb" do not do is to determine which rules
of thumb are statistically significant, a term used to sig-
nify what variables are, indeed, important to Fiscal Strain
analysis. Many variables have been listed in the previous
chart. It is possible that the association between some of
these variables and Fiscal Strain is just not important.
Assumptions and beliefs of the past are now tested in econo-
metric and statistical analyses.
Quantitative Research--Econometric
Modeling
Gramlich, Ghazalah, and Clark-Rubin-Pettler-Zimmer-
man have conducted detailed regression analyses of fiscal
22
7factors. The factors they have tested are:
1. Economic
a. Disposable Income
b. Median Household Income
c. Percentage of population earning less than
$5,000/year
d. Percentage of population earning more than
$10,000/year
2. Demographic
a. Population
b. Density
c. Percentage non-white
d. Region
3. Financial Data
a. Debt per capita
b. Revenue sharing
Gramlich and Ghazalah perpetuate the idea that low-
income groups and blacks are associated with large welfare
programs, which, in turn, contribute to large operating def-
icits. Gramlich introduces a new concept, the "Marginal
Account"--marginal in the sense that it does not normally
drain revenue from the city government.8 It includes:
Welfare
Higher education
7Edward Gramlich, "The New York Fiscal Crisis: What
Happened and What is to be Done?" American Economic Review
(May 1976):418; I. A. Ghazaleh, "The Fiscal Problem in Urban
Areas," paper presented at XXIV International Meeting, Insti-
tute of Management Sciences, Honolulu, Hawaii, 19 June 1979;
Joan K. Martin, "Predicting Fiscal Strain in Cities," unpub-
lished paper, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts, June 1977;
Terry Nichols Clark et al., "How Many New Yorks?" Unpub-
lished working paper, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illi-
nois-, June 1976; George E. Peterson, "Finance" in The Urban
Predicament, eds. William Gorham and Nathan Glazer (Washing-
ton, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1976).
8Gramlich, p. 418.
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Transit
Public hospitals
Public housing
Pension contributions
Gramlich asserts that it is this set of accounts that is
affected by the percentage of non-white and low-income
groups. The deficit ensuing in the Marginal Account then
causes a deficit in the Current Account or operating
balance.
Using the same data as both Gramlich and Ghazalah
(whose research designs and analyses are similar), I have
tested and reject the notion of Marginal Accounts by
explaining that Marginal Accounts have always displayed
deficit positions. Simple exploratory data analysis using x
versus y plots indicates no relationship between deficits in
Marginal and Current Accounts.9 By simulating the regression
models touted by Gramlich and Ghazalah, I was able to test
the significance of the individual independent variables
attempting to explain deficits in the Current Account. Sur-
prisingly, a model built by only two variables, Disposable
Income (DI) and Debt per capita (DEBT), was chosen as the
"best."10 The individual regressors, DI and DEBT, were
tested significant at the 95 percent level, and the over-
all R2 was .86.
9Appendix A.
10"Best" as chosen by the computer program as a com-
bination of R2 and C . Further explanation in Appendix A.
24
Traditional Fiscal Strain descriptors, percentage
low-income (LOINC) and percentage non-white (NONWH), added
nothing to improve the R2 of the original two-variable
model. As individual regressors, each was weak as each t
score dropped below a 75 percent level of significance.
Even the purportedly strong demographic variable South (STH),
as a representative of regional location, fared poorly.
Thus, the three variables seen on everyone's list of Fiscal
Strain indicators, LOINC, NONWH, and STH, were not signifi-
cant in building a predictive model. Doubt is cast on most
of the conventional wisdom.
Constructing and testing these econometric models
led me to believe that something was wrong with the Census
data used by Gramlich, Ghazalah, and me. A knowledge of
accounting gave me the insight to study the flows of the
budget, revenues, and expenses. Understanding the relation-
ship between the sources and uses of funds led me to hypoth-
esize that managers were not overspending as thought but
that revenues were not coming in as expected.
Because of the individualistic accounting practices
of cities, revenue and expense flows cannot really be
explained by econometric modeling. Accounting bases differ
across cities, thus, one city records a revenue as received
while another city may not do so until actual receipt. In
order to understand a deficit, a researcher should know
whether the money has been received, whether it is likely
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to be received, or whether it is a delinquency just remain-
ing in the budget to inflate assets. The amount of informa-
tion needed to portray a city accurately in econometric
modeling is overwhelming.
Only one other source in the literature supported
this theory, a theory that may have nothing to do with the
number of poor or black in the city. Hooper examines eleven
sources of revenue as to their proportional variability of
the total municipal revenue, The property tax was sig-
nificantly related to overall revenue variability while
other forms of tax had no significant association to overall
revenue variability.
The relationship between overall revenue variability
and federal transfers was found to be statistically signifi-
cant. Hooper postulates that federal transfers seem to
increase the revenue variability of the municipalities, both
by their dependence upon it and by its variable nature.
Hooper also finds the variability of state transfers as a
proportion of overall revenue to be almost twice as high in
the largest cities as compared to the smallest cities. For
municipal services such as airports, schools, hospitals,
parking facilities, and sewer and water charges, the data
indicated no significant relationship to overall revenue
11Frederic A. Hooper, Jr., "Revenue Variability and
Municipal Debt," DBA dissertation, Harvard Graduate School
of Business Administration, 1979.
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variability. The fact that schools are included in this
list provokes a new look at the traditional causes of Fis-
cal Strain.
By using a dataset of over 2,500 municipalities,
Hooper was able to test both size and location as associated
with revenue variability. He concluded that revenue vari-
ability differs greatly both with size of the municipality
and with the state in which the municipality is located.
He further found that the more variable municipalities were
not such because they had chosen poorly among revenue
sources but because their revenue sources were more vari-
able. Hooper suggested that either the tax structure or the
environment (forces outside this dataset) of the more vari-
able municipalities are the cause of their high variability
rather than any actions of the municipality's management.
My course of study and research continues this argu-
ment that revenue variability is significantly associated to
Fiscal Strain. I look in detail at the three sources of
revenue--Tax, Transfer, and Debt--not only to chart vari-
ability over the years but to discover how deficits begin,
how they are covered up, and how they are paid. The hypoth-
esis at the base of this is that large operating deficits
are due to revenue deficits.
PREFACE TO CASE STUDIES
Theoretical Framework
This thesis attempts to create a new tool for budget
analysis by breaking the budget into components, which allows
the analyst to trace the flow of funds more effectively.
Revenue and expense balances are disaggregated into the
major sources and uses of current funds. Exhibit #2.0,
"Disaggregating Municipal Budget Deficits," illustrates this
process and serves as a framework for analysis.
On the Expense side, a deficit means that a manager
has spent more than was budgeted, either because of sloppy
administration or because programs could not be implemented
successfully at the cost levels estimated. Deficits can
appear in either the original appropriation or additional
appropriations. Theoretically, additional appropriations
can only be made if no deficits have occurred in the origi-
nal budget. Most people misconstrue Current Account defi-
cits as being Expense-related because it appears that the
manager has knowingly spent more that was available. What
often happens, however, is that the city's various sources
of Revenues fail to materialize when expected and not that
the manager spends more than was intended.
In Exhibit #2.0, three types of Revenue deficits can
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EXHIBIT #2.0
DISAGGREGATING MUNICIPAL BUDGET DEFICITS
REVENUES
Taxes
Property Taxes/Other Taxes
The mix of taxes varies across cities.
Inaccuracies in the stimation of delin-
quencies for each type of tax contrib-
utes to faulty reserves and a deficit
position.
Transfers
When expected intergovernmental trans-
fers are not received, but programs have
already been implemented, the city loses
what it spent to initiate programs.
Debt
A city can issue Bond Anticipation Notes
if it is waiting for interest rates in the
capital market to drop. When rates do not
drop, the city must either pay the higher
bond rate or continue to hold out in the
high-priced money market.
If estimate > actual, then deficit
If estimate < actual, then surplus
EXPENSES
Appropriations
If managers spend more than
expected as itemized in the
original appropriation budget,
a deficit occurs.
Any additional appropriations
authorized after the start of
the new fiscal year that are not
backed by additional revenues
will cause a deficit.
If estimate < actual, then deficit
If estimate > actual, then surplus
1O
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arise when the sources of Revenue are over-estimated. The
first potential Revenue deficit in Exhibit #2.0 is Taxes.
Because the Tax component is the single largest source of
Revenue for most cities, it is of the greatest concern.
Fiscal Strain analysis is complicated by the fact that the
mix of local taxes used to raise operating Revenues varies
across cities. Whatever the mix, a city is responsible for
accurately'forecasting and reserving for delinquencies in
each category.
When reserves are underestimated, city accountants
sometimes inflate the Taxes Receivable estimates to convince
bankers to lend them money for short periods. They claim
that Revenue shortfalls are the result of seasonal fluctua-
tions. However, if the Revenue shortfall is not erased by
additional income, the short-term notes, Tax Anticipation
Notes (TANs), are "rolled over" and accumulate annually.
Thus, programs on the Expense side are not running deficits;
rather, Revenues are not being received at the expected rate
or level. Under these circumstances, shortfalls should be
labeled Tax deficits, not Expense deficits.
The Transfer component measures the difference
between the monies that state and federal agencies were
expected to share with the city and those that were actually
rece-ived. Municipalities may begin programs upon the incor-
rect assumption that funds will arrive later in the Fiscal
Year. If funds are not appropriated, a city must pay for
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the program with its own funds. A deficit arises immedi-
ately whether or not the program is cancelled. The city
may have funded the program with Revenue Anticipation Notes
(RANs), loans issued by banks for this specific type of cash
shortage. The banks risked their funds on the city's assur-
ance that Revenues from other governmental units would
arrive.
Cities also issue tax-free securities, either Gen-
eral Obligation (GO) Bonds or Revenue Bonds. The latter are
used for capital expenditures such as highway or hospital
construction. Bond Revenues are used to pay off the debt.
GO bonds are paid back through general tax Revenues rather
than through specific fees or income generated by projects
themselves. The cost of GO and Revenue bonds is directly
related to interest rates in the bond market.
If interest rates are high, a city may have to take
out Bond Anticipation Notes (BANs) while waiting for the
interest rates to drop. The higher price cities pay for
short-term BANs may be worth it over the long run if inter-
ests rates drop. Problems occur, however, when a city
begins construction on a project and the market does not
drop. The higher-priced rate can cause the deficit, the
of which depends on how much higher the cost of the debt is
thanr was originally estimated.
If the city decides not to issue the debt because
the interest rates are too high, the city has lost a major
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portion of its budget. This poses problems because the
total of the three Revenue components--Tax, Transfer, and
Debt--was set to match the Expenses component at the begin-
ning of the Fiscal Year. Even if only one of the Revenue
components drops its position, the entire budget is affected
causing an imbalance between Revenues and Expenses. Simi-
larly, if the Expense component rises over its estimate,
the budget falters.
This framework of analysis attempts to demonstrate
how the operating deficit was created structurally--which
side and which account. It hopefully will put to rest two
issues in the study of Fiscal Strain: Cl) the simplistic
explanation that Expenses exceeded Revenues because managers
were spending more than was budgeted and (2) the political
explanation that minorities and low-income populations are
necessarily correlated with large operating deficits. These
issues will now be tested through application of the frame-
work to the following case studies of Detroit and Boston.
CHAPTER 2
CASE STUDY: DETROIT, MICHIGAN
The following analysis of Detroit's financial state-
ments does not provide a view as flattering as Detroit had
intended in those statements. All information for this
analysis is taken from published exhibits describing
Detroit's financial solvency.1  This information was recon-
ciled to provide an analysis of the overall Current Account
and its four subsidiary accounts. Detroit's major problem
is an overwhelming and accumulating deficit in the Transfer
component on the Revenue side of the Balance Sheet. The
extent of this deficit provokes the following question to
keep in mind while assessing Detroit's solvency: How does
the city pay for the tremendous projected Revenue deficit?
The "Analysis of Changes in Fund Balance," Exhibit
#2.1, reports a balance of ($36,884,556) at year-end June
30, 1976. The deficit seems to arise from expenditures
being greater than receipts, but Detroit does not provide a
picture in this one exhibit of what exactly costs more than
1 Data collection for Detroit was relatively straight-
forward. The Annual Financial Reports were easily obtained
for -the years 1970-1977 from the Municipal Finance Library
in Detroit. It is unfortunate that my research was rushed
by a time deadline imposed by the city. The library was
being closed due to a lack of funds, perhaps an omen of
what was to come.
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EXHIBIT #2.1
CITY OF DETROIT--GENERAL FUND, ANALYSIS OF CHANGES IN FUND BALANCE
Years Ended June 30, 1976 and June 30, 1975
Year Ended Year E
June 30, 1976 June 30
BUDGETARY SURPLUS (DEFICIT)
Balance at Beginning of Year ...............
Additions (deductions):
Total Revenue (Exhibit A-3). .. ............
Less Capital Revenue ... ..... . ........
Total Expenditures (Exhibit A-5) ............
Less Capital Expenditures ...............
(Increase) Decrease in Net Balances Forward.......
Balance at End of Yea. ..................
APPROPRIATED SURPLUS (Excluding Capital)
Balance at Beginning of Year ...............
Transfers to Hospital Fund ...... . ........
Increase (Decreaid)i~i Net Balances Forward......
Balance at End of Year.... . . . . . . . . .......
RESERVE FOR OTHER ASSETS
Balance at Beginning of Year.. o...... ... .
Increase (Decrease) in Other Assets . . . . . .. .....
Balance at End of Year ...................
Total Fund Balance (Excluding capital). . . . ......
$524,263,088~
21,208,290
546,980,996
23,216,431
$ (16,352,461)
503,054,798
(523,764,565)
(20,709,767)
177,672
(36,884,556)
24,239,366
(1,749,586)
(177,672)
22,312,108
43,380,827
(1,208,872)
42,171,955
$ 27,599,507
$527,356,741
29,792,077
562,987,3495
38,554,589
APPROPRIATED SURPLUS (Capital)
Balance at Beginning of Year. ................
Additions (deductions):
Revenue. ............................
Expenditures (Exhibit A-7). .. . .......
Transfers-to Street Fund ................
Transfers to Hospital Fund ................
Balance at End of Year ...................
$ 66,438,611
21208,290
(23,216,431)
(857,450)
(150,000)
$ 63,423,020
S 14,445,76s
497,564,664-
(524,432,760)
(26,868,096)
(3,930,133)
(16,352,461)
20,309,233
3,930,133
24,239,36C
40,669,180
2,711,647
43,380,827
$ 51,267,732
$ 75,201,123
29,792,071
(38,554,S19)
$ 66,438,611
The accompanying notes are an integral part of the financial statements.
33
Ade4
1975
34
expected. Some cities are more explicit than others in this
regard. The question is thus if the alleged $36,884,556
deficit was really caused by overspending as is suggested
from this one statement.
Expenses
The "Statement of Appropriations and Expenditures,"
Exhibit #2.2, shows the managers to be $134,032,494 under
their budget of $681,013,490. Table #2.1 calculates
expenses from 1970 to 1978. Mr. John Davis, Chief Account-
ing Officer, City of Detroit, asserts that the non-reserving
for contingent liabilities is one of Detroit's major finan-
cial problems.2 Until recently, these liabilities were not
reserved for in any way, but they are mentioned in the foot-
notes to the General Fund.3 For example, $803.6 million are
claimed by citizens for improper police behavior. Lawsuits
against the Department of Transportation, the Water Board,
the Sewage Disposal System, the Department of Housing, the
Detroit General Hospital, and the Community and Economic
Development Department contribute to the staggering grand
total of $1,184.5 billion contingent liabilities for the
General Fund. The remaining $5.9 million are claimed
2Interview with John L. Davis, Chief Accounting
Officer, Detroit, Michigan, 20 June 1979.
3City of Detroit, Michigan, Annual Financial Report:
Fiscal Year Ending 30 June 1976; notes to General Fund,
Note H.
CITY
STATEMENT OF
EXHIBIT #2.2
OF DETROIT--GENERAL FUND
APPROPRIATIONS AND EXPENDITURES
Years Ended June 30,
Department or Activity
Fxecutive Agencies:
Arts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . .
Budget . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
buDdings and Safety Engineering. ...........
City Engineering . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Civic Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Community and Economic Development .......
Cosumer Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Council of the Arts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Data Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Environmental Protection and Maintenance . . . . .
Fiance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fire . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Health. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Historical ............................
Hospital (Note A)......................
Human Rights .......................
Law ..............................
Mayor's Office .........................
Parking Enforcement ..................
Personnel ............................
Planning .-..........................
Police ...............................
Public Information .... . ..............
Public Lighting . .......................
Recreation ...........................
Senior Citizens. .......................
Transportation - Planning and Traffic
Engineering Division ................
Youth. ...........................
Zoological Park ........................
Total Executive Agencies ..........
Legislative Agencies:
Auditor General ........................
City Clerk. ..........................
City Council ..........................
City Planning Commission ................
Election Commission ..................
Ombudsman ..........................
Zoning Appeals Board. ..................
Total Legislative Agencies ..........
Judicial Agencies:
Recorder's Court - Criminal .............
Recorder's Court - Jury . .. .........
Recorder's Court - Psychiatric .............
Recorder's Court - Traffic and Ordinance ......
Total Judicial Agencies ...........
Non-Dcpartmcntal. ......................
Total ........................
1976 and June
Wrvised
Appropriations
3 3,346,801
894,281
7,384,781
5,275,706
23,354,478
12,194,343
55,A66
6,536,567
50,369
5,677,843
699,745
11,936,194
60,348,293
48,234,658
2,386,725
640,767
2,813,102
4,498,011
1A71,127
4,627,059
3,166,024
175,288,053
1,196,663
62,823,187
39,191,939
427,931
3,662,522
1,175,744
4,079,933
580,138,512
1,275,954
647,116
1,064,201
308,799
1,642,512
367,736
290,064
5,596,382
5,210,443
93,034
639,405
7,009,110
12,951,992
82,326,604
568 1,013,490'
Actual
ERpenditures
pzaniit A-6)
S 2,22,725
938,382
7,500,847
5,139,319
9,591,068
6,656,697
536,282
4,152,785
39,421
5,272,473
72,593,812
11,316,024
9,363,741
34,252,159
1,196,917
637,105
2,915,074
3,435,654
639,874
4,314,015
1,574,180
174,421,747
1,083,719
35,986,093
29,713,231
-275,333
3,058,576
976,506
3,606,180
485,609,939
1,232,610
620,304
1,041,937
164,395
1,322,810
349,996
306,042
5,038,094
5,352,476
94,905
630,478
6.441,644
12,519,503
43,813,460
5546.980,996
30, 1975
Aetuat
Over
(Under)
0 P24.076)
44,101
116,066
(136,387)
(13.763,410)
CS,S37.646)
(19,384)
083.782)
(10,948)
(405.370)
(14,105,933)
(620,170)
(984,552)
(13,982,499)
(1,189.808)
(3,62)
101,972
(1,062,357)
(1,031,253)
(313,044)
(1,S91,844)
(866,306)
(112,944)
(26,837,094)
(9,478,703)
(152.59S)
(603.946)
199,238)
(473,753)
(94,528,573)
(43,344)
(26,812)
(22,264)
(144,404)
(319,702)
(17,740)
15,978
(558,2SS)
142.033
1,871
(8,927)
(567,466)
A32,489
(38,513,144)
S(134,032,494)
The accompanying notes are an integral part of the fnancialstatencnts.
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Prior
Year
S 2,165,468
962,125
7,56,930
S,167,021
S,557,374
-6,947,492
566,315
6,524.012
15,117
5,189,687
73,241,031
11,599,974
57,498,015
26,430,698
1,126,765
39,249.055
676,126
- 3,222,98S
2,436,036
1,075,395
3,808,451
3,057,772
160,429,147
1,207,407
45,564,540
25,662,346
174.404
2,889,140
496,595
3,576,915
502,174,341
1,131,672
486,184
1,054,169
84,683
3,918,812
234,602
277,700
5,187,822
2,714,293
87,208
585,576
6.327,995
9,715,062
45,910,124
S562,987,349
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TABLE #2.1
EXPENSE DEFICIT WORKSHEET 1970-1978
(Dollars in Millions)
Year EstimaExpensesActual Surplus/(Deficit)
1970 380.5 384.8 (4.3)
1971 536.7 440.7 96.0
1972 545.2 447.6 97.6
1973 625.5 496.1 129.4
1974 666.5 533.7 132.8
1975 691.5 563.0 128.5
1976 681.0 547.0 134.0
1977 627.2 556.9 70.3
1978 740.6 682.2 58.4
Total 2 = 842.7 x = 93.6
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against other funds that, like the General Fund, are the
responsibility of the City of Detroit.
The city tries to belittle the enormity of this
liability by explaining:
The outcome of the above-mentioned lawsuits and
various other lawsuits and claims against the City
cannot presently be determined, and, accordingly, no
provision for amounts, if any, arising from settlement
thereof has been made in these financial statements.
It has been the City's experience that the amounts of
any judgments of settlements are substantially less
than the amount of the lawsuits filed.4
The city, however, does not provide an accounting
for the amounts for which it is judged liable. Simple
arithmetic shows that, if only one percent is judged pay-
able, a $11.8 million bill will be placed on the General
Fund. Five and ten percent projections are, respectively,
$59.2 and $118.3 million. These numbers are large enough
to bear upon the General Fund with the same importance as
any one disaggregated deficit discussed in the Revenue sec-
tion. If a conservative one percent figure is used to esti-
mate the write-off, another category should be added to the
framework under Expenses. Table #2.2 displays the impact
of contingent liabilities on the General Fund deficit.
A more recent communication from Mr. Davis changed
the picture for the future somewhat:
The City of Detroit budgets annually into a General
4City of Detroit, Michigan, Annual Financial Report:
Fiscal Year Ending 30 June 1976 [hereafter cited as AFR
Fiscal 1976]; notes to General Fund, Note H.
TABLE #2.2
CONTINGENT LIABILITIES 1976
(Dollars in Millions)
Fund Surplus/(Deficit) Total Contingent One Percent TotalLiability Reserve Deficit
General (38.2) 1,184.3 (11.8)4 (50.0)
Water 2  1.6 120.4 ( 1.2)5 0.4
Sewer 3  0.4 21.6 ( 0.2)6 0.2
Water and Sewer can take care of themselves.
Source: AFR Fiscal 1976.
1Exhibit #1, General Fund Deficit.
2Exhibit Q-3. Water has operating surplus of $1,634,588. Because this is a separate
fund, the surplus cannot be transferred to the General Fund. Losses, however, are
covered by the General Fund. If contingent liability is greater than surplus, the
General Fund is charged. If not, all funds remain in Water Fund.
3Exhibit P-3. Sewer Fund has operating surplus of $368,598. Because this is a
separate fund, the surplus is not transferred to the General Fund.
4General Fund, Note H.
5Water Fund, Note G.
6Sewer Fund, Note F.
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Fund Damage Claims Account. Since 1977-78, the City
has also maintained a Public Liability Self-Insurance
Fund. The first $100,000 of any one claim is charged
to the Damage Claims Account. Any amounts in excess
of $100,000 are charged to the Public Liability Fund.
Claims paid during the last four periods are as
follows:
1976-77 $1,951,959
1977-78 6,567,775
1978-79 6,353,957
1979-80 (8 months) 7,089,197
No correlation has been made between the contin-
gency and ultimate liability. However, during the
period mentioned, the percentage varied from 23/100
to 66/100 of one percent. 5
Even though Davis calculates the highest liability
to date as 66/100 of one percent, a one percent write-off
as illustrated in Table #2.2 is more conservative. Since
the percentage is growing over time, the one percent reserve
will, on average, be more accurate.
Additional expenses, which are not accounted for in
the General Fund, are the transactions of Water and Sewer
Funds. Although they are independent authorities, ultimate
liability lies with Detroit, that is, any deficit in these
two funds is to be covered by the General Fund. This, of
course, includes contingent liabilities. In Table #2.2, the
conservative one percent of total contingent liabilities is
used as a reserve for any adjudication against the city.
The Water and Sewer funds have manageable liabilities of
$1.2 million and $0.2 million because their respective sur-
pluses of $1.6 million and $0.4 million cover the projected
5John L. Davis, Letter to Joan K. Martin, 31 March
1980, Detroit, Michigan.
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expenses. The General Fund has such an enormous total con-
tingent liability that the projected reserve adds $11.8 mil-
lion to an already high Current Account deficit of $38.2
million rendering a total deficit of $50.0 million. Although
Water and Sewer have surpluses, they cannot be transferred
back to the General Fund. However, as the surpluses are so
low relative to the deficit, the reduction, if allowed,
would almost be meaningless.
Revenues
As a first step, the "Statement of Revenue--Esti-
mated and Actual," Exhibit #2.3, should be scanned for the
inclusion of long-term capital. Since we are analyzing the
Current Account, any revenues, other than current, obscure
the analysis. Long-term capital deposited in the Current
Account can easily cover up short-term losses. To illus-
trate, Exhibit #2.3 includes Sale of Bonds on the last line.
This adds $32,045,000 to the estimated revenues and
$16,485,000 to the actual receipts, a tidy sum if running
a deficit elsewhere.
Table #2.3, "General Fund Deficit," separates the
long-term capital from the total revenues to calculate the
Current Account balance. Because the large cutback of
$134,032,494 in expenses was not large enough to prevent a
deficit, it may be to Detroit's advantage to include Debt as
a line item in the General Fund. Tax and Transfer revenues
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EXHIBIT #2.3
CITY OF DETROIT--GENERAL FUND
STATEMENT OF REVENUE--ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL
Years Ended June 30,1976 & June 30, 1975
Csaadfication
Executive Agencies:
Arts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Building and Safety Engineering ............
City Engineering. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Civic Center ..........................
Community and Economic Development .......
Consumer Affairs ......................
Corrections .......................
Council of the Arts ...................
Data Processing ........................
Environmental Protection and Maintenance .....
Finance .............................
'Fire. .. ...........................
Heal'h. .............................
Historical ..........................
Hospital (Note A) ....................
Human Rights .........................
Law ............................
Manpowcr Office ....................
Mayor's Office ......................
Personnel .................. ........
Planning. ............................
Police ...........................
Public Information .....................
Public Lighting .......................
Recreation ...........................
Senior Citizens. ......................
Transportation - Planning and Traffic
Engineering Division ..................
Youth .............................
Zoological Park ........................
Total Executive Agencies ..........
Revised
Eutmased
Revenue
$ 1,033,765
55,945
6,086,564
4,208,377
4,504,404
9,512,267
22,706
5,794,081
161,210
33,562,942
-2,169,211
13,844,099
32,438,540
423,649
3,440
1,021,522
1,953,624
582,035
2,296,688
2,912,766
40,333,532
736,454
18,91,439
16,592,232
226,194
3,359,570
817,235
2,311,900
205,656,391
Legislative Agencies:
Auditor General ........................... 234,426
City Clerk. ................................ 9,000
City Council ...................... . ....- - - .
City Planning Commission .............. . 134,000
Election Commission ........................ 60,639
Zoning Appeals Board ...................... 39,000
Total Legislative Agencies ......... ..... 477,065
Judicial Agencies:
Recorder's Court - Criminal ............ . 208,779
Recorder's Court - Traffic and Ordinance ...... 10,079,123
Total Judicial Agencies ............ -. 10,287,902
Non-Departmental .......................... 360,385,322
SaO of Bonds .................... .... 32.045,000
Total Revenue ................ $608,851,680
Th accompanying notcs are an integral part of the financial statements.
Actual
Actual Over
Revenue (Under)
S 955,004 (78,761)'
119,812 63,867
5,597,492 (489,072)
2,836,073 (1,372,304)
3,951,983 (552,421)
5,730,498 (3,781,769)
73,763 51,57
5,550,357 (243,724)
2,128 2,128
388,676 -227,466
24,456,620 (9,106,322)
1,852,553 (316,658)
12,350,822 (1,493,277)
22.298,070 (10,140,470)
356,953 (66,696)
103,347 99,907
248,880 (772,642)
188,447 (1,765,177)
531,336 (50,699)
1,935,569 (361,119)
1,054,972 (1,857,794)
36,702,804 (3,630,728)
494,016 (242,438)
15,512,728 (3,178,711)
17,138,300 546,068
119,155 (107,039)
3,3?6,673 (32,897)
764,355, (52,880)
2,205,350 (106,550)
166,846,736 (38,809,655)
175,600
9,695
13,88]
98,054
48,031
345,261
45,9S9
6,878,10S
6,924,097
333,661.994
16,485,000
5524,263,OSS
(58,826)
695
13,881
(134,000)
37,415
9,031
(131,804)
(162,790)
(3,201,015)
(3,363,805)
(26,723,328)
(15,560,000)
S(84,SSS,592)
-I
Actua
Tear
3 320,353
260
4A31,724
3,130,536
2.608,508
5,072.943
14,921
5,732,178
181.007
24693,399
928,524
10,549,753
12,474,7.
78,142
24084,396
809,449
: 88,992
287,007
556,464
288,531
31,725,330
533,909
17,761,543
6,453.400
. . . ... ....
3055,130
4,054,555
1,922,660
162,038.466
18,092
-8,653
252
(62,228)
(18,570)
34,330
(19,471)
175,441
7,024,558
7,199,999
331,407,747
26,730.000
$527,356,141
TABLE #2.3
GENERAL FUND DEFICIT, 1976
Estimate $ Actual $ Estimate-Actual $
Total Deficit
Revenue 608,851,680 524,263,088 84,588,592
Expense 681,013,490 546,980,996 134,032,494
Deficit (72,161,810) (22,717,908) (49,443,902)
General Fund Deficit or Operating Deficit
Total Revenue 608,851,680 524,263,088
Sale of Bonds 32,045,000 16,485,000 15,560,000
Net Revenue 576,806,680 507,778,088 69,028,592
Expense 681,013,490 546,980,996 134,032,494
Deficit (104,206,810) (39,202,908) (65,003,902)
Source: City of Detroit, Michigan, Annual Financial Report, 30 June 1976, General
Fund Statement.
_V_
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also contributed to the deficit as they neither increased
nor remained as forecast but fell $84,588,592.
This suggests that revenue variability may exist on
such a large scale that managers are unable to forecast cor-
rectly at the start of the fiscal year.6 This puts managers
in the impossible position of being behind before even start-
ing. In Fiscal Year 1976, if revenues were only $22,717,907
higher, a break-even position could have been achieved. To
place this in perspective, $22,717,907 are only 3 percent of
the original revenue estimate. If these 3 percent were
received and expenditures were cut as evidenced, no deficit
would have occurred. If only 3 percent can make the differ-
ence, the need for precision, let alone better forecasting,
is demonstrated.
The Statement of Revenue also allows a calculation
between the expected and actual Debt as discussed above in
connection with Sale of Bonds. Detroit netted $15,560,000
less than expected.
Property Tax
Exhibit #2.4, "Tax Levies and Tax Collections by
Levies," aids in discerning the pattern of delinquencies.
Under "Collections to June 30, 1976," it appears that a high
percentage of collected taxes to tax levy is evidenced.
6Frederic A. Hooper, Jr., "Revenue Variability and
Municipal Debt" (DBA dissertation, Harvard Graduate School
of Business Administration, 1979).
EXHIBIT #2.4
TAX LEVIES AND TAX COLLECTIONS BY LEVIES
1967 to 1976
Tax Levy
$105,126,391
115,249,079
118,561,598
125,307,310
143,796,052
152,052,921
156,028,368
175,123,408
158,856,729
165,135,739
Additions
to Tax
Levy (net)
$ 165,198
276,544
1,114,911
795,347
1,907,966....
864,612
673,879
712,215
363,831
258,854
Collections to June 30, 1976
Year
Ended
June 30
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
year
Ended
June 30
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
Ratio to
Tax Levy
98.74%
99.41
100.40
99.94
100.50
99.38
99.00
98.30
97.26
95.48
Less
Cancellations
and
Adjustments
$1,457,978
902,841
480,552
609,140
636,265
869,345
766,362
669,931
270,193
149,731
Net Taxes
Receivable
$103,833,611
114,622,782
119,195,957
125,493,517
145,067,753
152,048,188
155,935,88S
175,165,692
158,950,367
165,244,862
Uncollected Balances at June 30, 1976
Ratio to
Amount Tax Levy
$ 32,773
57,107
158,358
264,202
554,817
932,789
1,468,311
3,020,507
4,448,734
7,570,164
.03%
.05
.13
.21
.39
.61
.94
1.72
2.80
4.58
Amount
$103,800,838
114,565,675
119,037,599
125,229,315
144,512,936
151,115,399
154,467,574
172,145,185
154,501,633
157,674,698
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After a two-year lag, e.g., in 1974, 98.3 percent have been
collected. After three years, at most one percent is not
collected. In order to assure good accounting and forecast-
ing techniques, a one percent delinquency factor can be
applied to the levy to obtain the tax deficit for 1976. The
city states that this has been reserved for. If this were
true, the one percent residual after the lag would not
appear. On the other hand, one percent is so small, it is
incomparable to the abatement problem evidenced in Boston.
A conservative accounting approach might be a one percent
reserve for delinquencies. The reserve for 1976 thus
becomes $1,652,448. This reserve becomes even more impor-
tant when the economy is poor. Detroit has been hit the
hardest by the current recession.
The city creates a first-year reserve of 6.77 per-
cent, based on historical trends. After the first year, the
taxes come in as discussed. Abatement or cancellations of
taxes pose another threat to tax collection. But Detroit
seems not to be plagued by this problem. In a communication
from Mr. Davis, this is confirmed. 7 Cancellation of taxes
is reserved for in the 6.77 percent charge.
"General Fund--Statements of Revenue," Exhibit #2.5,
determines taxes as $251,824,090 and lists more types than
just- the Property Tax. Municipal Income Tax, Utility Users
7John L. Davis, Chief Accounting Officer, Letter to
Joan K. Martin, 15 February 1980, Detroit, Michigan.
EXHIBIT #2.5
CITY OF DETROIT--GENERAL FUND
STATEMENTS OF REVENUE
Years Ended June 30, 1976 and June 30,
ClasfiatIon
Taxes, Assessments, Interest, and Penalties:
PuMnt Year Property Tax. ............................
Year Property Tax ............................
cial Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......
unicipal Income Tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Utility Users Tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Other Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Interest and Penalties on Taxes ...........................
Total Taxes, Assessments, Interest, and Penalties .............
Licenses, Permits, and Inspection Charges:
Business Licenses ...........................
Safety Inspection Charges .............................
Construction Inspection Charges .........................
Other .......................................
Total Licenses, Permits, and Inspection Charges .............
Fines and Forfeits:
Ordinance Fines - Traffic Court .........................
Other .......................................
Total Fines and Forfeits ...........................
Revenue From Use of Assets:
Earnings on Investments ..........................
Real Estate Rentals .............. ................
Concessions ...................................
Urban Renewal Revenue . ... ..........................
Other .......................................
Total Revenue From Use of Assets ....................
Grts and Shared Taxes:State Income Tax ....................................
State lntangibles Tax ..............................
Liquor and Beerticenses. .............................
State Sales Tax.................................
Federal Revenue Sharing............................ .
Grants - Health ....................
Special Revenue Funds Reimbursements for Personnel Expenses .....
Other Grants .......................................
Total Grants and Shared Taxes .........................
Sales and Charges for Services:
Detroit General Hospital Revenues (Note A). .................
Other Hospitals and Clinics .......................
Prisoner Care ................................
Maintenance and Construction. . . ...................
Other Labor and Materials ........ ....... . ..........
Electrical .....................................
Water and Steam. ...................................
Sanitation Charges. ................................ ..
Recreation Fees ...................................
Street Funds Reimbursement ......................
Other Departmental Sales and Charges for Current Services ........
Total Sales and Charges for Services .....................
Sales of Property, Other Assets, and Compensation for Losses:
Recoveries ....................................
Other .......................................
Recovery of City Equity - Sewage Disposal System .............
Total Sales of Property, Other Assets, and
Compensation for Losses .........................
Contributions and Transfers:
Debt Service Payments - Transportation Fund (Note C) .........
Debt Scrvice Payments - Water Fund (Note C) ...............
Grant Contribution - Cash ..........................
Other ................................... ........
Total Contributions and Transfers. .....................
Miscellaneous:
Sale of Bonds. .......................................
Other ............................................
Total Miscellaneous .............................
Total Revenue .....................................
The accompanying notes are an integral part of the financial statements.
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1976 1976
$111,798,569 S109,070,374
4063,825 4153.438
123,939 126.385
109,021,084 102,659,923
34.805,085 21,789.636
409,841 233.767
1.601,747 914,597
251.824,090 23 9 .448,120
788,677 127,948
4,974,599 4,532,7771,497,823 1.77,338
645,075 569,980
7,906,174 7,07.943
(Decrease)
S 2.728.195
(589,613)(2,446)
6,361,161
3015,449
176,074
687,150
12,375,970
(39,271)
441,822(179,515)
75,195
298,231
6,717,752 6,967,319 (249,567)
129,719 72,555 57,164
6,847,471 2.039,874 (192,403)
7,737,016.
2,468.578
-900,417
4,033,123
179,811
15,318,940
24,366,061
17.681,860
967,727
25,424,208
39,501,532
14,796,787
35,642,585
8,327,706
166,708,466
1,154,695S
5,526,255
3,989,948
843,837
11,649,009
978,654
905,931
1,743,797
12,967,901
15,284,657
55,044,684
793,456
1,043,321
1,836,777
441,190
1,071,325
157,988
176,390
1,846,893
16,485,000
444,593
16,929,593
5524,263,OSS
-11,150,604
2.642,499
114,499
4.087,483
82,526
18,777,611
24,791,722
10,811,957
992,750
23,698,591
43,083,459
6,791,852
13,205,719
13,215,198
136,591,248
23,866,371
3,127,617
5,165,591
5,849,849
1,468,947
34,245,056801,139
1,125,784
3,881,244
14,911,794
33,576,185
84,019,577
1,359,863
938,880
2,540,698
4,839,441
821,970
1,053,395
55,043
1,930,40S
26,730.000
372,519
27,102,519
$527,356,741
(3,413,588)(173,921)
85,913(54,360)
97,285
(3,458,671)
(425.661)
6,869.903(25,023)
1,725,617(3,581,927)
8,004,935
22,436,866(4,887,492)
30,117,218
(23,866,371)
27,078
360,664(1,859,901)(625,110)(2,596,047)
177,515(219,853)(137,447)(1,943,893)
1,708,472
(28.974,893)
(566,407)
104,441(2,540,698)
(3.002,664)
(380,780)
17,930
102,945
176,390
(83,515)
(10,245,000)
72,074
(10.172,926)
S (3,093,653)
46
1975
47
Tax, Other Taxes, and Interest and Penalties on Taxes have
a combined total of $135,836,000. I label these "Other
Taxes" and assume that this was an estimate since no other
data are evident to evaluate the surplus/deficit position.
Transfers
The "Statement of Revenue--Estimated and Actual,"
Exhibit #2.3, does not provide a direct reference for Trans-
fers. By manipulating data, the Debt deficit was calculated
from the above exhibit, and the Tax deficit was calculated
from "Tax Levies and Tax Collections by Levies," Exhibit
#2.4. The Statement of Revenue provides a total revenue
deficit. Since we have two of the three revenue components
and the total, a plug for the Transfer deficit can be cal-
culated.
Total $84,588,592
-Tax 1,652,448
-Debt 15,560,000
Transfer $67,376,144
The Transfer deficit of $67,376,144 is 11 percent of
the total revenues expected and 80 percent of the total def-
icit. The bearing of Transfers on the Current Account defi-
cit is overwhelming. Whoever is at fault is less of an
issue than Detroit's dependence on funds not generated
within its political, geographical, and economic domain.
-f Table #2.4, "Revenue Deficit Worksheet, 1970-1978,"
displays the calculations necessary to achieve the three
disaggregated Revenue deficits. The nine-year time span
TABLE #2.4
REVENUE DEFICIT WORKSHEET, 1970-1978
(Dollars in Millions)
.9 4
Revenue Source Estimate Actual Sur(Def) Estimate Actual Sur(Def) Estimate Actual Sur(Def)
1970 1971 1972
TAXES
Property 125.3 118.1 ( 7.2) 145.6 136.6 ( 9. ) 152.8 150.9 ( 5.8)
City Income 92.8 93.3 0.5 96.1 88.2 ( 7.9) 96.1 94.5 ( 1.6)
Utility 17.5 10.7 ( 6.8) 17.5 16.7 ( 0.8)
Unallocated 51.6 38.2 (13.4) 51.4 45.7 ( 5.7) 75.0 61.8 (13.2)
Total Tax2 269.7 249.6 (20.1) 310.6 290.2 (29.4) 341.4 320.0 (21.4)
TRANSFERS 148.1 114.7 (33.4) 163.6 143.2 (20.4) 120.3 107.1 (13.2)
Total Current Account 417.8 364.3 (53.5) 474.2 433.4 (49.8) 461.7 427.1 (34.6)
BOND SALES 27.1 15.7 (11.4) 46.9 29.6 (17.3) 38.4 28.0 (10.4)
TOTAL REVENUE 444.9 380.0 (64.9) 521.1 463.0 (67.1) 500.1 455.1 (45.0)
1973 1974 1975
TAXES
Property 156.4 150.9 ( 5.5) 175.8 167.6 ( 8.2) 159.2 151.8 ( 7.4)
Railroad 18.7 18.7 0.0
City Income 93.6 104.5 10.9 106.5 108.5 2.0 116.8 102.7 (14.1)
Utility 17.1 17.8 0.7 18.6 18.9 0.3 19.7 21.8 2.1
Unallocated 68.1 66.6 ( 1.5) 79.1 79.0 ( 0.1) 105.0 90.3 (14.7)
Total Tax2 335.2 339.8 4.6 398.7 392.7 ( 6.0) 400.7 366.6 (34.1)
TRANSFERS 211.4 179.5 (31.9) 194.3 171.5 (22.8) 199.6 171.2 (28.4)
Total Current Account 546.6 519.3 (27.3) 593.0 564.2 (28.8) 600.3 537.8 (62.5)
BOND SALES 40.0 36.5 ( 3.5) 34.5 33.4 ( 1.1) 29.8 26.7 ( 3.1)
TOTAL REVENUE 586.6 555.8 (30.8) 627.5 597.6 (29.9) 630.1 564.5 (65.6)
1Property tax is calculated by netting foreclosures from current property tax received.
2Transfer is a plug. Total shared revenue less Unallocated revenue = Transfers.
-P.
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TABLE #2.4
Revenue Soutrce Estimate Actual Sur(Def) Estimate Actual Sur(Def) Estimate Actual Sur(Def)
1976:5 1977 1978
TAXES 4
Property 156.9 170.1 159.9 (10.2) 112.8 112.8 0.0
City Income 109.0 114.3 124.0 9.7 132.1 132.8 0.7
Utility 25.2 29.8 30.4 0.6 32.8 32.5 ( 0.3)
Unallocated 96.8 88.4 ( 8.4) 102.9 96.3 ( 6.6)
Total Tax2 292.8 291.1 ( 1.7) 411.0 402.7 ( 8.3) 380.6 374.4 ( 6.2)
TRANSFERS 284.1 216.7 (67.4) 268.4 240.7 (27.7) 317.2 279.4 (37.8)
Total Current Account 576.9 507.8 (69.1) 679.4 643.4 (36.0) 697.8 653.8 (44.0)
BOND SALES- 32.0 16.5 (15.5) 135.6 49.2 (86.4) NA NA NA
TOTAL REVENUE 608.9 524.3 (84.6) 815.0 692.6 (122.4) 697.8 653.8 (44.0)
3The format of the audit changed in 1976 including actual revenues but deleting estimated revenues.
The property tax and bond figures are calculated other data. See Revenue section.
4The format in 1978 changes to include more detail in the tax structure. The new items--special
assessments, other taxes, and interest and penalties--are combined with the property tax item
here in order to maintain consistency in this.
Source: City of Detroit, Michigan, Annual Financial Reports, 1970-1978.
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provides an excellent comparison between Fiscal Year 1976
and the remaining eight years. Table #2.5, "Summary of Rev-
enue Deficits, 1970-1978," excises the deficits from Table
#2.4 and compares the nine years through descriptive statis-
tics.
How representative is Fiscal Year (FY) 1976 of
Detroit's fiscal history? Over the nine years, the Transfer
component averages 51 percent of the total Revenue deficit.
Although the FY 1976 statistic, $67.4 million, is 24 percent
higher than the average Transfer deficit of $31.4 million,
it accurately reflects the relative position of the Transfer
deficit to the other two revenue components, that is, Trans-
fer is the overwhelming deficit. Statistics created for the
time series in Table #2.4 and the graph of these statistics
in Figure #2.1 confirm the supposition that Detroit's major
problem lies in the dependence on aid from state and federal
levels. To the extent that these funds are not received but
intended programs are still implemented, Detroit runs a very
high transfer and ensuing revenue deficit.
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the relationship between the
Transfer deficit and the total Revenue deficit. The total
Revenue deficit follows the increase or decrease in the
Transfer component. In FY 1976, when the Transfer deficit
was .t its highest, the total Revenue deficit increased
dramatically in the following year, FY 1977. The Debt defi-
cit is now disproportionately high because the desire to
TABLE #2.5
SUMMARY OF REVENUE DEFICITS, 1970-1978
(Dollars in Millions).4,
Revenue 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 Total Mean
Tax 20.1 29.4 21.4 +4.6* 6.0 34.1 1.7 8.3 6.2 122.6 13.6
Transfers 33.4 20.4 13.2 31.9 22.8 28.4 67.4 27.7 37.8 283.0 31.4
Total CACCT 53.5 49.8 34.6 27.3 28.8 62.5 69.1 36.0 44.0 405.6 45.1
Debt 11.4 17.3 10.4 3.5 1.1 3.1 15.5 86.4 - 148.7 16.5
TotD fiRve TRD) 64.9 67.1 45.0 30.8 29.9 65.6 84.6 122.4 44.0 554.3 61.6
Components as Proportion of TRD in Percentages
Tax/TRD 31 43 47 12 20 52 2 6 13.6
Transfer/TRD 52 31 31 78 77 44 79 23 86.4
Debt/TRD 17 26 22 10 3 4 19 71 -
Total Tax 1970-1978 / TRD = 22%
Total Transfers 1970-1978 / TRD = 51%
Total Debt 1970-1978 / TRD = 27%
*) Surplus.
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FIGURE 2.1. Relationship Between Transfer and Revenue Deficits: Detroit.
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raise debt to cover the FY 1976 Transfer deficit is not met
with market approval. Thus, the total Revenue deficit is
relatively high. In FY 1977, the Transfer deficit was low-
ered to $27.7 million, close to the average of $31.4 mil-
lion. The dramatic increase in FY 1976 caused the other
components to respond in the following years in order to
pay for that increase.
The tax component appears to have a two-year cycle
as illustrated in Figure #2.1. Every two years, it changes
direction but remains in a $30 million band. The Debt com-
ponent appears even more steady within a $20 million band
except when it responds to the Transfer deficit as an
instrument to rectify the other deficits. Figure #2.1 thus
illustrates the behavior of the Total Revenue deficit to be
determined and responsive to the Transfer component.
Summary of Revenues and Expenses
Disaggregating the Current Account into the four
potential deficits allowed a view of the budget that is not
readily observed. Initially, Detroit looked as if it had
just flagrantly overspent. By disaggregating the flow of
funds, it became evident that the Expense side actually
recorded a surplus of funds--that is, managers cut their
budgets to record expenditures much lower than expected.
Disaggregating the total Revenue deficit exposes the major
problem of Transfers. State and federal governments did not
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send the intergovernmental transfers as scheduled. The
problem was worsened each year by Detroit's continued ina-
bility to forecast Revenues properly. Historical precedent
did nothing to aid in financial projection.
Table #2.6, "Summary of Revenue and Expense Defi-
cits, 1970-1978," gives the overall picture of the imbal-
anced Revenues and Expenses. In Fiscal Years 1973 to 1978,
large surpluses on the Expense side aided in the attempts to
balance the budget. A range of ($4.3) million to $134.0
million over these years shows only one year, 1970, where
the budget was overspent although not by much. The only
discrepancy on the Expense side is the lack of adequate
reserves for Contingent Liabilities. If any part of the
over $1 billion in litigation materializes, the payment is
charged to Expense, thus altering the surplus balance.
Although the historical rate is a small percentage, the
charge will still be in the millions.
The most interesting and puzzling statistics in the
Summary of Revenue and Expense Deficits are the average
Total Revenue deficit, $61.6 million, and the average
Expense surplus, $93.6 million. Regrettably, this does not
mean that, over the course of a decade, Revenues and
Expenses wash, leaving no deficit but a surplus. Simple
stat-istics of the net between receipts and expenditures show
the incongruity (Table #2.7, "Current Account Net, 1970-
1978"). All but three years, FYs 1973, 1974, and 1977, have
TABLE #2.6
SUMMARY OF EXPENSE AND REVENUE DEFICITS,
(Dollars in Millions),4
1970-1978
Source 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 Mean
EXPENSE ( 4.3) 96.0 97.6 129.4 132.8 128.5 134.0 70.3 58.4 93.6
REVENUE
Tax (20.1) (29.4) (21.4) 4.6 ( 6.0) (34.1) ( 1.7) ( 8.3) ( 6.2) (13.6)
Transfers (33.4) (20.4) (13.2 (31.9) (22.8) (28.4) (67.4) (27.7) (37.8) (31.4)
Total (53.5) (49.8) (34.6) (27.3) (28.8) (62.5) (69.1) (36.0) (44.0) (45.0)Revenue
Total Current
Revenue and (57.8) 46.2 63.0 102.1 104.0 66.0 64.9 34.3 14.4 48.7
Expense
Total urn (53.5) (49.8) (34.6) (27.3) (28.8) (62.5) (69.1) (36.0) (44.0) (45.0)
Debt Revenue (11.4) (17.3) (10.4) ( 3.5) ( 1.1) ( 3.1) (15.5) (86.4) - (16.5)
Total Revenue (64.9) (67.1) (45.0) (30.8) (29.9) (65.6) (84.6) (122.4) (44.0) (61.5)Deficit
U,
U,
, I
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TABLE #2.7
CURRENT ACCOUNT NET, 1970-1978
(Dollars in Millions)
Year Receipts Expenditures Surplus/(Deficit)
1970 364.3 384.8 (20.5)
1971 433.4 440.7 ( 7.3)
1972 427.1 447.6 (20.5)
1973 519.3 496.1 23.2
1974 564.2 533.7 30.5
1975 537.8 563.0 (25.2)
1976 507.8 547.0 (39.2)
1977 643.4 556.9 86.5
1978 653.8 682.2 (28.4)
deficits ranging from $7.3 million in 1971 to $39.2 million
in 1976.
How can Detroit display a deficit position in actual
dollars but show huge surpluses in a component analysis?
Deeper analysis reveals the start of the deficit even before
the fiscal year begins. Detroit does not even start with a
balanced budget; Revenues do not equal Expenses. Projected
Expenses before the start of the year are consistently
higher than projected Revenues. Thus, an expenditure sur-
plus of $132.8 million in FY 1974 may mean little, A sur-
plus of $156 million is necessary to bring it down to a
projected revenue statistic. The problem is that the Reve-
nue side now leaves the estimate figure and plunges to the
act-ueal. Thus, the very large expenditure surplus does not
take care of the entire Revenue deficit. Hence, the $93.6
million Expense surplus does not act as a wash. Individual
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Revenue and Expense surplus/deficits are relative to their
respective starting points--points that are unfortunately
not the same.
How Deficits Are Paid
The remaining deficit can be paid for by a number of
measures. Short-term debt in the forms of Tax Anticipation
Notes (TANs), Revenue Anticipation Notes (RANs), and Bond
Anticipation Notes (BANs) are easily detected by reading the
"General Fund Balance Sheets," Exhibit #2.6. In FY 1976,
Detroit increased its use of TANs from $23 million in FY
1975 to $40 million. This is an increasing liability under
the Liabilities and Fund Balance section. Total liabilities
for FY 1976 exceed $112 million. Any liability is a source
of income since it puts off payment to a future date, that
of the following fiscal year. This begins, or even contin-
ues, an accumulating deficit. This year's expenses are paid
for by next year's taxes. Any deficit, by all states' laws,
takes first claim on the following year's taxes even though
the provision for this is nowhere to be found in the budget.
Detroit relies heavily on all the line items under the Lia-
bilities section on the Balance Sheet to prolong payment and
stave off bankruptcy. Curiously, Detroit does not use TANs
as heavily as other cities or even RANs or BANs. Table #2.8,
"Short-Term Debt," summarizes this form of payment stalling.
RANs and BANs are not used at all. Thus, the heavy use of
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EXHIBIT #2'6
CITY OF DETROIT--GENERAL FUND BALANCE SHEETS
June 30, 1976 and June 30, 1975
ASSETS June s0. 1976 Jane 30.175S
Current Assets (excluding Capital Projects):
Cash (includes Certificates of Deposit) ............................ S 13,966.457 S 7,793,951
Temporary investments - at Cost and Accrued Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13,974,543 20,692,36
Total Cash and Temporary Investments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27,941,000 28146,837
Lass Equity of Other Funds in Cash and Temporary beestents. . . . . . . . . . . . . 14,056.071 12,829,501
Net Cash and Temporary Investments ...................... 13,884,929 15,657136
Temporary Loan to Transportation Fund (including Interest of $268,566 and$179,548. respectively) .................................. 268,566 6,779,548
Advance to Hospital Fund ...................................... 5,515,522 .........
Accounts Receivable:
Due from Other Governmental Agencies ................................ 20,278,987 22.596,090
Due from Other Funds .................................. 42,295,273 23,190,010
Withheld Income Taxes Receivable .................................... 11,500,000 9,119,485
Other (net of allowance for uncollectibles of $9,782,627) (Note A) ......... .. 4,172,945 ........
Total Accounts Receivable - Net ........................ . 78,247,205 54,975,515
Total Current Assets ......................................... 97,916,222 77,412,469
Other Assets (excluding Capital Projects):
General Taxes on Real and Personal Property (net of allowance for
uncollectibles of $3,67 1,762 and $3,171,200. respectively) .............. .14,502,284 12,683,470
Special Assessments (net of allowance for encollectibles of 51,134,921 and -
51,417,550, respectively) ................................ . 515,446 297,596
Interest on Taxes and Special Assessments ................................... 1,788,583 1,512,010
Income Tax Assessnents (net of allowance for uncollectibles of 52,000,000 and
$1.715,000, respectively) ....................................... .. 3,055,000 3.900,000
Other Accounts Receivable (net of allowance for uncollectibles of
$32,969,438) (Note A) ................................................. - -- -...... 2,273,231
Imprest Cash .................. ........................................... ....... -82,000
Workin: Capital Advances to Other Funds ......................... . 898,999 898,999
Land Contracts Receivable ............................... .... . 567,485 -U7,485
'Property Held for Sale - at Net Realizable Value .............................. 779,990 %0,165
Materials and Supplies - at Cost....................... .......... 12,400,484 13,770,619
Advance Rental Account with Detroit-Wayne Joint Building Authority (Note D). . . . 7,663,684 8,695,252
Total Other Assets - Net ......................... ..... 42.171,955 43,380,827
Total Assets (excluding Capital Projects) .................... . 140,088,177 120,793,296
Capital Projects Assets:
Cash (including Certificates of Deposit). .................................... 57,049,389 67,441,316
Temporary Investments - at Cost and Accrued Interest ......................... 9,175,826 653,565
Total Cash and Temporary Investments ............................ 66,225,215 68,094,881
Accounts Receivable:
Due from Other Governmental Agencies ....................... .. 2.060,361 1,604,017
Due from Other Funds ............................. ...... .. 112,197 90,439
Other ............................................. 1,318 .........-
Total Accounts Receivable ...................................... 2,173,876 1,694.456
Total Capital Projects Assets ................ ............ 68,399,091 69.789.337
Total Assets ....................................... ..... -208,487,268 5190,582.633
The accompanying notes are an integral part of the financial statements.
The amounts shown for June 30,1975, in some instances.have been reclassified to conform with classifications adopted in 1976.
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EXHIBIT #2,6
LIABILITIES AND FUND BALANCE
Liabilities and Fund Balance (excluding Capital Projects):
Liabilities:
Tax Anticipation Notes Payable .................................
Accounts and Contracts Payable. ..............................
Accrued Salaries and Wages ................................
Fringe Benefits Payable (Note E) .............................
Payroll Deductions Payable (Note E) ..............................
Due to Other Governmental Agencies ...........................
Due to Other Funds. .........................................
Due to Policemen and Firemen Retirement System ..................
Undistributed Tax Receipts ................................
Deposits from Vendors and Customers .............................
Taxes Collected in Advance ................................
Income Tax Refunds in Process. .................................
Condemnation Awards Payable (Note E). .........................
Matured Bonds and Interest Payable ...........................
Other Liabilities ...........................................
Total Liabilities ................................... ....
AiN 30.1976 Jam 0. 1975
$ 400000
- 01.296
10,102.452
3,47,136
6,926,299
3,323,491
15,131,375
16,92,078
36,496
1,205.754
1.611,784
5,196.264
53,288
2,521,957
112.481.670
$ 2300P.00
9,187,719
10088.603
2,45,339
4,586.,01
11,700,000
677,246
1,233,844
796,790
3,638,899
$00,996
817,633
951,694
69,525,564
Contingent Liatilitics (Note H)
Fund Balance (excluding Capital Projects) (Exhibit A-2). ..................
Total Liabilities and Fund Balance (excluding Capital Projects) ........
Capital Projects:
Liabilities:
Accounts and Contracts Payable. ...............................
Accrued Salaries and Wages ....................................
Due to Other Governmental Agencies. ............................
Due to Other Funds ......................................
Deposits from Vendors and Customers .............................
Total Capital Projects Liabilities ............................
Fund Balance (Exhibit A-2) ......................................
Total Capital Projects Liabilities and Fund Balance ................
Total Liabilities and Fund Balance ...........................
27,599,507 51,267,732
140088,177 120.793,296
3.279,37
-90,305
1,54,210
52,469
4,976,071
1.964,806
,40,292
254,902
790.726
3,350.726
63,423,020 66,43S.611
68,399,091 69,789,337
$208,487,268 S190,582,633
60
EXHIBIT #Z,6
BALANCE SHEETS
PROPERTY TAXES AND SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS RECEIVABLE
Property taxes of the City of Detroit and the Detroit School District -are billed, collected, and accounted for together by the City
Treasurer. Collections, cancellations, and adjustments ae prorated to these taxing units according to their respective tax levies. Property
gaxes receivable (Exhibit W-3) and changes In property taxes receivable (Exhibit W.4) do not Include taxes of the Detroit School District.
Changes in special assessments receivable of the General Fund and Special Assessment Funds for the year ended June 30, 1976 are
shown in Exhibit W6.
The special assessments receivable of the General Fund, $1,650,367, consisted of $1,411,732 past due at June 30, 1976. and $238,635
due after June 30, 1976.
Delinquent property taxes and collections thereof for the ten years 1966-67 through 1975-76 are included in Exhibit X-2. A
comparison of tax levies with collections for these years is shown in Exhibit X-3.
Collections'on the current tax levy during the year 1975-76 were 95.48% of the levy.
Other tax data for the years 1966-67 through 1976-77 are in Exhibit X-1.
PROPERTIES HELD FOR SALE
General Fund equities in property held for sale are shown at net realizable value and amounted to $779,990 at June 30, 1976.
land contracts receivable represent the uncollected balances on sale of property, and are shown in the balance sheet of the General Fund
in the amount of $567,45.
MATERIALS AND SUPPLIES
Material and supplies of the General Fund amounted to S12,400,484 at June 30. 1976, compared with $13,770,619 at June 30.
1975. The inventories of the larger departments are stated at average cost, and were compiled from perpetual inventory records which
are adjusted by periodic physical inventories. Other departmental inventories are largely estimates of quantities and costs as of June 30,
1976, based on physical inventories taken at various dates.
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TABLE #2.8
SHORT-TERM DEBT
($ Millions)
Year TAN RAN BAN
1970 20 - -
1971 15 - -
1972 23 - -
1973 10 - -
1974 0 - -
1975 23 - -
1976 40 - -
1977 0 -
1978 0
Total = 131.0 x = 14.6
liabilities keeps the budget balanced.
There is an additional explanation for Detroit's
reliance on other forms of revenues than short-term debt.
The political situation is raw; there are very strained
relations between the City of Detroit and the State of Mich-
igan. The bankers seem to want collateral in two forms:
Cl) that the state back Detroit by giving more direct aid
to the city; and (2) some feeling that the state would
intervene further if Detroit were ever in the position of
having to default on its loans from the banks.
The friction between city and state undermines the
flow of funds from the private sector banks to the city.8
Similar to New York City, Detroit is a large, Democratic
8Ellen Grzech, "Detroit Banks Relent, Buy City Tax
Anticipation Notes," Detroit Free Press, 6 September 1976,
p. 3A.
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city. The rest of the State of Michigan is rural, agricul-
tural Republican. The way of life is so vastly different
that it is sometimes difficult to understand and empathize
with the woes of a big, hustling city.
The major problem, however, is the city's inability
to forecast correctly. Revenues and Expenses are not even
budgeted to match. Detroit is living on future fiscal years'
income. The cycle, if not broken, geometrically increases
the accumulating deficit. This cash flow problem further
antagonizes the banks who, behind the scenes, probably pres-
sure the governor and the state legislature. On top of
strained relations between city and state, the critical
problem in forecasting is the relationship between federal
and municipal levels. Transfers from the Federal Government
are clearly at fault. The city should be aware of the pat-
tern of intergovernmental transfers. Either estimates
should be drastically altered, or large enough reserves
should be established in order to cope with the pattern.
The problem then may boil down to politics again, Services
promised to citizens may be too extravagant for taxes and
reasonable transfers.
Another problem is the matter of the Census. The
city claims its inhabitants are undercounted.9 Low-income
citizens are precisely the ones who most heavily rely on
9William Dunn and Robert Ankeney, "City Sue Census
Bureau," Detroit News, 3 April 1980.
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government programs. If the count is inaccurate, more citi-
zens than provided for demand and receive the stated ser-
vices, immediately causing a Revenue deficit. The unrelia-
bility of the Census is more fully discussed in Chapter IV,
"Incongruities Between Census Data and Audit Data."
CHAPTER 3
CASE STUDY: BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
Reconciling the accounts published in the Anuual
Audit Reports presents a less than solvent image of Boston.
The Current Account records a deficit throughout the seven-
year time series. When disaggregated, the Current Account
shows deficits in two subsidiary accounts--Tax and Expense.
The Tax problem is the result of projecting more revenues
than actually receiving. The delinquency in Abatements
stems from an outdated statute, which constrains Boston to
reserving only 5 to 6 percent for Abatements, thus automat-
ically causing a deficit because the historical percentage
is much higher. Also problematic to the Tax component is
the underreserving for delinquencies in the collection of
Property Taxes. Boston's Tax problem on the Revenue side
is worsened by the accumulating deficit on the Expense side.
Budgets are expanded without additional Revenue.
To understand both Revenue and Expense deficits, an
analysis of the Current Account begins with reconciling Fis-
cal Year 1976 in depth. As with Detroit, the Current -
Account analysis will be expanded over the seven-year time
series to see the worsening position of the Tax and Expense
deficits. The "Analysis of Changes in Fund Balances" of the
64
65
Annual Financial Report, Exhibit #3.1, reports additions of
$22,289,425 and deductions of $7,728,056 for an ending bal-
ance of $38,341,718.1 There are six accounts reporting the
additions that create a surplus balance for Boston's General
Fund--a much more positive position than seen in Detroit's
General Fund deficit--of over $38 million. How is Boston
different? Are these six reconciled accounts thruthful?
The following analysis of Expenses and Revenues will trace
the development of these accounts, testing the surplus posi-
tion of Boston's flow of funds.
The City of Boston maintains its books on a modified
accrual basis of accounting Csee Appendix B). Taxes are
credited to Revenue when levied with a reserve for Abate-
ments. Other Revenue is recorded when received. Expenses
are incurred when transacted. The most significant feature
is the treatment of deficits. They are treated as assets
rather than charges against surplus. As will be discussed
in the Revenue section under Tax, this biases the report to
1Only one problem occurred with the data collected
from the Annual Financial Reports of Boston. The ending of
the Fiscal Year was changed from December 31 to June 30 in
1973. In its initial year, the city lengthened the report-
ing period to eighteen months, thus beginning on January 1,
1973, and ending on June 30, 1974. The problem impinging on
time series analysis is that this one fiscal year may skew
averages inordinately high or low. Carefully watching for
thist change also involved scrutiny in FY 1975 for overlap-
ping effects. It is common knowledge that changing the fis-
cal year leads to balancing the budget because the city can
claim the entire levies of two fiscal years but only reports
expenses from one, thereby washing the slate.
EXHIBIT #3.1
ANALYSIS OF CHANGES IN FUND BALANCES
City of Boston and County of Suffolk
GENERAL REVENUE FUNDS
Analysis of Changes in Fund Balances
Iear Lnded Juie 30, 1976
GENERAL REVENUE FUNDS
Fund Balance, , une 30, 1975 .
Additions:
Actual Revenues Over Estimates (Fxhibit I-2) .
1974 School Committee Appropri.ioi :la(nce eiedulc 11-1) .
Tax Title Abitements kScheul ie 1-7)
Rfeinstated Taxes (Schedul 11-7)
Tax Title Ilceeipts (Net of letrunds of $1 39.67t)) ,.-helule 11-7)
Tax Possession Ieceipts (Schedule 11-11)
. 12.7 1 7 -9
3.5>16.7.1
I * 3. o ,876
3.11 o.153
716.02,
Deductions:
Taxes Transferred to Tax Titles (Schedule 11-7)
Fund Balance, June 30, 1976 (Exhibit 11-1) (Note I)
$23,780,34;
22,2819,423
$16.069,774
..728,056'
$:'8.3t1.718
0
CN
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a very great and grave extent.
Expenses
Boston's Expense statement is more detailed than
Detroit's by providing statistics on money transfers to/from
the General Fund to/from the other seven funds. Table #3.1,
"Statement of Appropriations and Expenditures, 1976," shows
the Current Account deficit to be $20,730,129. This net
includes the appropriations, expenditures, and transfers.
Although it is more detailed, it can confuse the assessment
of managerial skills. The transfer transactions cloud the
bottom line of Expenses by making up for the over-spending
with surplus elsewhere. Table #3.2, "Expense Deficit Work
sheet, 1970-1977," gives the statistics for a clear view of
managerial spending. As can easily be seen, these figures
are quite different from what Boston states as its surplus/
deficit-operating deficit in Table #3.3.
TABLE #3.2
EXPENSE DEFICIT WORKSHEET, 1970-1977
(Dollars in Millions)
Fiscal Year Estimate Actual Surplus/(Deficit)
1970 357.7 353.6 4.1
1971 410.0 404.0 6.0
1972 473.1 466.2 6.9
1973-1974 726.3 729.1 C 2.8)
1975 522.8 540.9 (18.1)
197 6 602.8 628.2 (25.4)
1977 644.6 639.5 5.1
TABLE #3.1
STATEMENT OF APPROPRIATIONS AND EXPENDITURES, 1976
(Dollars)
Expendi- Net #1 Other Revenue SourcesITEM Appropriations tures Budget Net 1975 Transfers Total
Balance To (From)
City Budget
General Government 31,718,658 36,313,546 ( 4,594,888) 2,790,533 2,645,427 5,435,960
Public Safety 88,814,737 105,442,513 (16,627,776) 1,171,766 8,457,048 9,628,814
Inspection 1,835,608 1,766,209 69,399 103,464 0 103,464
Public Works 13,192,544 13,948,502 (755,958) 694, 208 2,125,205 2,819,413
Health and Hospitals 51,743,343 49,906,441 1,836,902 630,189 0 630,189
Veterans' Services 6,894,173 3,343,679 3,550,494 0 0 0
Libraries 9,452,261 9,194,342 257,919 7,547 240,402 247,949
Parks and Recreation 6,590,631 7,822,090 (1,231,459) 426,510 0 426,510
Miscellaneous 37,388,085 26,465,111 10,922,974 1,878,623 (16,308,378) (14,429,755)
Total City Budget 247,630,040 254,202,433 (6,572,393) 7,702,840 (2,840,296) 4,862,544
School Budget 147,230,789 171,099,048 (23,868,289) 381,121 7,342,183 7,723,304
County Budget 26,501,139 28,085,461 (1,584,322) 98,459 (480,493) (382,034)
Federal Revenue Sharing 41,000,000 42,046,359 (1,046,359) 1,017,393 750,000 1,767,393
Debt Requirements 2  47,067,733 55,587,607 (8,519,874) 50,753 7,788,907 7,839,660
Contributions to Retire- 41,365,928 41,840,585 (474,657) 16,569,880 (16,095,223) 474,657
ment Funds3
StantsMDC, MBTA Assess- 36,615,596 35,336,102 1,279,494 (230,514) (1,139,916) (1,370,430)
Deficit Appropriations 15,430,245 0 15,430,245 0 (15,430,245) (15,430,245)
Total Appropriations,
Expenditures, and 602,841,470 628,197,595 (25,356,125) 25,589,932 (20,105,083) 5,484,849
Balances
Source: City of Boston, General Revenue Funds Audit, Exhibit B-3, pp. 20-21.
1City Council Appropriations, School Committee Appropriations, Chapter 224, Acts of 1936.
3Debt Requirements Appropriated under Chapter 44, Section 16, of General Laws.
Contribution to Retirement Fund Appropriated under Chapter 32, Section 22, of General Laws.
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TABLE #3.1
Net #2 Balances June 30, 1976 Net #3
ITEM Budget Net and Carried Forward Unexpended 6
Other Revenue to 1977 (Overexpended)
City Budget
General Government 841,072 536,860 304,212
Public Safety (6,998,962) 0 (6,998,962
Inspection 172,863 87,087 85,776
Public Works 2,063,455 33,386 2,030,069
Health and Hospitals 2,467,091 64,561 2,402,530
Veterans' Services 3,550,494 0 3,550,494
Libraries 505,868 0 505,868
Parks and Recreation (804,949) 58,258 (863,207)
Miscellaneaous (3,506,781) 0 (3,506,781
Total City Budget (1,709,849) 780,152 (2,490,001)
School Budget (16,144,985) 25,235 (16,170,220)
County Budget (1,966,356) 0 (1,966,356)
Federal Revenue Sharing 720,934 100,734 620,200
Debt Requirements2  3 (680,214) 43,962 (724,176)
Contributions to Retirement Funds 0 0 0
State, MDC, MBTA Asses m ents 4  (90,,936) (90,936) 0
Deficit Appropriations 0 0 0
Total Appropriations, Expenditures, (19,871,276) 859,147 (20,730,129)6
and Balances
4Assessment Appropriated under Chapter 59, Section 2, of General Laws.
5Prior Year Deficits Raised in 1976 Taxes
6Balance June 30, 1976 (Overexpended) (20,730,423)
+ Unliquidated Reserves Prior Year Balances 638,034
- Federal Revenue Sharing Unexpended Balances (620,300)
Fiscal 1976 Operating Deficit to be Raised in 1977 Taxes (20,712,689)
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In FY 1976, Boston's managers are spending 3 percent
more of the year's total budget than appropriated, easily
the beginning or continuance of an accumulating deficit.
Footnote 1 of Table #3.1 shows over $20 million of FY 1976's
deficit to be raised in FY 1977's taxes. This deficit of
$20 million has claim to the very first $20 million of taxes
collected. What happens to the $20 million in services that
were originally matched to these revenues? They are still
performed, and then, as a FY 1977 deficit, they are paid for
by FY 1978. If Boston goes by the FY 1977 budget without
any overspending, then, the $20 million deficit remains just
that and is "rolled over" and paid by yearly TANs. It con-
tinues and accumulates until Expenses are cut sufficiently
below Revenues.
Contingent liabilities pose no commanding threat as
they do in Detroit. Reserves called "encumbrances" are
properly used. More importantly, Boston is not faced with
the frequency and magnitude of Detroit's lawsuits. However,
Boston's spin-off Water and Sewer authorities run deficits
with the following statistics:2
Year $ Millions
1970 0
1971 (3.0)
1972 (7.3)
1973-1974 (5.2)
1975 0
2Statistics are culled from State Tax Recapitulation
sheets. They cannot be found in Annual Financial Reports,
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Year $ Millions
1976 (3.7)
1977 (5.6)
Water and Sewer are considered independent of Boston
although the funds flow through Boston's account. A Water
and Sewer deficit is redeemed by appropriations from Boston.
The identification of Water and Sewer as separate authori-
ties is considered to alleviate some of the debt and deficit
of the City of Boston. Without Water and Sewer, Boston has
less accumulating deficit on its books and less total debt,
thus creating a more creditworthy image. Ultimately, the
City of Boston is responsible for these deficits.
Table #3.3, "Summary of Expense Deficits, 1970-
1977," compares the deficits calculated here as prescribed
in the framework with the deficits listed by Boston, The
numbers are not similar, especially when Water and Sewer
deficits are added. Because of the independent authority
status, quite legally, they are not included. However, Bos-
ton is liable. The Operating deficit is later used by Bos-
ton as its bottom line Current Account, including all the
Revenue deficits such as abatements and deliquencies. This
is an important point to remember while reading the Revenue
section. The Operating deficits become the one statistic
used for both Revenues and Expenses.
The addition of Water and Sewer deficits tempers
the Expenses surpluses in Table #3.3. A build-up in total
Expense deficits begins in 1972 with only a $0.4 million
TABLE #3.3
SUMMARY OF EXPENSE DEFICITS, 1970-1977
(Dollars in Millions).4,
1970 1971 1972 1973-1974 1975 1976 1977
EXPENSE
Calculated Estimate-Actual 4.1 6.0 6.9 ( 2.8) (18.1) (25.4) 5.1
Water and Sewer2  - 3.0) ( 7.3) ( 5.2) - ( 3.7) ( 5.6)
Total 4.1 3.0 ( 0.4) ( 8.0) (18.1) (29.1) ( 0.5)
Annual Operating Report - (27.5) ( 6.9) 8.4 6.2 (20.7) (17.7)
Overlay (Asset) ( 4.1) ( 6.0) - - (18.3) (20.3) (25.4)
Total ( 4.1) (33.5) ( 6.9) 8.4 (12.1) (41.0) (43.1)
1Table #3.2.
2Tax Recapitulation Sheets.
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deficit. By 1976, a $29.1 million deficit is reported.
Investigation shows two accounts contributing almost
entirely to the deficit. The Police Department overspent
$7 million, and the School Committee, although an indepen-
dent authority, overspent and charged Boston $16 million
(Table #3.1). The independent authorities, like the School
Committee, make the city look better by not adding to the
amount of outstanding debt. This allows the city to borrow
money for other things even though Boston is ultimately
liable for the school debt as it is ultimately liable for
the school deficit of $16 million.
If the School Committee experienced a $16 million
deficit in FY 1976, why did the General Fund receive a
transfer from the School Committee of $32,817 from FY 1974
(see Exhibit #3.1)? This is an example of "lag" in account-
ing. Fiscal Year 1976 should be recognizing a $16 million
deficit; FY 1974 should have recognized a $32,817 surplus.
In municipal fund accounting, non-enterprise funds transfer
all surpluses to the General Fund at the close of the fiscal
year. In this case, the School Committee netted a surplus
for FY 1974, but the General Fund could not record the
receipt until FY 1976. The lag is concurrent with other
findings that accounts do not clear for at least two years.
The -explanation for this focuses on the ill-conceived timing
aspect of budgeting. It was not made known until the end to
FY 1974 what the status of the account was. The FY 1975
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budget, however, had already been made and been passed by
the appropriate political body. Thus, the surplus could not
be recorded until two years past the original fiscal year
although the use of funds experienced no constraints.
In the case of the 1974 School Committee, the Boston
budget can easily absorb the surplus because of the FY 1976
$16 million deficit. In FY 1976 financial statements, which
recorded the surplus, the School Committee reports a deficit
of $16,170,190 in operations, overexpending appropriations,
and a $7,308,482 deficit in revenues. Together, a deficit
$23,478,672 for the School Committee is created. This will
be quite a burden for FY 1978.
Revenues
Although Boston's Expense exhibits are more detailed
than Detroit's, the reverse is true for Revenues. Table
#3.4, "Statement of Revenues: Estimated versus Actual,
1976," was compiled with statistics from several exhibits in
the Annual Financial Report. As Revenues as analyzed, it
becomes apparent that it is to Boston's advantage to have
financial statistics scattered across many schedules and
exhibits. The combined collection of Revenue accounts does
not recognize a deficit. Table #3.4 shows a surplus of over
$12 million. Research shows the Revenue accounts to be mis-
represented similar to the School account under Expenses.
The two-year lag becomes very evident in the Tax account.
TABLE #3..4
STATEMENT OF REVENUES: ESTIMATED VERSUS ACTUAL, 1976
Source Estimate Actual Revenues A(Unde Resm atOer
TAXES
Excise Taxes
Property Taxes
Overpayment of Taxes
Prior Years -
Total Taxes
TRANSFERS
Transfers State for
City and General
Purposes
County Purposes
School Purposes
Total State
Transfers Federal
Local
Other
Total Federal
Total Transfer
9,821,122
328,823,580
11,503,901
328,912,724
1,685,671
338,644,702
34,606,029
1,464,632
102,273,413
138,344,074
42,671,040
0
42,671,040
DEBT
OTHER (Hospital fees, etc.)
Departmental 76,762,886
Other 6,418,768
342,102,296
35,805,828
677,264
95,510,924
131,994,016
42,671,040
16,620,540
59,291,580
191,285,596
NA
181,015,114
NA
75,781,889
6,418,768
1,682,779
89,144
1,685,671
3,457,594
1,199,799
( 787,368)
(6,762,489)
(6,350,058)
0
16,620,540
16,620,540
10,270,482
NA
( 980,997)
0
Total Other 83,181,654 82,200,657 ( 980,997)
TOTAL REVENUES 602,841,470 615,588,549 12,747,079
Ul
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Property Tax
The Property Tax account in Table #3.4 lists a sur-
plus of $89,144. The Modified Accrual basis stipulates that
taxes be recorded as received when levied. The Annual
Financial Report does not discuss the reliability of these
receivables. Given that the Property Tax is the single
largest source of funds, the importance of accurate fore-
casting and reserving cannot be overstated. Investors such
as investment and commercial banks place heavy pressure on
accurate budgeting. Although a deficit in this account is
not recorded, component analysis, unfortunately, uncovers a
deficit that never surfaces. Accrual accounting creates and
continues this situation. Information regarding the relia-
bility of the receivables is covered up. Specifically:
(1) the historical collection rate as compared to the
accrued levy, (2) the adequacy of the reserves to cover
abatements and bad debts, and (3) the time factor involved
in recognizing these losses. If the Fund Balance does not
reconcile these facts, it is useless in assessing the finan-
cial soundness of a city.
Before examining the specific accounts, an explana-
tion of how Boston creates the tax levy is necessary. The
city first estimates its needs for the next fiscal year and
sets-ta budget. Since these future expenses must be met by
equal revenues, the total budget amount becomes the Net
Levy. The levy is the net because it is expected that some
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taxes will be abated, and some will be delinquent. The pro-
portion used to estimate abatements is governed by state
law; the proportion that should be reserved for uncollected
taxes is not defined by state law.
The abatement proportion is tened the Overlay Reserve
and is added to the Net Levy to obtain the Gross Levy. The
Gross Levy is then divided by the total sum value of assessed
land to determine the tax rate. It is now expected and
hoped that the default in payment is less than or equal to
the estimated Overlay Reserve. If it is not, the city expe-
riences a deficit in Revenues. Boston is unique in its
policy regarding the property tax abatements. The Massachu-
setts legislature constrains Boston's balance sheet by plac-
ing a minimum-maximum reserve of 5 to 6 percent of the levy
for abatements.3 This is "overlaid" the Revenue needed;
hence, the term Overlay Reserve.
Comparison between the mandatory 5 to 6 percent and
the historical rate of abatements shows the reserve to be
insufficient (Table #3.5). The most reliable data, FYs 1970
to 1975, range the percentage of actual abatement to Prop-
erty Tax levy from 6.25 percent in 1970 to 8.77 percent in
1975, all exceeding the maximum 6 percent Overlay Reserve
and increasing yearly. This Overlay Deficit (the differ-
ence'between the actual and the reserve) is not evidenced
3Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Funding Loan Law,
Chapter 17, Section 5, Acts of 1957.
TABLE #3.5
ACTUAL ABATEMENTS
Fiscal Year $ Abatements $ Overlay Reserve2 $ Overlay Deficit % Abatements/Levy % Increment
1970 15,857,140* 14,435,389 1,421,751* 6.25
1971 20,582,792** 13,989,372 6,967,595** 7.00 0.75)
1972 28,722,914 16,215,466 12,507,448 8.51 1.51) x =
1973-1974 44,765,507 29,241,371 15,524,136 8.63 0.12) 0.63%
1975 30,773,439 19,864,927 10,908,512 8.77 lag-free 0.14)
1976 26,518,758 23,952,559 2,566,199 7.39~(1.38)
1977 18,190,643 22,722,452 4,531,809 4.00 (3.39)
1Data are from Fiscal Year 1977 audit, except *Fiscal Year 1975 and **Fiscal Year 1976. Data are as
2reported; historical averages are applied only to Fiscal Years 1976 and 1977 in lower half of 
Table.
Funding Loan Law, Chapter 717, Section 5, Acts of 1957, require a reserve of 5% to 6%.
Adjusted
Fiscal Case #1 Case #2
Year % FY-1+0.14 $ Abatements $ Overlay Deficit % FY-1+0.63 $ Abatements $ Overlay Deficit
1976 8.91 31,994,980 8,042,421 9.40 33,754,525 9,801,966
1977 9.15 41,568,237 18,845,784 10.03 45,566,056 22,843,604
There is a steady increase in actual abatements as a percentage of the property tax levy from Fiscal
Year 1970 to Fiscal Year 1975. The following two years see a decrease in FY 1976 and a very steep
decline in FY 1977. The two-year lag is clearly seen; thus, FYs 1976 and 1977 are discarded in favor
of predictions based on historical trends. Because the increment fluctuates before FY 1975, the last
lag-free year before the lag, two estimates are created. Case #1, the best case for Boston, is one in
which the last lag-free year's increment of 0.14 is added to the bases of FYs 1975 and 1976 to achieve
adjusted FYs 1976 and 1977 figures. Because the 0.14 increment is in the smaller domain of increments,
it may under-reserve. A more conservative projection uses the average of all the increments, thus
allowing for the worst of situations. Case #2 employs the average of 0.63 to be added to the bases
of FYs 1975 and 1976.
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in the Fund Balance (Exhibit #3.1) nor the Statement of Rev-
enues (Table #3.4) because it is still part of the Property
Tax receivable, money recorded when levied.
Table #3.5 highlights the concept of time lags in
the accounting system. It takes a few years for a specific
Revenue item to be as collected as it will historically get.
As we have seen, accounts take two years to clear. Thus,
any financial analysis should disregard the present fiscal
year's collection record and the preceding year's as well.
A historical average of abatements in Table #3.5 is created
and applied to the lagged year to obtain estimates of what
might be collected. This can help in forecasting of budgets
and assessing the financial assets of cities. Table #3.5
shows two different ways to project the deficit for best
and worst cases. The method as defined in Table #3.5 sets
parameters for the ultimate Tax and Revenue deficits.
Table #3.6 displays similar historical analysis for
uncollected and delinquent taxes. The years 1970 to 1975
show a range from 0.92 percent to 3.11 percent of the Prop-
erty Tax levy, steadily increasing throughout the time
period. The deficit is made up of delinquent tax bills
attached to properties that are, whatever their worth,
asset-based. These are transferred back to Property Tax
receivables as the Tax Title Abatement (discussed later).
Thus, the Balance Sheet is affected negatively. The deficit
due to uncollected and unsold taxes is material in an
TABLE #3.6
ACTUAL UNCOLLECTED TAXES
Fiscal $ Property Tax $ Transfer to $ Collected $ Sold $ UNCS Actual
Year Levy (PTL) Tax Title (TTT) (C) (S) (TTT-C-S) % UNCS/PTL Increment
1970 253,928,157 4,357,742 2,000,584 138,740 2,357,158 0.92) -
1971 294,271,134 5,355,662 2,900,454 105,677 2,349,531 0.79) 1.42 (0.13)
1972 338,279,239 6,747,466 3,080,470 129,862 3,753,528 1.11) 0.32)- _
1973-1974 518,938,517 10,509,324 4,040,433 428,577 6,040,314 1.16) lag- 0 .0 5)0 55
1975 351,074,433 16,273,993 5,017,551 318,325 10,938,117 3.11) free 1.95) '
1976 359,090,688 7,728,056 5,140,053 716,026 1,871,977 0.52 ~ (2.59)
1977 454,297,666 13,334,511 3,955,041 610,761 8,768,709 1.93 1.41
Adjusted
Fiscal Case #1 Case #2
Year % UNCS $ UNCS % FY-1+0.55 $ UNCS
1976 1.42 5,099,087 3.66 13,142,719
1977 1.42 6,451,027 4.21 19,125,931
The trend of the UNCS in the lag-free years is increasing overall but with a back-and-forth movement
which gives a jagged appearance to a trendline. Because of this, using the average to project Fiscal
Years 1976 and 1977 seems most prudent as it will continue the direction of movement at a rate which
best represents all types of behavior. Two averages are considered: Case #1 represents the average,
1.42%, UNCS per property tax level; Case #2 applies an average, 0.55%, of the increment to the imme-
diately past Fiscal Year UNCS base. Both cases evince deficits; the range showing UNCS in Case #2
over twice that of Case #1.
00
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accounting sense and should be reserved. The combined defi-
cit of UNCS and the Overlay Deficit serves to diminish the
$12,747,079 surplus of Actual Revenues over Estimates.
Boston recognizes to a small extent the tax delin-
quency problem. In the Analysis of Changes in Fund Balances
CExhibit #3.1), there is a set of accounts to process these
transactions. This set performs the functions of recogniz-
ing losses and adding back profit from collection of delin-
quent tax bills and sale of foreclosed property. Exhibit
#3.2, "Analysis of Tax Title Account," deals with the col-
lection of delinquencies while Exhibit #3.3, "Analysis of
Tax Possessions Account," deals with the sale of properties
when they are finally foreclosed. We want to be able ulti-
mately to project what is not collected and not sold (see
Table #3.6).
Tax Title accepts $7,728,056 from delinquent tax
bills from the Property Tax Receivable account CExhibits
#3.1 and 3.2). The tax bills may be dated as much as six
years late since the state does not regulate the maximum
time a property can be counted as a receivable. Also unreg-
ulated is the time of stay within the Tax Title Account,
thus, there is no time definition for moving the property
from Tax Title to Tax Possession. This confuses the true
asse-ssment of Boston's fiscal worth as it may overestimate
or even underestimate (tax bills held in Tax Title not ready
for sale) Property Tax assets.
EXHIBIT #3.2
ANALYSIS OF TAX TITLE ACCOUNT
City of Iloston and County of Suffolk
GENERAL REVENUE FUNDS
Analysis of Tax Title Account (Note 1)
Year Ended June 30, 1976
Balance, June 30, 1975
Additions:
Transfers from:
Tax Accounts (Exhibit 13-1, Schedule 13-5)
Building Razing Charges (Net of Abated Clargcs of $5,710)
Sidewalk Assessment . . .
Overpayments of Tax Titles . .
Costs and Intcrest Billed to Property Owners. .
Less: Cancelled Costs and Interest. .
Deductions:
Collections (Net of Befunds of $139 670) (Exhibit B- . .
Abatements (Exhibit B-1) .
Reinstatements to Tax Accounts (Exhibit l1-1, Schedule B-5)
Reinstated to Sidewalk Assessments .
Balance, June 30, 1976 (Schedule B-4) . .
No-E 1. The Tax Title Account reflects taxes anid other charges receivable fr
accordance with section S3 of Chapter 60 of the General Laws.
$621,387
1,271
. 1,008,101
. 102.096
om properties for which the city has taken titl- in
$26,111,443
7,728,056
622,658
9,205
606,008
$35,077,370
$5,140,053
- 3,516.574
136,376
20
$26.283.847
00
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EXHIBIT #3.3
ANALYSIS OF TAX POSSESSIONS ACCOUNT
City of Boston and County of Suffolk
GENEItAL REVENUE FUNDS
Analysis of Tax Pcssessions Account (Note 1)
Year Ended June 30, 1976
Balance, June 30, 1975
Deductions:
Beceipts (Exhibit 11-1) . .
Loss on S-!es of Foreclosed Property .
Less: Profit on Sales of Fokeclosed Property . . .
Balance, June 30, 1976 (Schedule B-3) . . . .
NoTE 1. The Tax Possesioneq Accouit reflects taes ml other charges receivable from properties
cordance with section 65 of Chapter 60 of the General Laws.
$728.038
50,920
716.026
- - 677,118
$5.688.839
which l;ire been forecloseil in ac-
$7,081,983
00
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What can happen to a tax bill once it is transferred
to Tax Title? Three possibilities exist: (1) the city col-
lects the delinquent taxes; (2) the taxes on individual
property are abated entirely; or (3) reinstatements, error
corrections due to bookkeeping entries, are made. Repre-
senting actual cash, possibilities #1 and #3 are straight-
forward; #2 requires explanation. If recovery of tax bills
or sale is unlikely, the total bill can be abated, and the
property is transferred back to the General Fund account,
thereby inflating assets by giving the appearance of poten-
tial current fiscal year tax receipts. If it were at all
possible that the property could be packaged for sale, it
probably would have been transferred to the Tax Possessions
Account.
It should be noted that transferring the property
back to the Property Tax receivables allows the city to bor-
row more funds since their assets on the Balance Sheet have,
indeed, increased. It can also be argued that this is a
fair representation since land does not depreciate and can
be sold and, since the Tax Possessions Account is overloaded
with a property backlog of up to six years, in all likeli-
hood, it will be sold at some time. If it remains in the
Tax Possessions or even Tax Title Account, it is written
off.t The only way to reflect the asset nature of the prop-
erty properly is to debit it to Property Tax receivables as
it waits for a more appropriate time to be sold.
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The only material asset in the Tax Title set of
accounts is the Collections account of $5,140,053 (cash
outflow). The increase in transfers to the Tax Title
Account is:
Balance June 30, 1976 $35,077,370
Balance June 30, 1975 $26,111,443
Net increase (inflow) $ 8,965,027
The ratio of cash outflows to inflows is 57 percent, or,
inversely, 43 percent of transferred funds remain uncol-
lected. A survey of the audits of other fiscal years for
Boston shows a higher percentage of uncollected taxes than
FY 1976.
Fiscal Percentages Transferred
Year Uncollected Collected
1970 61 39
1971 54 46
1973-1974 67 33
1975 73 27
1976 43 57
1977 73 27
These statistics portend an unpromising future for the prop-
erties that have been written off. It is unlikely that they
will be packaged and sold within a reasonable time frame.
The effect on the Balance Sheet and Fund Balance account is
negative. First, the taxes written off were not reserved;
it can be assumed that the money had been appropriated and
used in its respective fiscal year. Second, even with sell-
ing foreclosed property to recoup these unreserved substan-
tial losses, amounts remained uncollected (see data above
and Table #3.6). These differences must be made up in other
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ways: sale of other assets, borrowing short-term loans, or
stalling vendor payments. Account reconcilement of this is
shown later.
Exhibit #3.3 lists receipts of $716,026 on sale of
foreclosed property. This is deceiving; it is correct that
the original tax bill had been written off and that this is
the money gained through sale later. The problem is that it
reflects on the marketability of these properties. To be a
stable, reliable source of Revenue, the Property Tax must be
able to recoup its delinquencies in other ways, If Boston
can only obtain 55 percent of the delinquent tax bills
through sale, the apportionment of money in the original
fiscal year was based on false claims (Table #3.7).
Recei
Loss
Cost
Cost
Recei
Profi
Loss
TABLE #3.7
LOSS ON SALE OF PROPERTY, 1976
pts $ 716,026
$ 728,038
of Goods Sold $ 1,444,064
of Goods Sold $ 1,444,064
pts $ (716.026)
t $ (50,920)
$ 677,118
Loss/COGS
Balance 1975
Balance 1976
Net Change
Receipts/Net Change
47%
$ 7,081,983
$ 5,688,839
$(l,393,142)
55%
In summarizing the Revenue deficits, Figure #3.1,
"Relationship Between Tax and Revenue Deficits," provides a
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FIGURE 3.1. Relationship Between Tax and Revenue Deficits: Boston.
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graphical view of the relationship from 1970 to 1977. Quite
obviously, the total Revenue line shows the average between
the Transfer surpluses and Revenue deficits. The Transfers,
though, are not high enough to offset the large Tax defi-
cits, thus total Revenue deficits, for the seven years.
With the increased deficits provided by Tax deficits--worst,
the total deficit is that much worse. The propositions are
quite different from the surplus Boston publishes (Table
#3.4). Disaggregating the Revenue deficit has allowed us
to see that Boston's problem is in Tax collection,
Transfers
Table #3.4 shows the disaggregating of the Transfer
component. While state Transfers are $6,350,058 under the
estimate, federal Transfers are $16,620,540 over the esti-
mate. The federal Transfer creates a total Transfer surplus
of $10,270,482, which makes it the largest contributor to
total Revenue surplus of $12,747,079. Within the state
Transfer deficit is the large $6,762,489 school deficit.
Even though the School Committee is an independent author-
ity, its large deficit is ultimately charged to the General
Fund as a current Expense. Without disaggregation, the
school deficit is missed because of its independent nature.
The $6,350,058 deficit is of sufficient magnitude to
cause concern. The city claims a surplus of $12,747,079 as
total actual Revenue over estimates as seen in Table #3.4
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and Exhibit #3.1. A few other deficit accounts of the same
$6 million magnitude of the state Transfers could immediately
swing the surplus to a deficit position. This is, indeed,
possible because the Transfers deficit is only one percent
of total estimated Revenue. A one percent variability in
any disaggregated account may not at all be unlikely. On
the other hand, the state Transfers account is relatively
good since the likelihood exists that the state just has not
yet transferred the funds promised to the city, Operating
on a Modified Accrual basis, the city cannot recognize the
Transfers Revenue, unlike the Property Tax, until it is
received. This knowledge renders the Transfers deficit less
harmful than a deficit in an accrual account. The weighting
of various accounts according to their accounting basis in
addition to the deficit magnitude sets one parameter of Fis-
cal Strain quantification.
Because the federal Transfer surplus is strong at
$16.6 million, the state deficit is easily managed. Depart-
mental fees, e.g., health and hospital fees, are under less
than $1 million. Boston does not have the Transfer problem
that Detroit has. Table #3.8 shows surpluses for three of
the four years listed. There were no data available for
FYs 1970, 1971, and 1972. The federal category has no
deftcit while two years show minor state deficits.
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TABLE #3.8
TRANSFERS 1973-1977
Source 1973-1974 1975 1976 1977
State
Estimate 108.5 88.5 138.5 109.9
Actual 107.5 97.1 131.9 123.9
Surplus/(Deficit) (1.0) 8.8 (6.4) 14.9
Federal
Estimate 29.0 21.0 42.6 16.0
Actual 29.0 21.0 58.0 26.7
Surplus/(Deficit) 0 0 16.6 9.3
Grand Total {z = 42.2] (1.0) 8.8 10.2 24.2
Debt
Unfortunately, this category cannot be calculated
because estimate and actual statistics are unavailable in
the Annual Reports. Because of this, the General Fund defi-
cit cannot be created as easily as for Detroit (Table #2.3).
There, it was shown how the elimination of long-term debt
netted the General Fund deficit.
Summary of Revenues and Expenses
Disaggregating the Current Account provided a view
of Boston's financial position not readily seen in socio-
economic studies. Boston has both Revenue and Expense defi-
cits. The Tax deficit is due solely to underreserving of
Abatements and Property Tax delinquencies. Historical pre-
cedent shows very precisely what portion of the tax levy to
reserve as bad debts. Of course, the State Legislature is
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at fault by constraining the abatement reserve to 6 percent.
However, this is no surprise to Boston's financial planners.
Additional reserves could have been held. The delinquency
problem stems from poor enforcement. The upper class that
has the money to pay just is not paying. This conclusion
would be totally impossible to make from the econometric
model correlations. The models projected Fiscal Strain as
an association with low-income and non-white populations.
The Expense deficit would also be difficult to proj-
ect based on demographics. To some extent, Water and Sewer
cause Boston additional deficits. Although Water and Sewer
are considered independent of Boston, their deficits are
redeemed by appropriations from Boston. The identification
of Water and Sewer as separate authorities is considered to
alleviate both long-term and current deficits of the City of
Boston. Without Water and Sewer, Boston has less accumu-
lating deficit in its General Fund and less total debt.
Nonetheless, the Water and Sewer deficits are still funded
by Boston, documentation of which can be found only on the
Tax Recapitulation sheets at the State House and not in the
public Annual Reports.
Table #3.9 summarizes all Revenue and Expense defi-
cits. Overlay and UNCS deficits can be calculated in many
ways. Two are shown here to display a range from "best" to
"worst" of what could happen. Under the best conditions,
Boston, in FY 1976, shows a total deficit of $29.3 million
TABLE #3.9
SUMMARY OF REVENUES AND EXPENSES, 1970-1977
(Dollars in Millions)
1970 1971 1972 1973- 1975 1976 1976 1977 1977 Total Total
1974 Best Worst Best Worst Best Worst
EXPENSE
Estimate-Actual 4.1 6.0 6.9 ( 2.8) (18.1) (25.4) 5.1
Water and Sewer - (3.0) ( 7.3) ( 5.2) - ( 3.7) ( 5.6)
Total Expense 4.1 3.0 ( 0.4) ( 8.0) (18.1) (29.1) (29.1) ( 0.5) ( 0.5)
REVENUE
Tax (3.7) (9.3) (16.2) (21.5) (21.8) (14.4) (28.9) (25.2) (41.9)
Overlay (1.4) (7.0) (12.5) (15.5) (10.9) ( 8.0) ( 9.8) (18.8) (22.8)
UNCS (2.3) (2.3) ( 3.7) ( 6.0) (10.9) ( 6.4) (19.1) ( 6.4) (19.1)
Transfer - - - 15.6 8.8 10.2 10.2 24.2 24.2
Debt - - -
Total Revenue (3.7) (9.3) (16.2) ( 5.9) (13.0) ( 4.2) (18.7) ( 1.0) (17.7)
TOTAL 0.4 (6.3) (16.6) (13.9) (31.1) (29.3) (47.8) (-1.5) (18.2) (98.4) (133.6)
to0
1, ;1
I i
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while the worst increases to $47.8 million. Fiscal Year
1977 shows best a $0.5 million deficit and worst a $18.2
million deficit. The Total Deficit created by reconciling
these various accounts is much higher than indicated in any
single public document. When calculating deficits for FY
1976 and FY 1977, predictions based on best and worst, sce-
narios differ by approximately $14.5 million in FY 1976 and
by $16.7 million in FY 1977. Either case greatly affects
the General Fund Balance of the published Annual Report.
How Deficits Are Paid
The easiest way to pay yearly deficits is to under-
take TANs, RANs, and BANs. Boston has used this method over
the seven-year time span in all three short-term debt forms
at a total of $350 million, an average of $50 million per
year (see Table #3.10).
TABLE #3-10
SHORT-TERM DEBT
($ Millions)
Year TANs RANs BANs Total
1970 - 85 -
1971 130 - -
1972 -
1973-1974 -
1975 - 90
1976 30 - -
1977 - 15 -
Total 160 100 90 350
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Both total and average are much higher than both best and
worst cases of total deficit, $84.8 million best and $120.0
million worst. If BANs are exercised to net a "current"
short-term, that is for Taxes and Transfers only, $260
million is netted.
Fiscal Year 1971 shows $130 million in TANs. Fur-
ther scrutiny of the Annual Report for 1971 uncovers:
Taxes Receivable $41 million
Excise Tax Receivable $10 million
State School Transfer Receivable $14 million
Other Taxes Receivable $33 million
Total FY 1971 Receivable $98 million
The remaining $30 million may be a "roll-over" from FY
1970's high $85 million RANs. Boston uses this form of pay-
ment heavily. In FY 1976, this heavy proportion can be seen
under the Liabilities category in Exhibit #3.4. Boston also
holds $44 million in Warrants payable, $2 million in Tax
Refunds, and $1 million in Investment Funds. Although these
are FY 1976 charges, Boston will hold payment until FY 1977
with claim on the first portion of taxes to repay FY 1976
debts. These, like short-term notes, are roll-overs. The
lag between receiving services and paying for them allows
Boston to spend mor money than the matching time period
permits.
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EXHIBIT #3.4
City of Boston and County of Suffolk
GENERAL REVENUE FUNDS
Cornparative Balance Sheet
Total
June 30, 1976 June 30, 1975
ASSETS
Cash on Hand and in Bank (Exhibit B-5) (Note 1) . $27,820,131
Amounts Due (to) from Federal Revenue Sharing Funds (7,199,263)
Amounts Due from Enterprise Funds . . . . 20,810,377
Property Taxes Receivable (Schedules R-5. and B-6) . 75,712,747
Less: Overlay Reserve for Abatements (Note 2) .. (11,219,862)
Reserve for Uncollected Charges Added to
Taxes (Note 3) . . . . . . (1,589,414)
Accounts Receivable (Schedule B-4) . . . . 65,571,742
Less: Amounts Not Available Until Collected . (65,571,742,
Reimbursements Due from Agency Funds (Exhibit F-1) 21,876
Amounts Due (to) from Sinking Funds . . . . 34,541
Prepaid Expenses ... . ..... 392.718
Abatements in Excess of Overlay - to Be Raised in
Taxes (Schedule B-6) (Notes 2 and 4) . . . 20,336,670
Fiscal 1976 Operating Deficit - to Be Raised in Taxes
(Exhibit B-3) (Note 4) . . . . . . 20,712.689
Total Assets $145,833,210 $10,172,766
$2,973,503
7,199,263
130'793,634 $49,067,505
29U0Ul 5,863,20-
75,712,747 9MB, 244
(11,219,862) (1,285,271)
(1,589,414)
65,571,742
(65,571,742)
21,876
34,541
392,718
63,864,670
(63,864,670)
56,561
(6,622)
20,336.670 18,332,301
20,712,689
$156,005,976 $131,815,923
LIABILITIEs, RESERVES AND FUND BALANCES
., LIABILrrIs
Tax Anticipation Notes Payable . . . . . $30,000,000
Warrants Payable (Note 5) . . . . . . 44,612,269
Tax Refunds Payable . . . . . . . . 2,309,611
Amounts Due Special Revenue Funds . . . 16,742,107
Amounts Due Community Development Block Grant
Funds (Exhibit H-1) . . . . . . . 68,232
Amounts Due Trust Funds. . . . . . . 1,338,768
Overpayments of Taxes, Licenses, etc. .... 606,828
Miscellaneous Liabilities . . . . . . . 229,626
Total Liabilities . . . . . . . $95,907,441
RESERVES
Reserve for Encumbrances (Note 6) . . . . $10,825,638
Appropriation Balances (Exhibit B-3) (Note 6) . . 758,413
Premium on Permanent Loans . . . . . .
Unappropriated Revenue from State . . . ,
Total Reserves . . . . . . . . $11,584,051
~ FUND BALANCES
Surplus Revenue (Exhibit B-4) $38,341,718
Total Liabilities, Reserves and Fund Balances . $145,833,210
$30,000,000,
$3,029,875 47,642,144
2,309,611
16,742,107
68,232
1,338,768
606,828
229,626
$33,320,470
4,673,010
8,017,686
1,981,014
521,319
$3,029,875 $98,937,316 $48,513,499
$3,269,972 $14,095,610 $10,919,775
100,734 859,147 25,599,031
115,922
240,402
$3,370,706 $14,954,757 $36,875,130
$3,772,185 $42,113,903 $46,427,294
$10.172.766 $156.005.976 $131.815.923
NOTE 1. Includes cash equivalents of $10.000.000 and $21.000.000 at June 30. 1976 and 1975. respectively.
NOTE 2. The overlay reserve for abatements is provided for by the Funding Loan Law. Chapter 717, Section 5. Acts of 1957.
NOTE 3. Reserve set up as of June 30. 1976, to adjust sewer and water charges and betterment assessments added to taxes in liscal
1976 to cash basis.
NOTE 4. Accounting procedures established by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts require that deficits to he appropriated in future
tn&ces be rorted as ass;ets rahr'an as offsets Ro su us revenue
NOTE n ue to State em. A ruling has been requested from the insurance commissioner
of the state whether this amount can be offset against alleged overpayments bN the city in prior years.
NOTE 6. Open purchase and service orders. contracts. and estimated costs for utilities and similar services incurred but not yet billed
are charged to expenditures and set up As reserves for encumbrances. Open contract.% prior to June 30. 1976 were carried forward
as appropriation balances.
General
Revenue
Funds
Federal
Revenue
Sharing
Funds
CHAPTER 4
INCONGRUITIES BETWEEN CENSUS DATA
AND AUDIT DATA
Most efforts to analyze the fiscal condition of
American cities use financial statistics gathered by the
Bureau of the Census. These data have been presented to be
accurate, consistent, and adequate to evaluate Fiscal
Strain. No suspicions and, certainly, no tests of these
assumptions appear in the literature. Not even a footnote
has ever questioned the validity of these data. Having used
both Census data and the Audit statistics issued by the
individual cities, I could see the differences in even the
most basic statistics. Charting of gross revenues and
expenses illustrates the glaring differences. When opera-
tions are performed upon these statistics to reconcile the
Current Account balance, the errors are compounded. Not
only are the basic statistics different, but the reconciling
method itself differs. The following tables and figures
display the inaccuracies, inconsistencies, and inadequacy
of the Census data.
Accuracy
Accuracy connotes conforming exactly to truth or to
a standard. Both Census and Audit are published on the
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basis of financial statistics emanating from a city's finan-
cial transactions. Presumably, both data sources would use
the same statistics to describe the same financial trans-
actions. This section tests their accuracy of conforming to
the same standard. Theoretically, the Census statistics are
identical to the Audit because of the Census data collection
techniques. The Census actually collects detailed compara-
tive financial and employment figures from cities having
populations of at least 50,000. Census policy is to record
data of large cities directly from official accounts at the
individual cities. Three of these statistics are crucial to
any financial analysis: (1) Gross Revenues, C2) Gross
Expenses, and (3) Property Taxes.
Gross Revenues and Expenses
In Table #4.1, gross Revenues as reported by Census
and Audit sources differ by an average of $127 million per
year over the eight-year time span. Fiscal Year 1970 shows
only a $16 million difference, but the difference between
the two sources increases to $190 million by 1977. The
Census thus declares that Boston's Revenues for the eight
years were $1,016 billion more than the city itself reported
in its annual audits.
The difference worsens when the averages for Bos-
ton's Expenses are compared. The average difference is $152
million, and the range is $34 million in FY 1970 to $217
TABLE #4.,1
RAW DATA VARIATTON--GROSS REVENUES AND EXPENSES
($ millions)
Year Census Revenues Audit Revenues C-A Census Expenses Audit Expenses C-A
Boston
1970 369 353 16 387 353 34
1971 430 376 54 469 409 60
1972 498 450 48 529 466 63
1973 565 597
1974 593 738 420 581 729 449
1975 665 523 142 726 540 186
1976 761 615 146 845 628 217
1977 863 673 190 895 639 206
1=4,744 Y=3,728 X=1,016 Y=5,024 Y=3,759 Y=1,215
X= 593 X= 466 X= 127 X= 628 X= 470 X= 152
Detroit
1970 509 384 125 479 384 95
1971 607 458 149 564 440 124
1972 692 456 236 646 447 199
1973 784 555 229 681 496 185
1974 807 565 242 701 533 168
1975 529 527 2 803 562 241
1976 781 524 257 845 546 299
1977 1,061 647 414 893 588 305
j=5,770 Y=4,116 Y=1,654 Y=5,612 X=3,996 Y=1,616
X= 721 X= 514 X= 207 X= 702 X= 500 X= 202
00
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million in FY 1976. The difference between Census and Audit
increased yearly for a total of $1,215 billion. Thus the
Census declared that Boston had $1.2 billion more Expenses
than the Audit claimed.
In Detroit, the differences in Revenues increase
yearly except for a dip in FY 1975. The average difference
between Census and Audit Revenue statistics is $207 million
per year with the Census reporting $1,654 billion more than
the Audit. Expense differences for Detroit are slightly
smaller. The average difference in Expenses is $202 million
with a total of $1.6 billion over the eight years. Figure
4.1 emphasizes the magnitude of the differences. Differ-
ences in the millions increase yearly with only one reversal
in FY 1975 for Detroit.
The net of Gross Revenues and Gross Expenses is the
Gross Balance as calculated in Table #4.2. Boston's eight-
year time series is plotted in Figure 4.2 as is Detroit's
in Figure 4.3. Detroit's balances are what is expected--a
large difference separates Census from Audit data, and the
Audit looks closer to the balance calculated in the previous
chapters. However, Boston does not necessarily show that
the Audit data are closer to my calculations than the Census
data. This can be explained by Boston's large tax deficit
attributed to underreserving and undercollecting over a num-
ber of years. Detroit has virtually no tax problem, but its
Transfer problem surprisingly does not show up in the Gross
100
FIGURE 4.1. Revenue and Expense Differences: Detroit and Boston.
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TABLE #4.2
BOSTON AND DETROIT GROSS DEFICIT
(Dollars in Millions)
Year Census CENGR Audit AUDGR MYGR
R Total - E Total S/(D) R Total - E Total S/(D) S/(D)
Boston
1970 369.5 387.2 (17.7) 353.1 353.5 ( 0.4) 0.41
1971 430.7 464.4 (33.7) 376.1 404.0 (27.9) C 6.3)
1972 498.1 529.8 (31.7) 450.2 466.2 (16.0) (16.6)
1973 565.8 597.4 (31.6) 738.7 729.0 9.7 (13.9)
1974 593.8 581.4 12.4
1975 665.4 726.6 (61.2) 523.1 540.8 (17.7) (31.3)2
1976 761.9 845.6 (83.7) 615.5 628.1 (12.6) (29.3)
1977 863.7 845.2 18.5 673.2 639.5 33.7 12.02
Detroit
1970 509.0 479.2 29.8 384.0 384.8 ( 0.8) 15.53
1971 607.2 564.8 42.4 458.2 440.7 17.5 7.6
1972 692.4 646.7 45.7 456.1 447.6 8.5 39.8
1973 784.9 681.2 103.7 555.9 496.0 59.9 44.8
1974 807.8 761.7 106.1 565.9 533.6 32.3 2.4
1975 529.2 503.9 25.3 527.3 562.9 (35.6) (43.5)
1976 781.9 845.0 (63.1) 524.2 546.9 (22.7) (22.8)
1977 1,061.0 893.5 167.5 647.3 588.9 58.4 (93.5)
1Boston MYGR is
and Expenses."
calculated in Chapter 3, Table 3.9, "Summary of Revenues
2Best deficits FYs 1976 and 1977 are used. They will reflect divergence
from Audit and Census statistics. Fiscal Years worst would serve only
to exaggerate the divergence.
3Detroit MYGR is calculated by using revenue deficits created in Chapter
2 and plugged into the following equation:
Year R Estimate - R My Deficit = R Actual - E Actual = BAL 6 MYGR S/(D)
1970 464.7 64.9 399.8 384.8 15.0
1971 515.5 67.1 448.4 440.7 7.7
1972 532.5 45.0 487.5 447.6 39.9
1973 581.7 40.8 540.9 496.0 44.9
1974 565.9 29.9 536.0 533.6 2.4
1975 585.0 65.6 519.4 562.9 (43.5)
1976- 608.8 84.7 524.1 546.9 (22.8)
1977 617.8 122.4 495.4 588.9 (93.5)
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FIGURE 4.2. Boston Gross Balance.
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FIGURE 4.3. Detroit Gross Balarrce.
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Balances. Other work later in the chapter locates the prob-
lem.
Property Tax
The first step in financial analysis is an examina-
tion of the largest source of funds. Since the Property Tax
qualifies as the largest source in most cities, its impor-
tance in Fiscal Strain analysis is great. Table #4.3,
"Property Tax Differences Between Accrued Levies," compares
the statistics used by the Census and Audit. In Boston, the
Audit recognizes $95 million more in Revenues over the
eight-year period than the Census.
The difference between cities is also great as can
be seen in Figure 4.4, "Property Tax Differences: Detroit
and Boston." Detroit's differences over the eight years are
only $10 million with an average of $1 million. Table #4.4,
"Property Tax Surplus/Deficit by Datasource," illustrates
the difference by comparing both Census and Audit accrued
levies to the actual receipts, which are shown in Table
#4.5, "Propert Tax Levy." Detroit has virtually no differ-
ence between Census and Audit deficits. Comparing the Defi-
cit/Levy percentage column over the lag-free 1970 to 1975
Fiscal Years, there is at most a one percent difference
between the two deficits. Boston, on the other hand, varies
as mich as 20 percent in FY 1972 between Audit and Census
deficits. The Census, surprisingly, is more accurate
TABLE #4.3
PROPERTY TAX DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ACCRUED LEVIES
BOSTON ACCRUED LEVIES DETROIT ACCRUED LEVIES
YEAR Census Audit Census-Audit Census Audit Census-Audit
$ 000s $ 000s $ Millions $ 000s $ 000s $ Millions
1970 220,920 239,110 -19 125,595 125,307 0
1971 247,884 279,787 -31 144,349 143,796 1
1972 276,974 338,279 -61 151,811 152,052 -1
1973 303,601 154,672 156,028 -2
518,938 95
1974 311,093 172,010 175,123 -3
1975 325,897 351,074 -26 158,213 158,856 0
1976 325,858 359,090 -34 163,089 165,135 -2
1977 433,348 454,297 -21 167,545 170,679 -3
= -9 = -10
x -12 -1
I-a
C)
U,
, I
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FIGURE 4.4. Property Tax Differences: Detroit and Boston.
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TABLE #4.4
PROPERTY TAX SURPLUS/DEFICIT BY DATASOURCE
($ 000s)
Source Census Audit
Accrued Total Surplus/ Deficit/ Accrued Total Surplus/ Deficit/
Year Levy Receipts (Deficit) Levy % Levy Receipts (Deficit) Levy %
Boston
1970 220,920 239,447 18,527 8.3 239,110 239,447 336 0.1
1971 247,884 274,223 26,339 10.6 279,787 274,223 ( 5,563) ( 2.0)
1972 276,974 310,400 33,426 12.0 338,279 310,400 (27,878) ( 8.2)
1973 303,601 312,222 8,621 2.8 518,938 312,222 99,043 19.0
1974 311,093 305,769 ( 5,324) (1.7) 305,769
1975 325,897 317,743 ( 8,149) (2.5) 351,074 317,743 (33,330) ( 9.4)
1976 325,858 322,989 ( 2,869) (0.8) 359,090 322,989 (36,101) (10.0)
1977 433,348 397,923 (35,425) (8.1) 454,297 397,923 (56,374) (12.4)
Detroit
1970 125,595 125,242 ( 353) ( 0 ) 125,307 125,242 ( 65) (0.1)
1971 144,349 144,579 230 0 143,796 144,579 783 0.5
1972 151,811 151,196 ( 615) ( 0 ) 152,052 151,196 ( 856) (0.7)
1973 154,672 154,671 ( 1) ( 0 ) 156,028 154,671 ( 1,357) (0.9)
1974 172,010 172,669 659 0 175,123 172,669 ( 2,454) (1.4)
1975 158,213 155,615 ( 2,598) (1.6) 158,856 155,615 ( 3,241) (2.0)
1976 163,089 160,141 ( 2,948) (1.8) 165,135 160,141 ( 4,994) (3.0)
1977 167,545 160,717 ( 6,828) (4.0) 170,679 160,717 ( 9,962) (5.8)
C
-- 3
I I
TABLE #4.5
PROPERTY TAX LEVY
Collections to Date, June 30
'9 ii
Fiscal Year Levy 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 Total
Boston
1970 228,683 238,427 239,426 239,435 239,445 239,447 239,447 239,447
1971 261,161 272,630 274,210 274,221 274,221 274,223 274,223
1972 291,397 310,191 310,398 310,398 310,400 310,400
1973 307,495 311,745 312,133 312,222 312,222
1974 145,382 157,161 159,184 160,385 160,385
1975 24 304,288 313,574 317,744 317,744
1976 313,309 322,989 322,989
1977 10 397,923 397,923
Detroit
1970 122,530 123,859 NA 125,041 125,138 125,201 125,229 125,242 125,242
1971 141,158 NA 143,873 144,183 144,448 144,512 144,579 144,579
1972 NA 149,481 150,298 150,897 151,115 151,196 151,196
1973 150,971 152,710 153,949 154,467 154,671 154,671
1974 168,286 170,824 172,145 172,669 172,669
1975 152,531 154,501 115,615 115,615
1976 157,674 160,141 160,141
1977 160,717 160,717
00
, I
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regarding Property Tax Revenues than the Audit. This can be
explained by the knowledge that bankers tend to use finan-
cial statements more than Census data for analysis when
lending short-term debt. TANs are issued against the secu-
rity of the tax bills in the account. Inflating this
account by underreserving allows for a larger loan.
Testing for Accuracy shows that there are differ-
ences in raw data between the Census and Audit. Not only
are the differences large, but they increase annually. The
Gross Balance displayed this further, more so in Detroit
than Boston. The most interesting and, probably, the most
predictable result involves the Property Tax. Boston's
thorny problem, its Tax Deficit, shows up prominently in the
differences between Audit and Census data. If nothing else,
this single account analysis can serve as a warning signal.
When statistics are so far different, a deficit explanation
may exist for the difference.
Consistency
While the accuracy assumption focused on raw data
reporting, the issue of consistency focuses on the opera-
tions performed on these raw data in order to obtain mea-
sures of financial solvency. The two most notable measures
are the Current Account balance and the Property Tax bal-
ance. Since most banks analyze a prospective client by the
stability of its largest source of income, it is extremely
110
important that the Property Tax is measured not only accu-
rately but consistently.
Table #4.6, "Summary of Current Account Balances by
Datasource," displays the Current Account balances recon-
ciled by the three types of data, Census, Audit, and My.
The calculations underlying these deficits are displayed in
Table #4.7, "Current Account Balances Worksheets." The Cur-
rent Account deficits as summarized are also plotted in
Figures 4.5 and 4.6.
In both Boston and Detroit, Figures 4.5 and 4.6, the
Census dataline is very different from the Audit dataline.
One explanation revolves around the inclusion of capital
outlay as general Revenue. The Census makes it clear that
capital outlay is deducted from Current Account expenditures,
but there is no line item that capital revenue has been
deducted from General Revenue. Some, most, or all of this
net Long-Term Debt may go to the Current Account to supply
dollars for current-year Expenses. It is very easy for a
city to deposit its capital revenues into the Current
Account, thus altering the balance and making the city
appear to have more receipts than it does. Deflating this
Census statistic by the net LTD should draw the Census Cur-
rent Account balance closer to the Audit balance and may
explein the large differences in Figures 4.5 and 4.6. When
deflated, Boston's Census line is drawn closer to the Audit
line. Boston may use capital revenue as a means to inflate
TABLE #4.6
SUMMARY OF CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES BY DATASOURCE*
(Dollars in Millions)ii
Operating Gross
Year Balance Census Audit My Census Audit My
Number 1 X 2 3 4 5 6
Boston
1970 35.1 19.1 1.5 4.1 (17.7) ( 0.4) 0.4
1971 43.5 NA (27.5) 3.0 (33.8) (27.9) ( 6.3)
1972 62.0 12.3 (15.9) ( 0.4) (31.7) (16.0) (16.6)
1973 61.1 NA 19.6 ( 8.0) (31.5) 9.7 (13.9)1974 79.9 81.5 12.4
1975 57.6 29.1 25.6 ( 8.1) (61.2) (17.7) (31.1)
1976 61.6 9.6 (20.7) (29.1) (83.7) (12.6) (29.3)**
1977 100.2 62.5 (17.7) 13.0 18.5 33.7 12.00**
Detroit
1970 111.7 104.0 3.6 19.3 29.8 ( 0.8) 15.5
1971 154.5 NA 10.2 0.3 42.4 17.5 7.6
1972 191.3 172.6 1.9 33.2 45.8 8.6 39.8
1973 240.8 NA 52.5 37.5 103.7 59.9 44.8
1974 217.7 211.3 29.9 ( 0.04) 106.1 32.2 2.4
1975 147.7 .99.9 (23.8) (31.7) 25.4 (35.6) (43.5)
1976 223.5 237.0 (222.1) (17.1) (63.1) (22.7) (22.8)
1977 336.0 365.5 576.9 (100.4) 167.5 58.4 (93.5)
*) All balances are calculated in General Fund Balances Worksheets #3 and #4, Table #24.
**) Best deficits, FYs 1976 and 1977.
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TABLE #4.7
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES WORKSHEETS
Explanation
These worksheets display the method of calculating all General Fund
Balances as shown in Table #23. The methods used to calculate fund
balances may vary between cities because of data availability. This
difference is shown and explained. The six calculated balances and
respective abbreviations are shown below.
Balance 1 = BAL 1
Balance X = BAL X
Balance 2 = BAL 2
Balance 3 = BAL 3
Balance 4 = BAL 4
Balance 5 = BAL 5
Balance 6 = BAL 6
Balances 1-6 Surplus/(Deficit) = S/(D)
Census Operating
Census Deflated
Audit Operating
My Operating
Census Gross
Audit Gross
My Gross
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Worksheet 1: BAL 1 CENOP*
Year General Expense R General- E General 
= BAL 1
E Gross - E Capital = E General S/(D)
Boston
1970 355.0 46.4 308.6 343.7 308.6 35.1
1971 429.2 73.3 358.9 402.4 358.9 43.5
1972 493.2 85.2 408.0 470.0 408.0 62.0
1973 549.8 81.3 468.5 529.7 468.5 61.1
1974 530.5 58.1 472.4 552.3 472.4 79.9
1975 672.4 108.0 564.4 622.0 564.4, 57.6
1976 778.9 127.2 651.7 713.3 651.7 61.6
1977 779.4 73.8 705.6 805.8 705.6 100.2
Detroit
1970 353.4 54.2 299.2 510.9 299.2 111.7
1971 428.6 82.4 346.2 500.7 346.2 154.5
1972 489.5 99.4 390.1 581.4 390.1 191.3
1973 540.2 115.7 424.5 665.2 424.4 240.8
1974 548.3 90.9 457.4 674.1 457.3 216.8
1975 622.6 109.3 513.3 661.0 513.3 147.7
1976 654.9 96.5 558.4 781.9 558.4 223.5
1977 690.5 119.8 570.7 906.7 570.7 336.0
*) The Census provides only General Revenue as a statistic. General
Expense is calculated by netting capital expenditures from gross
expenditures.
= CENOP
= CENDEFL
= AUDOP
= MYOP
= CENGR
= AUDGR
= MYGR
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Worksheet 2: BAL X CENDEFL* ($ Millions)
Year IssuedLon- erd Net LTD BAL 1 - Net LTD = BAL X
Boston
1970 43.6 28.6 16.0 35.1 16.0 19.1
1971 NA NA NA 43.5 NA NA
1972 77.1 28.4 49.7 62.0 49.7 12.3
1973 NA NA NA 61.1 NA NA
1974 27.0 28.6 ( 1.6) 79.9 C 1.6) 81.5
1975 83.0 35.0 48.0 57.6 48.0 29.1
1976 85.0 32.9 52.1 61.6 52.1 9.6
1977 75.0 37.3 37.7 100.2 37.7 62.5
Detroit
1970 40.3 33.3 7.0 111.7 7.0 104.7
1971 NA NA NA 154.5 NA NA
1972 53.3 34.6 18.7 191.3 18.7 172.6
1973 NA NA NA 240.8 NA NA
1974 42.6 37.1 5.5 216.8 5.5 211.3
1975 83.0 35.2 47.8 147.7 47.8 99.9
1976 20.9 34.4 (13.5) 223.5 (13.5) 237.0
1977 8.9 38.4 (29.5) 336.0 (29.5) 365.5
*) Explanations are sought to explain the wide discrepancy between Audit
and Census data. Since it is unclear as stated in the Census that
Long-Term Debt was separated from the General Revenues, the Net LTD
is deducted from the original Census surplus/(deficit). This is not
an uncommon "oversight" in municipal accounting.
Worksheet 3: BAL 2 AUDOP; BAL 3 MYOP; BOSTON
Year BAL 2 S/(D) BAL 3 S/(D)
1970 1.51 4.1
1971 (27.5)1 3.0
1972 (15.9) ( 0.4)
1973) 19.62 8.0)
1974) 2
1975 25.623 (18.1)
1976 (20.7) (29.1)
1977 (17.7) ( 0.5)
1Source: Boston 
Audits
2General Revenue Funds, p. 
20.
3Summary of Appropriations, Expenses, and Balances, p. 31.
4General Revenue Funds, Combined Balance Sheet.Sumaary of Appropriations, Expenses, and Balances, p. 21.
*) All balances are calculated in Chapter III, Table #3.3, "Summary of
Expense Deficits."
114
Worksheet 4: BAL 2 AUDOP; BAL 3 MYOP; Net Capital; DETROIT ($ Millions)
Net Capital
Year R Capital - E Capital = Net Capital
1970 15.6 19.9 ( 4.3)
1971 29.5 22.2 7.3
1972 27.9 21.2 6.6
1973 36.4 29.1 7.3
1974 34.4 32.0 2.4
1975 26.7 38.5 (11.8)
1976 16.7 22.7 ( 6.0)
1977 38.9 32.0 6.9
BAL 2 AUDOP
Year BAL 5 AUDGR - Net Capital = BAL 2 AUDOP
1970 ( 0.7) ( 4.3) 3.6
1971 17.5 7.3 10.2
1972 8.5 6.6 1.9
1973 59.8 7.3 52.5
1974 32.3 2.4 29.9
1975 ( 35.6) (11.8) ( 23.8)
1976 (227.7) ( 5.6) (222.1)
1977 583.7 6.8 576.9
BAL 3 MYOP
Year BAL 6 MYGR - Net Capital = BAL 3 MYOP
1970 15.0 ( 4,3) 19.3
1971 7.6 7.3 0.3
1972 39.8 6.6 33.2
1973 44.8 7.3 37.5
1974 2.4 2.4 0
1975 (43.5) (11.8) ( 31.7)
1976- (22.8) ( 5.6) ( 17,2)
1977 (93.5) 6.8 (100.3)
Worksheet 5: Gross Deficit ($ Millions)
Census BAL 4 Audit BAL 5 BAL 6YearR Total - E Total = AUDGR MYGR
S/(D) S/(D) S/(D)
Boston
1970 369.5 387.2 (17.7) 353.1 353.5 ( 0.4) 0.41
1971 430.7 464.4 (33.7) 376.1 404.0 (27.9) ( 6.3)
1972 498.1 529.8 (31.7) 450.2 466.2 (16.0) (16.6)
1973 565.8 597.4 (31.6) 738.7 729.0 9.7 (13.9)1974 593.8 581.4 12.4
1975 665.4 726.6 (61.2) 523.1 540.8 (17.7) (31.1)
1976 761.9 845.6 (83.7) 615.5 628.1 (12.6) (29.3)2
1977 863.7 845.2 18.5 673.2 639.5 33.7 12.02
Detroit
1970 509.0 479.2 29.8 384.0 384.8 ( 0.8) 15.5 3
1971 607.2 564.8 42.4 458.2 440.7 17.5 7.6
1972 692.4 646.7 45.7 456.1 447.6 8.5 39.8
1973 784.9 681.2 103.7 555.9 496.0 59.9 44.8
1974 807.8 761.7 106.1 565.9 533.6 32.3 2.4
1975 529.2 503.9 25.3 527.3 562.9 (35.6) (43.5)
1976 781.9 845.0 (63.1) 524.2 546.9 (22.7) (22.8)
1977 1,061.0 893.5 167.5 647.3 588.9 58.4 (93.5)
1Boston BAL 6 MYGR are calculated in Chapter III, Table #17, "Summary of
2
Revenues and Expenses. I
Best deficits FYs 1976 and 1977 are used. They will reflect divergence
from Audit and Census statistics. Fiscal Years worst would serve only
to exaggerate the divergence.
3 Detroit BAL 6 MYGR are calculated by using revenue deficits created in
Chapter II and plugged into the following equation:
Year R Estimate - R My Deficit = R Actual - E Actual = BAL 6 MYGR S/(D)
1970 464.7 64.9 399.8 384.8 15.0
1971 515.5 67.1 448.4 440.7 7.7
1972 532.5 45.0 487.5 447.6 39.9
1973 581.7 40.8 540.9 496.0 44.9
1974 565.9 29.9 536.0 533.6 2.4
1975 585.0 65.6 519.4 562.9 (43.5)
1976 608.8 84.7 524.1 546.9 (22.8)
1977 617.8 122.4 495.4 588.9 (93.5)
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FIGURE 4.5. Boston Current Account Balance.
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FIGURE 4.6. Detroit Current Account Balance.
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assets and pay for current Expenses with long-term capital.
Because Detroit's deflated Census dataline has not
approached Audit to a significant degree, it can be assumed
the Detroit does not use this accounting technique to bol-
ster its net income. The technique employed may be based on
Detroit's overestimated Transfer Revenue. Chapter 2 on
Detroit supports this assertion by calculating the follow-
ing Transfer deficits:
Year $ Millions
1970 (33.4)
1971 (20.4)
1972 (13.2)
1973 (31.9)
1974 (22.8)
1975 (28.4)
1976 C67.4)
1977 (27.7)
1978 (37.8)
Figure 4.6 plots the deduction of these deficits from the
Census-LTD dataline. This produces a line closer to the
Audit-based line, but it still is quite a distance away.
Table #4.8, "Dataset Variation Among Current Account
Balances," provides the differences in the operating deficit
among the various data bases. The averages over the eight-
year span provide easy measures of comparison between Census
and Deflated Census statistics to Audit-based data. A sum-
mary of the important averages from Table 4.8 follows.
Census Deflated Census Audit
Boston $ 65.1 $ 35.7 ($4.6)
Detroit $202.9 $198.6 $8.1
In Boston, the average Census surplus is $65.1 million
TABLE #4.8
DATASET VARIATION AMONG CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES
(Dollars in Millions)
Surplus/(Deficit) Differences
Year BAL 1 BAL X BAL 2 BAL 3 1 -2 1 -3 2 -3 X -2 X- 3CENOP CENDEFL AUDOP MYOP
Boston
1970 35.1 19.1 1.5 4.1 33.6 31.0 ( 2.6) 17.5 4.9
1971 43.5 NA (27.5) 3.0 71.1 40.5 (24.5) - -
1972 62.0 12.3 (15.9) ( 0.4) 77.9 62.4 (15.5) 28.2 12.7
1973 61.1 NA 19.6 ( 8.0) 121.6 69.2 11.6 - -
1974 79.9 81.5 88.0 11.5 72.3 87.6
1975 57.6 29.1 25.6 ( 8.1) 51.5 85.2 33.7 4.5 37.2
1976 61.6 9.6 (20.7) (29.1) 82.4 90.8 8.4 30.3 38.7
1977 100.2 62.5 (17.7) 13.0 117.9 113.2 ( 4.7) 80.2 75.5
E=558.6 E=214.0 E=(36.6) E=(25.5) E=555.9 E=500.3 E=14.9 E=232.0 E=256.6
x= 69.8 i= 35.7 i=( 4.6) x=( 3.6) x= 69.5 x= 62.5 x= 2.1 x= 38.7 x= 32.0
Detroit
1970 111.7 104.0 ( 5.0) 19.3 116.7 92.4 (24.3) 109.0 84.7
1971 154.5 NA 10.2 0.3 144.4 154.3 9.9 - -
1972 191.3 172.6 1.9 33.2 189.4 158.1 (31.3) 170.7 139.4
1973 240.8 NA 52.5 37.5 187.6 202.6 15.0 - -
1974 217.7 211.3 29.8 0 187.0 216.8 29.8 181.5 211.3
1975 147.7 99.9 (47.5) (31.7) 196.4 180.6 (15.8) 148.6 132.8
1976 223.5 237.0 (28.4) (17.1) 251.9 240.1 (11.3) 265.4 254.1
1977 336.0 365.5 51.5 (100.4) 284.8 436.7 151.9 417.3 314.3
E=1287.2 E=1190.3 E=65.0 E=(59.0) E=1369.0 E=1587.0 E=125.0 E=1292.5 E=936.6
i= 160.9 i= 198.3 x= 8.1 i=( 7.3) i= 171.0 x= 198.0 i= 15.6 x= 215.4 x=156.1
tn
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compared to the average Audit deficit of $4.6 million, a
difference of $69.7 million. The deflated Census statistic
brings this down to an average surplus of $35.7 million and
a difference of $40.3 million from the Audit. Although this
seems to be a large difference, Figure 4.5 visually reduces
the large disparity, especially when pitted against Detroit
statistics, which have a $194.8 million range between Census
and Audit figures. Census statistics inflate Detroit assets
with a $202.9 million average Census surplus and a $198.6
million average deflated Census surplus. The small $4.3
million drop would indicate that Detroit is using other
statistics as well as capital to bolster its surplus. The
Audit statistic of $8.1 million seems logically closer to
the accurate figure.
The conclusion to be drawn from the comparison of
Current Account balances is that consistency of method does
not exist across data sources. Because Detroit did not
respond to deflating techniques as well as Boston did, it is
important to remember that techniques for assessing the
creditworthiness of cities will vary across cities. Using
Census data alone certainly does not allow for accurate or
consistent assessment.
Adequacy
The methodology developed to disaggregate Current
Account deficits sets up the specific requirement of
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obtaining both estimated and actual statistics for both
Revenues and Expenses. These differences immediately desig-
nate specific financial problems. Because the Census lacks
the key information of estimated and actual data, it is
impossible to discern where problems lie. While the Census
purports the sole statistic used to be the actual, it also
registers a disclaimer that the statistic can vary from
actual to estimated within one city's budget.
These facts are extremely important to remember when
using Census statistics because the researcher can very eas-
ily be persuaded to use the Census dataset when making a
cursory comparison between the Audit and Census gross defi-
cits, total Revenues minus total Expenses. Table #4.7 and
Figures 4.2 and 4.3, which compute and plot these statis-
tics, tender small differences in Boston and Detroit. It
could be thought that, because the trendlines follow each
other, some factor could be constructed to project an Audit
line from the Census statistics. However, further analysis
in Figures 4.5 and 4.6, Current Account Deficits," show
that, once operations are performed on the data, the close
paralleling of datalines changes. The direction of the
lines changes, and the span of the difference increases
dramatically. Census data are, thus, inadequate to calcu-
late :deficits and, therefore, unable to discern Fiscal
Strain.
Other researchers use Census data, partly, because
122
each city's budget is compressed into 116 line items and is
readily available from the Bureau of the Census. What is
needed in a dataset is subordinated to the ease of availa-
bility. Audit data are difficult to obtain and then must be
further manipulated in order to approximate the real defi-
cits. While the Audit report is more reliable, Census is
much easier to obtain.
Implications
Extreme caution is advised in using either Census or
Audit data as a basis for evaluating Fiscal Strain in cit-
ies. I do believe that Audit data can be used as a basis if
the researcher understands accounting. Some key accounts
such as the Property Tax need manipulation before an accu-
rate data point is obtained. The reason why the researcher
can manipulate Audit data for better data accuracy is that
the Audit data present both estimated and actual figures.
This two-point presentation is obligatory in Fiscal Strain
analysis. Thus, if the researcher does understand account-
ing, then manipulation of several accounts can provide accu-
rate data even if they are inaccurate to start. Census
data, because of their single-point analysis, are simply
inadequate as a basis of analysis. However, when Census has
been used as a basis, its methods of reconciling the deficit
are inconsistent across cities.
The major implication that emerges is that, since
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the Census data are inaccurate, inconsistent, and inade-
quate, major doubts can be cast on any study that used
Census data. It is a bit frightening to think that public
policy may be based on studies that used Census data to
compare large cities, similarly for ratings and investment
in the private sector. In the private and public sectors,
Census data have been used because of their availability and
compactness--all the cities located in one publication with
only two pages to each city. The possibility of doing this
for Audit is quite distant. Building the dataset by account
reconcilement is a lengthy and costly process. However, it
is recommended that some form of this type of analysis be
started on the large cities.
CHAPTER 5
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This thesis attempted to determine the origins of
Fiscal Strain by disaggregating the Current Account into
specific Revenue and Expense deficits. Admittedly, two case
studies are not enough to make generalizations about all
cities, but enough information was collected to support the
finding that cities do, indeed, have different problems that
can be classified by Revenue or Expense type. For example,
both cities have severe Revenue deficits but each of a dif-
ferent type. Boston suffers from a Tax deficit while
Detroit's problem is a Transfer deficit. Their lack of
Revenues had previously been diagnosed as overspending and
attributed to the socio-economic, fiscal, and demographic
factors that serve as a basis for the conventional wisdom's
understanding of Fiscal Strain.
This study revealed that many problems are struc-
turally based. The accounting structures underlying city
finances actually fostered Revenue problems by having a
totally inadequate reserve system. Underestimated reserves
give the illusion of larger assets, which justifies the
spending of these forthcoming Revenues even before they have
been received. This does not implicate the entire system of
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accrual accounting. Recording assets when levied can work,
and in the case of Detroit's taxes, it does work.
On the other hand, Boston's Tax deficit is a perfect
example of a structural problem made worse by poor forecast-
ing. Boston is also a perfect example of what disaggregat-
ing the Current Account can show. As the real problems sur-
face, the conventional wisdom dissipates. The citizens of
Boston do not pay their property taxes, and the State Legis-
lature imposes a constraint on overlay reserves. The delin-
quent taxpayers are not the middle and lower income classes
but the wealthy with great influence and power. Boston is
in the throes of being "turned around" as Mayor Kevin White
has changed the face of Boston's downtown, waterfront, and
Back Bay areas. A young professional corps and a solid
upper-middle class have come back to the city to live. This
seemingly stable tax base has not been paying property
taxes. To alleviate the problem, several years ago, Newell
Cooke of the Tax Department unveiled a "Rogue's Gallery" in
City Hall of delinquent taxpayers. Because of the power and
influence of the delinquents, the gallery was closed within
twenty-four hours, and many of those bills are still delin-
quent.
Boston obviously should not be in the role of banker
--extending loans in the form of late tax bills at very low
interest rates. In order to prevent this bankrolling, it is
recommended that Boston and other cities record reserves
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large enough to accommodate delinquencies. Reserves should
be forecast on the basis of past delinquencies. This study
found that this type of forecasting can be done with accu-
racy. The State Legislature is also at fault in creating
the accumulating overlay Tax deficit. It is recommended
that Massachusetts rescind the constraint on the overlay
reserve but require Boston to create reserves based on his-
torical data. This clearly applies to any state regarding
any reserve.
Boston also showed a creeping Expense deficit but
not as severe as its Revenue deficit. Detroit showed a sur-
plus Expense balance--that is, it cut Expenses by the mil-
lions each year. Despite these large cuts, the Current
Account balance remained a deficit. Disaggregating
Detroit's financial statements led to the source of
Detroit's problems. Detroit begins each fiscal year with
an imbalanced budget. Detroit budgets Expenses millions
greater than Revenues. From the start of the fiscal year,
Detroit is racing against the clock to cut back Expenses in
order to match the original Revenue estimate. Detroit's
budget starts the year with an automatic deficit. Worsening
the problem is the Transfer deficit, which increases and
accumulates year after year. To say that poor forecasting
is-.at the root is almost simplistic. Most anyone can see
the historical precedent of estimates grossly exceeding
receipts.
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One explanation is that Detroit's expectations are
too high, and the city asks for more aid than other cities
do, which results in an automatic deficit in Transfers. A
second explanation is that Detroit may have a larger low-
income welfare-oriented population than the other large cit-
ies but only receives equivalent funds. Detroit may be given
relatively equal amounts to the other cities but certainly
not enough for its relatively larger '!poor" population.
Comparing demographic statistics, Detroit has 23.7 percent
of its population in the low-income bracket in 1973 while
Boston's is 32.5 percent, 5.4 percent higher.1  Thus,
Detroit's need is not necessarily greater than that of other
cities. 2
Detroit is also not asking for more dollars per
capita than Boston. In Table #5.1, Transfer statistics show
that, in 1973, Detroit asked for $80.00 per capita less than
Boston. In 1977, they differed only by $3.00 per capita in
their requests for aid. What each city received is far dif-
ferent. In 1977, Boston received $243.70 per capita, a
$40.00 per capita increase over its $203.70 request. The
story changes for Detroit. Detroit lost $20.00 per capita
from its request of $206.50. What possibly could have
1Annual Reports.
2It is acknowledged that no proof has been collected
that makes Boston representative of large cities. However,
it is used as a first comparison since Boston looks like it
has greater need and gets more than Detroit.
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TABLE #5,1
LOW-INCOME POPULATION AND PER CAPITA TRANSFERS
Item 1973 1977
Estimated Actual Estimated Actual
Boston
Percentage Low Income 32.5 24.1
Transfers per capita $214.50 $212.90 $203.70 $243.70
Detroit
Percentage Low Income 23.7 20.8
Transfers per capita $140.90 $119.70 $206.50 $185.20
happened for Detroit to drop to $185.20 per capita while
Boston received increased aid?
Perhaps, federal and state officials use similar
statistics as created in Table #5.1, that is, Boston is more
needy in its population than Detroit. Admittedly, Boston's
statistics may be inflated because of the preponderance of
students who may drop out of school for a while and then
re-register. But then, as discussed in Chapter 2, Detroit
feels that its low-income population has been grossly under-
calculated by the Census and the Federal Government.
Since Detroit requests less per capita than Boston,
it is fair to say that Detroit's welfare programs are not
"pie in the sky" as most people might think without placing
the Transfer situation in perspective. Although it may be
unfaiT that Detroit receives less per capita, the city's
budget office is performing a grave disservice by budgeting
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dreams instead of basing projections on historical prece-
dent. Detroit's problem is not greediness, far from it.
As the statistics illustrate, Detroit's problem is
not its low-income population. Thus, traditional explana-
tions using socio-economic statistics to project deficits
are far from the real source. Traditional explanations that
problems are Expense-side related are wrong, too. This is a
Revenue deficit, which began because of poor estimating and
budgeting practices. It is, therefore, recommended that the
Transfer component be estimated by historical precedent.
If Detroit, or any other city, wants additional
Transfers, the correct procedure is lobbying in Washington
and at the State House. The Balance Sheet and Income State-
ments are not the proper arena for increasing Revenues. For
only so long can money be created on paper. Detroit must
either persuade state and federal officials to send more
money or continue cutting Expenses until Revenues equal
Expenses. It also seems that Detroit may be a victim. The
state and federal levels must be involved in a Transfer
problem of this magnitude. It seems hard to imagine that a
city on its own could create an accumulating Revenue deficit
of this size. Future research should focus on this Transfer
deficit. Detroit's severe deficit leads me to think that
the=process of intergovernmental Transfers may be at fault.
Detroit's non-recognition of Contingent Liabilities
on the Balance Sheet is an Expense-side deficit. Contingent
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Liabilities are not recorded properly as a reserve but only
listed as a "note" to the financial statements. One rule of
thumb in financial analysis is that one can usually detect
trouble by looking at these "notes." Even if Detroit
records a reserve for liabilities, as it does now, the
billion-dollar liabilities from previous years are diffi-
cult to expend. Expenses like these, which are non-reserved,
are paid by undertaking short-term notes. The liability is
then added to the Balance Sheet as an "asset" to be raised
by taxes. When the earmarked taxes are collected, usually
two years later because of a time lag, the asset finally
becomes an Expense on the Income Statement. It is recom-
mended that cities list Contingent Liabilities accurately on
Balance Sheets with adequate resources to expend immediately
so that cities do not undertake and build an accumulating
short-term debt for this type of Expense.
Disaggregating the Current Account allowed a view of
Fiscal Strain not easily found in the literature. It shows
exactly how a city functions while having large deficits and
Revenues declining even further. Then the city does not
have the funds to pay, it puts off paying vendors, If pro-
longing payment is not politically feasible, the city must
tap one of its Revenue sources. Immediate funds can only be
obta4ned through the debt component as short-term notes with -
high interest rates are issued by banks. The short-term
debt has first claim on next year's taxes. When these taxes
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arrive, the bank demands repayment. The city repays the
debt although it has not been budgeted. This automatically
takes away some funds for services that the city had prom-
ised. If the city does not cut back on services, it goes
back to the bank and borrows the same amount it just repaid
again. Thus, the city's debt is "rolled over" or accumu-
lates. The deficit can increase if the city continually
budgets more than it will receive; thus, the city must ask
the bank for additional short-term notes. When the city
accumulates so many TANs, RANs, and BANs, the banks might
feel that the city is a bad risk and threaten not to "roll
over" the debt. If the city defaults on these notes, it is
said to be bankrupt. But the banks are partly to blame
because they kept lending against the very shaky Tax and
Transfer receivables. The banks did not recognize the
inflated assets. In sum, the banks aided the city down this
road of impoverishment.
The cities deluded themselves and bankers by report-
ing inflated assets. The greater the assets, the greater
the amount that can be borrowed. The city is pledging these
assets as a potential form of payment. When the taxes come
in, the banks get paid. But a time lag of at least two
years was created. The deficit of the present year is
allegedly not known before the end of the year. By that
time, the following fiscal year's budget has been approved
and cannot be touched. Thus, the present year's deficit is
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recognized two years forward. Revenues and Expenses are not
matched in the same time period in an accounting sense.
Expenses for one year are paid by several years' Revenues.
There is no matching of funds, but the bills do get paid.
Although the city is responsible only to the bank, it
deludes the bank in the first place by inflating assets on
the Balance Sheets to match Expenses for the current year.
Therefore, it is recommended that assets not be inflated and
that Revenues be matched with Expenses during the same time
period.
Watching the process of disaggregation allows the
viewer to see who the players are in municipal finance. The
cities are not alone in their surplus or deficit position.
As just seen, banks play a large role in keeping cities
liquid. The seasonal fluctuation in Taxes demands some type
of financial assistance. The state and federal levels of
government send large amounts of aid for social programs.
Thus, the city is heavily dependent on other Revenue sources
than just its taxing component. Any imbalance necessarily
causes a deficit. Because of these findings, the Revenue
component takes on more importance than it had been previ-
ously accorded in the literature.
This framework has shown that the Revenue deficit
catetyzes a reaction among the entire set of accounts.
Expenses are cut or not paid if a Revenue deficit emerges,
This causes the debt component to be used as a plug. This
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bouncing back and forth among the components draws all the
actors--banks and all levels of government--into play. The
citizens are affected by this chain reaction only if the
necessary Revenue cannot be found although they were at the
beginning of this process by voting for the central player,
the mayor. After the election, it is the structural system
that takes over--how the money is processed. The accounting
system is blind to low income, blacks, high density, and
regional location. Fiscal Strain is inherent in the
accounting system, and the extent of Fiscal Strain is per-
haps related to the initial political contract struck
between the mayor and his constituency.
Apart from the actual Revenue and Expense findings,
the most interesting and startling discovery of this study
emerged by accident. After working with the Census data and
then disaggregating the Current Account deficit by use of
Audit data, I could sense a difference between these data
sources. While the two datasets were supposed to represent
the same financial data, conflicting statistics appeared for
the same budget items. This felt disparity led me to test-
ing these differences more formally. According to the tests
set up in Chapter 4, it was found that Census data are inac-
curate, inconsistent, and inadequate for use as a dataset to
analyze Fisal Strain. Also, no clear pattern between Census
and Audit data emerged that would allow for a correction
factor to be created so that the easily available Census
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data could be used. Presently, it is recommended that the
evaluation of Fiscal Strain in large cities be carried out
by use of only Audit data. Census data should never be used
unless the researcher is very familiar with the Audit data
and accounting procedures and is using the two data sources
in tandem.
APPENDIX A
A FRESH LOOK AT THE ALLEGED CORRELATIONS
OF FISCAL STRAIN
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Gramlich and others have suggested in the literature
that deficits in the Current Account (CACCT) are influenced
and explained by socio-economic, fiscal, and demographic
factors. Once the proper identification of these variables
can be made, a model can be built to predict the behavior of
the Current Account and, thus, to define Fiscal Strain. As
discussed in the Literature Review, Gramlich further narrows
the concept of the Current Account to a group of six subsid-
iary accounts, which, he feels, actually drain the city cof-
fers, and labels this group as Marginal Account (YACCT).1
Gramlich then builds models to predict both MACCT and CACCT.
The objective of all models is to explain a phenom-
enon, and their worth lies in the ability to predict that
behavior over time. What good is a model if it explains
only the present year? If the significance of the factors
changes over the years, great doubt lies in these Fiscal
Strain models. Thus, the objective of this study is to test
the stability of the descriptors over time. In so doing, a
retest of the significance of the original descriptors is
necessary as a step in building the predictive model.
Methodology
The methodology underlying this model-building
1This set of accounts is termed "marginal" because,
in-Pie past, they did not normally drain revenues from the -
city. They are welfare, higher education, transit, public
hospitals, public housing, and pension contributions.
Gramlich felt that, be predicting the Marginal Account, an
operating deficit can be predicted.
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involved data collection of budget variables for the thirty
largest cities for two years, 1970-1971 and 1974-1975, the
model to be built with the first year's data and then proj-
ected forward and be tested for accuracy with 1974-1975.
The budget was collapsed, Exhibit Al, to obtain the two
dependent variables, Marginal and Current Accounts. The
independent variables, created by Census data and the Sur-
vey of Buying Power, are:2
1. Economic
a. Disposable Income (DI) of the city's population
in net dollars. This indicates the relative wealth of a
city. The higher the DI, the greater the earning lev-
els of the population. This indicates the potential for
more dollars going to taxes to close the revenue-expense
gap.
b. Median Household Income (MEDHH), another indica-
tor of the relative wealth of the community.
c. Percentage of population earning less than
$5,000/year (LOINC) indicates the relative number of
people needing social welfare programs. The higher this
percentage, the greater the probability of a MACCT
2The problem of inflation between the two years was
resolved by deflating the prices to a common year. The GNP
Implicit Price Deflator is the ratio of GNP in current prices
to GNP in constant prices. The 1970-1971 data are weighted
by 96.0 as the 1974-1975 data are weighted by 126.4. The
base year used by the Statistical Abstract of the United
States is 1958, and the year 1972 is weighted by 100. To
use these weights, the price is multiplied by 100 and then
divided by the weight. For example, if DI in 1970-1971 was
1000, 1000 x 100 : 96.0 = 100,000 : 96.0 = $1,041.67. If
DI in 1974-1975 was 1000, 1000 x 100 : 126.6 = $791.14.
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EXHIBIT #A1
METHODOLOGY TO COLLAPSE BUDGET DATA
Step #1: Number budget data from the Census, 116 items Data Sheet.
BUDGET DATA SHEET--116 ITEMS
($000)
ITEM 19. New Orleans 1. New York
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
Population 1973 (Estimated) 573,479
Revenue, Total 229,819
General Revenue 214,162
Intergovernmental Revenue 79,403
From State Government 33,463
Education -
Highways 6,365
Public Welfare 1,473
Health and Hospitals 387
Housing and Urban Renewal -
General Support 22,264
Other 2,974
From Federal Government 45,670
General Revenue Sharing 18,211
From Local Governments 270
General Revenues from Own Sources 134,759
Taxes 82,897
Property 29,317
General Sales and Gross Receipts 36,357
Selective Sales and Gross Receipts 10,580
Alcoholic Beverages 780
Motor Fuels -
Public Utilities 5,640
Tobacco Products -
Other 4,160
Income Taxes -
Motor Vehicle Licenses 1,036
Miscellaneous Licenses 5,607
Other -
Charges and Miscellaneous Gen. Revenue 51,862
Current Charges 35,199
Education -
School Lunch Sales -
Other Local School Charges -
Institutions of Higher Education -
Highways 237
Hospitals -
Sewerage 6,571
Sanitation Other than Sewerage 2,576
Parks and Recreation 2,125
Housing and Urban Renewal -
7,646,818
14,231,572
12,763,879
6,699,536
6,069,385
1,525,369
64,295
3,264,183
201,773
60,449
596,817
356,499
613,700
259,681
16,451
6,054,343
4,852,702
2,668,722
791,116
407,306
9,694
96,033
44,795
256,784
891,056
23,454
35,486
35,562
1,211,641
770,718
95,235
13,449
221
81,565
132,040 -
198,097
47,836
13,985
8,693
191,104
139
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65,
66.
67.
68,
69.
70.
71.
72.
73,
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
Intergovernmental Expenditure
Direct General Expenditure
Current Operation
Capital Outlay
Construction
Land and Existing Structures
Equipment
Assistance and Subsidies
Interest on General Debt
Education
Local Schools
City-Operated Schools Only
Institutions of Higher Education
Highways
Public Welfare
Categorical Cash Assistance
Other Cash Assistance
Vendor Payments for Medical Care
Vendor Payments, Other
Welfare Institutions
Other Public Welfare
Hospitals
Own Hospitals
Other Hospitals
Health
Police Protection
Fire Protection
Sewerage
Sanitation Other Than Sewerage
Other Than Capital Outlay
Parks and Recreation
Other Than Capital Outlay
Housing and Urban Renewal
City Housing Projects
Capital Outlay Only
1,623
195,786
145,745
39,202
26,452
6,164
6,586
60
10,779
1,954
1,954
15,320
3,647
60
1,269
2,318
6,072
27,653
17,409
12,643
8,505
6,387
14,239
8,009
Airports 5,435
Water Transport and Terminals -
Parking Facilities 1,267
Miscellaneous Commercial Activities 12,631
Other 4,357
Special Assessment 788
Sale of Property 343
Housing and Urban Renewal -
Other 343
Interest Earnings 11,351
Fines and Forfeits 1,793
Other and Unallocable 2,388
Utility Revenue 9,862
Employee Retirement Revenue 5,795
Expenditure Total 218,650
General Expenditure 197,409
12,369
23,189
7,113
41,057
3,530
15,978
15,978
170,892
70,859
179,664
809,800
657,893
14,040,125
11,641,287
69,732
11,571,555
8,279,422
1,467,687
1,332,926
85,753
49,008
1,143,088
681,358
2,726,295
2,242,003
2,125,111
484,292
204,274
2,887,664
980,251
162,837
891,572
13,165
839,839
1,335,457
747,110
588,347
285,760
561,424
229,893
357,961
228,903
186,084
151,422
93,335
626,636
444,922
151,166
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93.
94.
95.
Urban Renewal Projects
Capital Outlay Only
Other
96. Libraries
97. Financial Administration
98. General Control
99. Courts
100. Other
101. General Public Buildings
102. Interest on General Debt
103. All Other
104. Airports
105. Other Than Capital Outlay
106. Water Transport and Terminals
107. Other Than Capital Outlay
108. Correction
109. Parking Facilities
110. Other Than Capital Outlay
111. Protective Inspection and Regulation
112. Miscellaneous Commercial Activities
113. Other and Unallocable
114. Utility Expenditure
115. Employee Retirement Expenditure
116. Exhibit: Total Expenditure for Personal
Services
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
2,269
4,943
10,800
6,127
4,673
4,715
10,779
56,461
7,123
2,181
7,983
280
258
1,788
12,880
26,407
9,017
12,224
98,457
* * * *
179,849
114,028
1,865
81,538
62,233
211,614
135,098
76,516
58,637
681,358
950,218
58,467
2,353
142,017
30.711
13,355
27,217
11,139
680,667
1,548,232
850,606
5,870,806
* * * *** * **
Step #2: Collapse data by use of formulas stipulated in 34 item Data
Sheet.
BUDGET DATA SHEET--34 ITEMS
New York
1974-1975
6699536
1583467
1525369
3590700
3264183
201773
60449
64295
6064343
6257667
2668722
1179134
132040
198097
191104
65789S
95235
6190397
2887664
204274
Col
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
Category
Grants (C1)
Normal Functions (Y)
Schools
Marginal Functions
Welfare
Public Health
Public Housing
Transportation
Own Revenues (C2)
Taxes (Z)
Property Tax
Marginal Functions
Transportation
Hospitals
Public Housing
Pensions
Schools
Marginal Functions = Q
Welfare
Highways
Data Sheet
5
12+13+14+16
7
9+10+11+8
9
10
11
8
17
17+55-33-37-38-42
19
37+38+42+56
37
38
42
56
33
73+72+80+83+91+115
73
72
141
Hospitals and Health
Public Housing
Pensions
Schools
Normal Functions
Normal Revenues Y + Z
School Grants and Charges
Current Account Deficit
Marginal Functions Deficit all
Welfare
Transportation
Public Health
Public Housing
Pensions
80+82
91
115
69+71
57-69-Q-71
7 + 33
3-57
below
9-73
8+37-72
10+38-80-82
11+42-91
56-115
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Step #3: Output of FORTRAN program should look like Gramlich's model.
COMPOSITION OF NEW YORK CITY BUDGET DEFICIT, FISCAL 1974
(Millions of current dollars)
Revenues
Grants
Normal functions plus untied
Schools
Marginal functions
Welfare
Higher education
Public hospitals
Public housing
Own revenues
Taxes plus normal charges
Marginal functions
Higher education
Transit
Public hospitals
Public housing
Current account deficit
11,291.5
5,076.3
1,442.2
872.4
2,761.7
2,393.1
196.0
135.5
37. 1
6,215.2
5,186.0
1,029.2
72.0
629.5
147.3
180.4
487.6
Cuirent expenditures
Normal functions
Schools
Marginal functions
Welfare
Higher education
Transit
Public hospitals
Public housing
Pension contributions
Normal revenues 6,628.2 Normal expenditures 3,769.5
School grants 872.4 School expenditures 1,726.3
Current account deficit 487.6 Marginal functions deficit 2,492.4
Welfare 194.3
Higher education 222.1
Transit 310.2
Public hospitals 80.3
Public housing 7t 8
Pension contributior-s 833 7
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census City Government Finances. 1973-74.
1621217
626636
850606
2726295
5123433
7841134
1620604
191447
-1420563
376519
-7939
-1221347
-375083
-192713
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
11,779.1
3,769.5
1, 726.3
6,283.3
2,587.4
490. 1
989.7
1 ,088. 1
294.3
833.7
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deficit.
d. Percentage of population earning more than
$10,000/year, another way to detect wealth, the relative
magnitude of this meaning less need for welfare and,
hence, less MACCT deficit.
2. Demographic
a. Population (POP) in absolute numbers.
b. Density (DENS) defined as population/mile. The
literature suggests that density equalizes the popula-
tion across cities and spotlights those with abnormally
high ratios. It is thought that high density is cor-
related with high LOINC, thereby draining MACCT.
c. Percentage non-white (NONWH) residents in the
population is thought to indicate the relative amount
needed for social programs, thereby affecting the MACCT.
d. Regional location of the city is indicative of
the general economic development potential. Certain
sections of the country are now enjoying rapid expansion
at the expense of older regions of the country. Gram-
lich felt that the dummy variables Midwest (MIDW) and
South (STH) would test this.
3. Financial Data
a. Debt per capita (DEBT) defined as gross out-
standing debt/population is used as an indicator of the
city's future responsibility to repay banks and bond-
holders. This ratio is thought to be unfair to cities
that have just taken out large amounts of debt for capi-
'tal improvements. Many times, these improvements are
signs of fiscal stability, thus conflicting with the
prevailing sentiment that high debt per capita ratios
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signal FS. 3 Some financial analysts feel that debt is
not an independent variable influencing or describing
the Current Account, but rather a dependent variable,
too. Thus, there may be too much unexplained variance
or collinearity in the model. The next attempt at an
econometric model would involve further work to isolate
and explain this variable.
b. Revenue sharing (REVSH) is the amount of abso-
lute dollars given to each city. It becomes a variable
in the 1974-1975 data. Since it is a new variable, it
will indicate the importance of these funds to declining
economies.
To further prepare the variables for model building,
exploratory data analysis plotted x versus y variables to
discover any non-linear relationships, which would necessi-
tate variable transformation. Surprisingly, no variables
formed any shape that might have indicated a curvilinear
form. Even POP and DENS, which I suspected would need
transformation, plotted a roughly horizontal bar. Another
problem that could disturb the linear relationship of the
data is the belief that some cities like New York or Los
Angeles are so big and different from the mainstream that
their influence would exaggerate the equation and line in
some way. To test the presence of outliers, the "Normal
Probability Plot for Standardized Residuals" in Figures
#Al and A2 was constructed. This plot tests the Gaussian
3Interview with Chester Harris, President of Chester
Harris and Company, Municipal Bond Underwriters, New York,
New York, 28 April 1977.
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FIGURE AAl
NORMAL PROBABILITY PLOT FOR STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS, 1970-1971
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FIGURE #A2
NORMAL PROBABILITY PLOT FOR STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS, 1974-1975
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assumption of normally distributed errors. In 1970-1971,
the standardized residuals fall on a roughly straight line
with only two possibilities for outliers. As an outlier,
New York had been evident in most x versus y plots while
Chicago and Los Angeles were seen less frequently. In
1974-1975, the standardized residuals fall on a tigher line
than in 1970-1971. Only one data point, New York City,
seems like a clear outlier. To test further for outliers,
Exhibit #A2, "The Hat Matrix," tests New York, Los Angeles,
and Chicago as outliers. The result is that none can be
determined to be an outlier, thus, all are used as data
points in the linear models.
Model Calibration
With variables in shape and all cities cleared for
residency in the dataset, the model is built by use of all
possible subsets.4 The following models were chosen from
a longer list of the "best equation output. I chose four
for each CACCT and MACCT on the basis of the computer's
assessment and an analysis of test results on the equation
4For each dependent variable, 2k regressions are
run. K is the number of the independent variables. For
1970-1971, 2k=210 = 1296. For 1974-1975, 2k=211 = 2592.
These regressions are then divided into sets of runs that
involve p variables, p = 1, 2, . . . k, and each set is
ordered according 2to some criterion. Usually, the criterion
is the value of R achieved by the least square's fit; if,
howeVer, the R2 is not substantially increased by inclusion
of additional variables, Mallow's Cp will be used to mini-
mize the number of regressors (and parameters), trading
bias for tigher prediction.
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EXHIBIT #A2
THE HAT MATRIX*
The Normal Probability Plot and several x vs, y plots indicate
the possibility of an outlier. The data point in question each time is
New York City. It is thus necessary to determine how much influence or
"leverage" each data value (y.) has on each fitted y-value (y.). The
hat matrix is employed to process each fitted value z. as a linear com-
J
bination of the observed values y..
To obtain h., the following formula was used:
r.
sr =
s Vl-h.
2
r. = actual residual s = residual mean square sr = standardized residual
The result h = .9962 is compared to the critical test of 2 p/n = .2000.
Since h. is much greater than 2 p/n, the observation, NYC, is highly sus-
pect as an outlier with great leverage on the regression line. It is now
important to determine whether this would have an adverse effect on the
fit. It is possible to have great leverage as detected by h., but still
maintained as a useful data point contribution to accurate prediction. To
test this condition, the studentized residual with a t distribution of
n-p-l degrees of freedom is used.
r* = r /s V-h
1 i (i)l
To determines , use: 2
(1) 2 2 r1(n-p-1) s = (n-p) s - 1-h.
The NYC r* = .5157 and is significantly smaller than the t statis-
tic, 2.000, indicating that NYC, even with its extreme values, is quite
important in providing information on certain coefficients. I thus choose
to maintain NYC (and LA and Chicago with similar findings) as an observation
in the data set. This statistical analysis is further buttressed by a more
practical reason. It is precisely these cities, NYC, Chicago, LA, that most
people in the field would like to be able to explain and predict. If they
were d#iscarded from the sample, all possibility of this would be lost.
*David Hoaglin and Roy Welsch, "The Hat Matrix in Regression and
ANOVA," Working Paper #901-77 (Cambridge: MIT, Sloan School of Manage-
ment, 1977).
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and the individual regressors.
Current Account (CACCT)
Model Cp _ 2 F-95% t 95%
C-DI-DEBT (1) -1.08 .84 yes yes
C-DI-NONWH-DEBT (2) -0.68 .85 yes no NONWH
C-DI+STH-DEBT (3) 0.34 .61 yes no STH
C-DI+STH-LOINC-DEBT (4) 1.35 ,63 yes no STH LOINC
Of all possible subsets performed on 1970-1971 data,
Model 1 was chosen as "best." Thus, Current Account is
explained "best" by DI (Disposable Income) and DEBT (out-
standing debt per capita). The Cp is minimized as the R2is
maximized. Only Model 2 has a comparable R2 of .85; how-
ever, NONWH is only a significant regressor at the 75 per-
cent level, thus casting much doubt on its inclusion in the
model. Model 3 includes STH, testing the location factor,
much heralded in the literature to explain Fiscal Strain.
Surprisingly, the R2 for Model 3 is only .61, a .20 drop
from Models 1 and 2. LOINC, another contender for predict-
ing Fiscal Strain, was included in only one of the "best"
subsets. Model 4 includes LOINC with the regressors in
Model 3 for a rise in R2 from .61 to .63. This meager
increase casts doubt on LOINC as a factor most social sci-
entists and municipal analysts claim as a vital statistic.
The models have shown that LOINC, NONWH, and STH do not add
significantly to the R2 and are not strong regressors.
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Thus, some of the fundamental beliefs about socio-economic
and demographic factors are shaken. Further analysis will
be shown in the Time Series section.
Marginal Account (MACCT)
Model Cp R2  F-95% t 95%
C-DI-DEBT (5) -1.73 .86 yes yes
C-DI+STH-DEBT (6) -0.43 .87 yes no STH
C-DI-DENS-DEBT (7) -0.43 .86 yes no DENS
C-DI-NONWH-DENS-DEBT (8) 0.77 .87 yes no DENS NONWH
Of all possible subsets performed on 1970-1971 data,
Model 5 was chosen as "best" as it minimized C while main-
p
taining a R2 of only .01 from the strongest R2s, three and
four variable models. Thus, MACCT is explained by the same
regressors as CACCT. Models 6 and 7 emerge as "best" for
three-variable models. With the inclusion of STH to DI and
DEBT, location becomes a significant regressor in Model 6.
However, DENS is not significant in Model 7, thus shaking
some conventional Fiscal Strain analyses. Model 8 also
lists DENS as an insignificant factor as well as NONWH. The
additions of NONWH and DENS, both planks of Fiscal Strain
theory, fare very poorly as regressors as can be seen by the
jump in C to 0.77. Thus, the two-variable model using
DI and DEBT explains MACCT just as it did for CACCT. The
important finding here is that the ten- to twenty-variable
models built in the literature are not even as accurate as
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the two-variable models tested here.
Projecting the Model
A. C-DI-STH-DEBT C. C-DI-DENS-DEBT
B. C-DI-NONWH-DEBT D. C-DI+STH-DEBT
The models chosen above do not include the "best"
MACCT and CACCT model, C-DI-DEBT, because these two vari-
ables are tested as to their stability over time by inclu-
sion in all the models above. These models were chosen as
representative of the conventional wisdom; this is just con-
tinued testing of those beliefs. The 1970-1971 models
already built will be compared to models built by 1974-1975
data. Using models built on data only four years apart
tests the stability and usefulness of the models, The big-
gest problem in forecasting is this change. How long does
it take for a model to become obsolete? If there is obso-
lescence within only four years, the ability to project with
any degree of accuracy is severely limited. Preliminary
analysis of the 1974-1975 data showed that REVSH, POP, and
DENS turn up as frequent regressors while, in the 1970-1971
dataset, these were practically non-existent. Although DI,
DEBT, and STH appear with frequency in both years, the
coefficient changes.
To formally test the stability of coefficients over
time, two equations were created for each model. The first
used only 1970-1971 data while the second incorporated both
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years. If the 1970-1971 coefficients plus (or minus) their
standard errors overlap with the 1970-1971 and 1974-1975
coefficients plus (or minus) their standard errors, then the
coefficients are interpreted as remaining significantly the
same. If not, model prediction four years away is risky,
at best.
Table #Al presents the results. STH in Model B is
the only regressor whose coefficient changes significantly
over time. As discussed, preliminary research showed STH as
a new addition to the key variables in 1974-1975. -Although
this is the only regressor to pass the standard test on
stability, there are other clues that cast doubt on most of
the remaining regressors. The tests do not conclusively
determine the regressors to be stable over time. Careful
analysis of the standard errors shows the magnitude to be
too great to place confidence in the regressors. The errors
are so large relative to the coefficient that there is
little hope for accuracy or precision.
Models A, B, C, and D were calibrated by 1970-1971
fiscal data and used to project CACCT and MACCT in 1974-
1975. These predictions were then compared to 1974-1975
actual data. Examination of the residual (actual-fitted)
plots showed tight clustering around zero for Model B,
CACGT = C-DI-NONWH-DEBT, and Model D, MACCT = C-DI+STH-DEBT.
Location STH is more important in predicting accuracy for
MACCT than for CACCT. Similarly, the racial composition,
TABLE #A1
STABILITY OF COEFFICIENTS OVER TIME
Dataset Variable Coefficient SE Range Overlap?
MODEL A CACCT = C - DDI - STH - DEBT
DI
STH
DEBT
DI
STH
DEBT
MODEL B CACCT = C - DI - NONWH - DEBT
DI
NONWH
DEBT
DI
NONWH
DEBT
MODEL C MACCT = C - DI - DENS - DEBT
DI
DENS
DEBT
DI
DENS
DEBT
MODEL D MACCT = C - DI + STH - DEBT
DI
STH
DEBT
70-71
70-71
+
74-75
70-71
70-71
+
74-75
70-71
70-71
+
74-75
70-71
70-71
+
74-75
*) Not evident due to rounding.
-. 0164
-11385.8
-209.25
-. 0052
4233.93
-119.476
.0024
34364.0
62.85
.0029
41147.2
63.4953
-.0186 to .0140
-45749.8 to 22978.2
-272.10 to -146.40
-.0081 to - .0023
369.27 to 45381.13
-182.98 to 55.98
yes
no
yes
-.02 .00 -.02 to -.02
1066.03 765.23 300.80 to 1831.26
-263.16 68.25 -331.41 to 194.91
-. 01
73.91
-120.10
-. 03
-4.76
-332.89
-. 03
-4.45
-279.41
-. 04
22495.90
-3085.67
-. 03
27040.20
-212.40
.00
914.41
68.83
.00
5.17
119.67
.00
3.33
65.78
.00
66622.00
126.93
.00
46538.4
58.36
-. 01 to -.01
940.50 to 988.32
-188.83 to -51.27
-.03 to -.03
-9.93 to .41
-452.66 to -213.22
-.03 to -.03
-7.78 to -1.12
-345.19 to -213.63
-.04 to -.04
-44126.1 to 89117.90
-512.60 to -158.74
-.03 to -.03
-19498.20 to 73578.60
-270.76 to -154.04
yes*
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes*
yes
yes
DI
STH
DEBT
i-j
U1
t-3
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NONWH, predicts better for CACCT than location, STH. The
residual plots also showed that both CACCT models underpre-
dicted (the fitted was less than the actual) more often.
According to the summary statistics for the compari-
son of the actual and predicted time series, the four models
and their regressors do not work well. The tight-fitting
residual plots initially obscure this conclusion. But, as
illustrated below, the correlation and regression coeffi-
cients are all negative. The negative coefficient means
that, as the actual set of data increases, the fitted values
decrease.
Model A B C D
Correlation Coefficient -. 3437 -.3261 -.3843: -.3704
Regression Coefficient -.1506 -.1383 -.0845 -.0801
In essence, the two groups of data, actual and predicted,
are moving away from each other. Not even DI and DEBT fared
well. Reasons for these poor results are possibly contained
in the construction of the dataset itself. Possible prob-
lems are: (1) the reliability of the data; (2) not enough
observations (years) to calibrate the model well; and
(3) the two years may be too different from each other to
compare. Because of this evidence, prediction results can
neither be trusted nor rejected. There is enough evidence,
though, to question the validity of past models. Further
modwting with an expanded dataset is clearly needed.
154
Conclusion
It was found that only two variables, DI and DEBT,
are significant regressors for both MACCT and CACCT. Other
models involving regressors LOINC, NONWH, and STH displayed
insignificant t scores, thus casting doubt on the conven-
tional wisdom's view of the factors associated with Fiscal
Strain. Although the coefficients of DI and DEBT remained
stable over time, the model projection over the four years
showed that the predicted scores did not fit the actual.
Negative correlation and regression results indicated that
other influences may have created the ill fit between actual
and fitted scores. Thus, if the dataset were enlarged and
made reliable, model prediction might become possible.
Gramlich's hypothesis concerning MACCT as being a
key indicator of FS is difficult to prove. Simple data
analysis (Table #A2) shows that all thirty cities carried a
MACCT deficit in 1970-1971 and twenty-nine out of thirty in
TABLE #A2
PERCENTAGE OF CITIES RUNNING DEFICITS
Deficit in 1970-1971 1974-1975 1970-1971+1974-1975
CACC16_ 15 9CACCT 53% 50% ~ 30%
MCT30 29 29
100% 97% 97%
CACCT and MACCT 
-- 53% 53% 53%
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1974-1975. It is possible that, historically, there is a
deficit in these accounts and not a surplus as was sug-
gested. The ability of a city to cover the MACCT deficit
by other resources thus prevents a CACCT deficit. A city's
resources are the indicator of Fiscal Strain and not the
MACCT balance.
APPENDIX B
OVERVIEW OF MUNICIPAL ACCOUNTING
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The basis for state and local governmental account-
ing systems is Governmental Accounting, Auditing, and Finan-
cial Reporting CGAAFR), developed by the Municipal Finance
Officers' Association. Although GAAFR is thought to be the
authoritative work, the Committee on Governmental Accounting
and Auditing of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants produced an industry audit guide, Audits of
State and Local Governmental Units (ASLGU). The audit guide
recognizes the authority of GAAFR but maintains:
GAAFR's principles do not represent a complete and
separate body of accounting principles, but rather a
part of the whole body on generally accepted accounting
principles, which deal specifically with governmental
units. Except as modified in this guide, they consti-
tute generally accepted accounting principles.1
The two independent sources have created some con-
fusion among analysts as to what the appropriate accounting
procedures are. The situation is analogous to corporate
accounting where a corporation prepares two sets of finan-
cial statements: one for the government Ctax purposes) and
one for accounting (auditing purposes). A municipality is
legally bound to one type, and then, to get a "clean" opin-
ion by an auditor, it prepares another type. If there is a
conflict between legal provisions and generally accepted
accounting principles applicable to municipal units, the
1Committee on Governmental Accounting and Auditing,
American Institute of Certified Pulic Accountants, Audits
of State and Local Governmental Units (New York: American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1974), p. 9
[hereafter cited as ASLGU].
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ASLGU states that GAAFR must take precedence if the auditor
is to render an unqualified opinion. Differences between
GAAFR and ASLGU will be discussed throughout this Appendix.
Both sources purport the use of Fund Accounting as
the basis that underlies the organization of information,
which is processed to report on and check the financial
soundness of municipalities. GAAFR reports:
A fund is defined as an independent fiscal and
accounting entity with a self-balancing set of accounts
recording cash and other resources with all related
liabilities, obligations, reserves, and equities that are
segregated for the purpose of carrying on specific activ-
ities or attaining certain objectives in accordance 2with
special regulations, restrictions, and limitations.
The use of a fund systems as a control device should
be noted. The authority creating the fund (constitutional
convention, legislative nody, or chief executive) does so to
accomplish a special purpose. Limitations are placed on the
use of resources, and requirements must be met in order to
continue similar budget appropriations. Because of this, it
is thought that fund accounting keeps government operations
"clean."3
Accounting Basis
The basis of accounting is a device for matching
revenues and expenses during a designated period of time and
refers specifically to the time when revenues and expenses
2Municipal Finance Officers' Association, Govern-
ment Accounting, Auditing, and Financial Reporting (Ann
Arbbr, Michigan: National Committee on Governmental
Accounting, 1968), pp. 6-7 [hereafter cited as GAAFR].
3GAAFR, p. 11
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are recorded as such in the accounting records. There are two
bases, each having -modifications to produce four types in total.
1. Full Accrual Basis
Revenues are recorded in the period in which the
service is given even if payments are made in a prior or
subsequent period. Expenditures are recorded in the period
in which the benefit is received even if payment is made in
a prior or subsequent period. It is commonly thought that,
if practicable, full accrual provides a superior method of
accounting because there is an accurate "matching" of costs
against revenues flowing from those costs, thereby reflect-
ing a more exact statement of profit and loss. For govern-
mental accounting, accrual basis is thought more important
for the accounting of expenditures as a check against exces-
sive spending by public officials. 5
2. Modified Accrual Basis
Revenues are recorded as received in cash except for
(a) revenues susceptible to accrual and (b) revenues of a
material amount that have not been received at the normal
time of receipt. The word "susceptible" is key; its meaning
in accounting is: for a revenue to be considered suscep-
tible to accrual, it must be both measurable and available.
Revenues are considered measurable at such time as the
amount becomes known or can be reasonably estimated based
5R. M. Mikesell and Leon Hay, Governmental Account-
ing (Homewood, Illinois: Richard P. Irwin, Inc., 1974), p.4.
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on prior experience and other information. Availability
implies the resource can properly be appropriated in a par-
ticular budget year and will be collected in cash or avail-
able for liquidating liabilities for expenditures that
occurred in the same period as that in which the revenues
are to be reported.
3. Cash Basis
Revenues are recorded in the period in which payment
is received and expenditures in the period in which payment
is made. Some governments record revenue on a cash basis
because it is sometimes uncollectible although legally due.
This is done to reflect a more accurate picture of cash
assets.
4. Modified Cash Basis
This type, as modified accrual, is part cash and
part accrual. It is non-discriminating in that either part
(accrual or cash) is acceptable, but both must be there
together.
Structure of Fund Accounting
Accounting systems allow different funds to be
accounted for differently. Following is a discussion of
the eight types of funds and two groups of accounts and the
basis of accounting for each.
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1. General Fund
Usually the largest and most important accounting
activity for municipal governments, the General Fund
accounts for all revenues and expenditures not accounted for
in other funds. Its importance should be emphasized as it
finances most of the current operations of governmental
units. It is the management and control of this fund in
particular that determine the financial soundness of a city.
Any current account deficits that must be covered by the
bond market are a warning and indicator of potential fiscal
crisis. 6
The General Fund receives as revenues: property
taxes, sales taxes, income taxes, licenses and permits,
business gross receipts taxes, fines and penalties, rents,
charges for current services, state-shared taxes, and inter-
est earnings. The General Fund may interact with other
funds to jointly finance construction of special assessment
improvements. The governmental unit's contribution to an
employee retirement fund may be paid out of the fund. The
fund may also transfer monies to and from other funds to
make up deficits. Any unappropriated balances of other
funds are generally transferred by the legislative body to
the General Fund. 7
6Joan K. Martin, "Predicting Fiscal Strain in Cit-
ies," unpublished paper, MIT, Cambridge, June 1977.
7GAAFR, p. 15.
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The General Fund is accounted for on the Modified
Accrual Basis. One major source of revenue, the property
tax, is a major source of discussion in the accounting
trade. Is the property tax susceptible to accrual? It is,
indeed, measurable; assessments are made, and fairly accu-
rate predictions of collection rates can be ascertained
based on prior experience. The problem of susceptibility
focuses on availability of revenue.
To determine the availability of property taxes,
it is known when taxes are billed and due, usually within
the same year. However, some municipalities make payments
due in the following year, which does case accounting inac-
curacy and a mismatching of revenues and expenditures, In
those cities where payment is due in the same year, the
property tax can be accounted for on an accrual basis. In
those cities where payment is due the following year, the
tax must be on a cash basis. However, if the municipality
can issues Tax Anticipation Notes in an amount equal to all
or a major portion of the tax levy, the taxes can be consid-
ered available and, thus, are susceptible to accrual.
Because the property tax is the largest source of
revenue, the way it is reflected in financial statements is
central to how sound the city appears to bond underwriters
andanalysts. Their assessment of the city largely deter-
mines the cost of issuing debt where even 0.25 percent dif-
ferential can mean inability to go to the bond market.
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Sometimes, it is too expensive to deal bonds in the market.
Use of the accrual method is imperative to reflect
financial soundness. Since the taxes are recorded as rev-
enue when levied, the city's expenditures are balanced in
that fiscal year's budget. It is crucial, however, to look
at the percentage allocated for taxes as receivable in the
following year and the percentage allocated for uncollect-
ible bad debts. This is the clue to assess a city's inflow
of tax revenue. Has the city charged off enough in each
category? To check, look at the footnotes to the financial
statements. One footnote should include historical data on
effective tax collection. Sometimes, cities will give accu-
rate data in the footnotes, e.g., 8 percent uncollectible,
and then use a 5 percent rate in the body of the balance
sheet. It is not hard to "tear up" financial statements if
one knows the warning signals. More clues will be discussed
later in the paper.
Other taxes such as income taxes, gross receipts
taxes, and sales taxes are not susceptible to accrual due
to their self-assessing basis. In other words, a municipal-
ity does not have data exact enough to predict or measure
the amount it will receive--it is not measurable though it
is available. Federal, state, or other grants are suscep-
tibte to accrual. Generally, if fund expenditure is the
prime factor for determining eligibility for the grant
funds, revenue should be recognized at the time of making
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the expenditures.8 In sum, the General Fund is established
to account for resources devoted to financing the general
services that are performed for the citizens. Any activity
that has not a special fund set up for it becomes part of
this.
2. Special Funds
These are used to account for revenues derived from
specific taxes or other earmarked revenue sources. Usually,
statutes, charter provisions, or local ordinances have
established these funds to finance particular functions or
activities of the government. Examples include parks,
schools, museums, highway construction, street maintenance,
law enforcement, and the licensing and regulation of pro-
fessions and businesses. 9
Legislative action can even charge off current oper-
aring costs to a special fund. This possibility gives rise
to yet another way to obscure operating deficits. Capital
outlays may also be accounted in a special fund though this
poses no immediate threat to analyzing a municipal budget.
At the time of legislative action establishing the funds,
the time expanse is created; it may have a definite, limited
life, or it may remain in effect until discontinued by simi-
lar legislative action.
8John E. Schramm, "Municipal Accounting and Report-
ing," CPA Journal 46 (May 1976):21.
9GAAFR, p. 28.
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The amount and nature of the revenue sources, which
finance a particular facility or program, determine whether
the program is accounted for as a Special Revenue Fund or as
an Enterprise Fund (another type, discussed lated). The
general rule is that the distinguishing characteristic of a
Special Revenue Fund is that most of the revenue involved in
the operation comes from tax and non-tax sources not
directly related to services rendered rather than from
direct charges to users of the services. Facilities and
programs financed predominantly from user charges are
accounted for in the Enterprise Fund.
Both the accounting principles and the accounting
basis used in the General Fund are applicable to the Special
Revenue Funds. Modified accrual basis is used if not spe-
cified to the contrary in the enabling legislation. The
accounting principles used in both General and Special Funds
are;
a. Depreciation is not taken on the assets
acquired by Special Revenue Funds. This is
quite logical since depreciation is just a
non-cash expense used to decrease the amount
of profit and, hence, reduce the tax share
paid by an individual investor or corporation;
since no taxes are paid in government, allow-
ance for depreciation is almost rendered mean-
ingless. It should be noted, however, that
there is a movement, small as it may be,
towards reporting depreciation to better
reflect deterioration and a more accurate,
businesslike picture of government assets,
b. The fixed assets are not accounted for in the
Special Revenue Fund but in the General Fixed
Asset Group of Accounts.
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c. Long-term debt and its debt service costs
incurred for Special Revenue Fund purposes
are usually not carried in the Special Rev-
enue Fund but in its own set of accounts.
An exception to this rule is the case of ear-
marked tax revenue, which, in addition to meet-
ing specified operating expenses and/or capi-
tal outlays, is also specifically directed to
be used for servicing limited tax bonds payable
only from thij0particular tax and its Special
Revenue Fund.
Accounting for public schools is done through the
Special Revenue Fund when stipulated by law. GAAFR, how-
ever, recommends not doing so and purports accounting for
as a single function in the General Fund. In order to
comply with the generally accepted accounting principles,
the fixed assets and long-term liabilities incurred would
be treated in the Capital Projects Funds, Debt Service
Funds, General Fixed Asset Group of Accounts, and Long-term
Debt Group of Accounts.
The accounting for public schools is a thorny prob-
lem because the wide variability of enabling state legisla-
tion has caused similar variability in accounting practices.
Since schools are a tremendous portion of the budget, the
accounting treatment could make a city look either solvent
or insolvent when compared to other cities. A city is more
likely to run a Current Account deficit if schools are
accounted for in the General Fund rather than in a Special
Revernue Fund or as an independent authority. This bears
10GAAFR, p. 29 11Martin.
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great relevance on the -municipality's ability to obtain an
Aaa rating by Moody's and, consequently, to raise money in
the bond market at a lower interest rate. This treatment of
public school accounting is another indicator of financial
soundness. The analyst should look immediately to this sec-
tion in a bond prospectus when assessing the worth of a city
and the risk of investment.
3. Debt Service Funds
The funds account to the payment of interest and
principal on long-term general obligation debts. However,
this does not include debt incurred for and serviced pri-
marily by a governmental enterprise (see Enterprise Funds)
or for Special Assessments (see Special Assessments Funds).
The three types of debt placed in the Debt Service Funds
are: (1) term or sinking fund bonds; (2) serial bonds; and
(3) notes and time warrants having a maturity more than one
year after date of issue.
The accounting for all three types is the modified
accrual basis. Since debt repayment is known and scheduled
at the time of issuance, it should be regularly budgeted as
part of a governmental unit's annual budget. Since each
debt issue constitutes a separate authorization, each issue
may have unique legal provisions, thereby rendering differ-
ent accounting procedures. Because of this, the Debt Ser-
vice Fund is generally seen as one of the more complicated
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accounting ones. GAAFR recommends that
. all general obligation bonds serviced by the
general property tax should be accounted for in a single
Debt Service Fund. The debt service for other general
obligation issues should be recorded in as few addi-
tional Debt Servie Funds as would be consistent with
applicable laws.
A significant accounting problem arises with the
treatment of interest accrual. Bond interest payments may
not coincide with the fiscal year, thus allowing for a situ-
ation where the end of the fiscal year comes between two
interest payment dates. Theoretically, interest has accrued
and should be noted as a liability. But GAAFR recommends
not recording those few months' interest because "no provi-
sion for financing such accruals can be made in the annual
budget, and the inclusion of accrued interest would produce
a book deficit when, in fact, none existed.",13
Another problem is that municipalities sometimes
account for their long-term debt in both the Debt Service
Account and the Enterprise-Fund in which the asset paid for
was placed. This gives the city an appearance of being
debt-heavy, which reduces their chance for investor confi-
dence in the bond market. Check the footnotes to see how a
municipality treats its capital investment. The ASLGU
treats this subject with great insistence as it specifies
that fixed assets constructed and financed through an Enter-
prise Fund should be accounted for only in that fund and not
12GAAFR, p. 37. 13 GAAFR, p. 38.
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in the Debt Service Fund. The only relation it should have
to the Debt Service Fund is as a contingent liability dis-
cussed in a footnote disclosure. 1 4
4. Capital Projects Fund
These account for all resources used for the acqui-
sition of capital facilities by a governmental unit except
those financed by special assessment and enterprise funds.
The Capital Projects Funds were established by GAAFR to
parallel the increased emphasis on capital budgeting by gov-
ernments in recent years and to reflect that major capital
projects are now financed from resources other than bonded
indebtedness. Grants or contractual payments from other
governmental units and agencies, funds from private sources,
direct revenues, and transfers of current revenues from
other funds now all contribute to the creation and finance
of capital projects.
Capital projects are budgeted on an individual basis
and should so be accounted for. The accounting basis is
full accrual recording assets (principally cash) and liabil-
ities as incurred. The important line item in this type of
fund is the Reserve for Encumbrances. As encumbrance is an
unpaid contracted service or good. The amount of project
obligations, which have not been specifically stated, is
reflected in this Reserve. It is this Reserve that can be
14ASLGU, p. 79.
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charged up with numerous cost overruns, added expenses, and
payoffs. Since very few projects ever cost exactly what has
been budgeted, it is this Reserve that will tell why. Again,
look to the footnotes for a disclosure of what has been
encumbered but what was not budgeted.
5. Enterprise Funds
Enterprise Funds account for the financing of self-
supporting activities of governmental units, which render
services on a user-charge basis to the general public. The
servicing of water, sewers, electricity, and natural gas
through public utilities is the most common enterprise fund.
Other services with great public demand undertaken by the
governmental unit are: hospitals, airports, transportation
systems, dock and wharf facilities, off-street parking lots
and garages, public housing, and recreational facilities
such as amusement parks, swimming pools, and golf courses.
The determining factor in relegating a project to
the Enterprise Fund and not the Special Revenue Fund is the
amount of user-charge monies used to finance the project.
If this amount is substantive, the activity is deemed Enter-
prise; if this amount is less than revenues originating from
other governments such as grants, it is deemed Special Rev-
enue. This accounting method is used to make it possible to
show whether the activities are operated at a profit or loss
similar to comparable private enterprises.
171
The accounting basis for Enterprise Funds, as in
business, is the accrual method--revenues from operations
are recorded when earned and expenses recorded when liabil-
ities are created. Since most enterprise operations deliver
services to customers who are billed periodically, Accounts
Receivable are debited, and the accounts for various rev-
enue sources are credited. Whenever the Accounts Receivable
item is a large asset, red flags should automatically go up
in an accountant's mind and the enlightened public's.
How steady are those receivables? How vulnerable
are they to the economy? What is the historical collection
rate? Has the city applied the correct rate to the Allow-
ance for Bad Debt? Is the city bound to repay the debt
assumed by the Enterprise Fund? All these questions should
be asked and should be answered in the footnotes. If they
are not, ask why!
Since fixed assets are of importance to enterprises,
proper accounting for them is essential to reflect the
financial status of the operation. Valuation of the fixed
assets is necessary as a component part in the determination
of rate structures under which consumers are charged for
services rendered. Thus, fixed assets are recorded at cost,
and this cost is charged against current revenues through
annual depreciation charges over the estimated useful life
of the assets. Included also in the book cost are: trans-
portation costs, engineering and supervisory services, legal
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and financial expenses, interest and insurance during con-
struction, and any other costs incidental to placing fixed
assets in their proper location and intended state of
.15
operation.
6. Intragovernmental Service Funds
This group of funds, also called Working Capital
Funds, finances and accounts for services and commodities
furnished by a designated agency of a governmental unit to
other departments of the same governmental unit. Since
these services are rendered within the government, their
funds are easily distinguished from those services rendered
to the general public that are accounted for in the General,
Special Revenue, and Enterprise Funds.
Common Intragovernmental Service Funds are those
established for central garages and motor pools, central
printing and duplicating services, and central purchasing
and stores departments. The creation of this particular
group of accounts can be viewed as a management tool to
create efficiencies within the governmental unit. By pool-
ing together the same function across agencies, costs are
saved, thereby creating a better matching of costs and
revenues.
The accounting for all Service Funds is on the
accrual basis. It is interesting that Encumbrances "may or
15 GAAFR, pp. 53-54.
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may not" formally be recorded in the books of account. How-
ever, memorandum records of orders and commitments are to be
kept to insure that cash and other fund resources will not
be over-obligated. Because of the inherent lack of order
and accountability in notes and memoranda, this rule set out
by GAAFR is subject to abuse and mismanagement. It is dis-
couraging to think that the Service Fund, which is a defi-
nite management tool, can be allowed to fall down in its
enactment.
7. Trust and Agency Funds
The two distinct funds within this category, Trust
and Agency, are set up for the purpose of accounting for
money and property received from non-enterprise fund sources
and are held by a governmental unit in the capacity of trus-
tee, custodian, or agent for individuals, governmental enti-
ties, and non-public organizations. The difference between
the two types focuses on the period of time the fund is in
existence. Agency Funds act as a clearing mechanism for
cash resources, which are collected by a governmental unit,
held for a brief period, and then disbursed to authorized
recipients. Trust Funds are in existence for a longer
period of time than Agency Funds. Because the Trust Fund
represents and develops vested interests (e.g., pensions),
more complex administrative and financial problems arise
(e.g., fund asset investment). Trust and Agency Funds are
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similar because each carries a fiduciary responsibility for
monies and other assets that the government does not own
outright.
Within the Trust Funds are two general types, expen-
dable and non-expendable. Expendable funds are those whose
principal and income may be expended in the course of their
designated operations. Pension and retirement systems are
examples of such. Non-expendable trust funds are those
whose principal must be preserved intact. An example is a
loan fund from which loans for specific purposes may be made
but which must be repaid so that the original amount of the
fund will be restored. When a situation arises that
embraces both categories, expendable and non-expendable,
both funds are established. For example, a non-expendable
fund would be set up for an endowment (assets and subsequent
investment) and an expendable fund for the income to be
expended and distributed. 16
It should also be noted that Trust Funds can be
either for public or for private use. There is more famili-
arity with the public type, the employee retirement fund
being the best-known. An example of a private fund is a
performance deposit where the principal will revert to the
private individual or corporation upon performance or com-
plet4on of a contractual agreement.
16GAAFR, p. 75.
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Trust and Agency Funds are accounted for on an
accrual basis, which is frequently a relatively simple pro-
cedure of proper recording of receipts and disbursements.
However, within this group of accounts lies the thorniest
problem in municipal accounting, Public Employee Retirement
Funds. Because the public employee contributes regularly
to the fund now in order to receive benefits later, an act
of trust and faith in the municipality is performed.
The governmental unit has an obligation, moral and
legal, to make sure that sufficient money is available to
pay retirement annuities and other benefits when they come
due. Here lies the problem. Many believe the actuarial
basis of these funds is inaccurate and will lead to the
unavailability of sufficient funds. An example is the case
of New York City, using actuarial statistics Clife tables)
from 1916, which grossly underestimate the human lifespan,
thereby creating public policy that underfunds the pension
funds. When auditing a governmental unit, check carefully
for the notes that explain the actuarial process underlying
the Pension Fund accounting. The method and the continual
updating of the method are essential for solvency.
The basic objective of an accounting system for a
public employee retirement system is to reveal the amount
and=source of financial resources set aside for retirement
benefits and the liabilities--both actual and prospective
based on actuarial evaluation--applicable to such resources.
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Since accrual is the recommended basis, all revenues (member
contributions) for the system are taken into account when
earned, without regard to date of collection, and expendi-
tures (retirement annuities) are reflected when the corre-
sponding liabilities are incurred, regardless of when pay-
ment is made.
The major problem in accounting for Pension Funds
is uniformity across governmental units. Great variability
arises in coverage, administration, and methods of finance.
Many governmental units have their own individual retirement
systems while others join together in a single state-wide
system. The problem is further compounded by the disaggre-
gation of certain groups within the unit who then form their
own systems such as state-wide teacher retirement systems.
Administrative operation and financial management
vary greatly. Costs for operations in one municipality may
be charged to the operating budget in the General Fund, and,
in another city, it has its own budget within a Finance
Department. This variability leads to many difficulties
in trying to match revenues and benefits, thus impeding a
cost/benefit analysis and possible fund deficiencies. The
actuarial bases used to compute proper fund levels are prob-
ably as numerous as the number of units. The state legis-
latu..es then use these to appropriate funds. Consequently,
some funds are underfunded. Legislatures also approve
increased benefits without an appropriate increase in the
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funding, thereby creating a deficit in the operating budget
of the fund. As a caveat to the Trust and Agency Funds dis-
cussion, read the notes to decipher assumptions and method-
ology leading to the budget of any Trust Fund. That is
where the damage is done.
8. Special Assessment Funds
The financing, accounting, and construction of cer-
tain public improvements are done through this set of funds.
These services are paid for wholly or in part through spe-
cial assessments to the benefited property. Examples are
residential streets, sidewalks, and storm sewers. These
projects are distinguishable from Capital Projects in that
only segments of the population are benefited; they are not
being done for the good of the whole community. Each proj-
ect is accounted for in its own fund with a basis of
accrual.
Since the cost of the project is likely to be quite
high, the benefited area is probably not able to pay for it
in a single assessment. Bonds are thus issued in serial
form, and, as special assessments are collected, bonds for
a corresponding amount are retired. The Accounts Receivable
item is key to determining solvency in this fund. Since
these funds are special assessments and limited to a par-
ticular geographic area. the fund is good only to the extent
that payment of taxes in that area is historically good.
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Careful scrutiny of individual projects is needed.
9. General Fixed Assets Group of Accounts
This group accounts for those fixed assets not
included in an Enterprise, Working Capital, or Trust Fund.
These assets possess three distinguishing attributes: (1) a
tangible nature; (2) a life longer than the current fiscal
year; and (3) a significant value. Significant value is
important because there are many assets that are tangible
and have a life longer than one year, but their value is so
small that the time and expense of maintaining detailed
accounting and inventory records on them are not justified.
In the case of equipment, the amounts of $25 and $50 are
widely used as a lower limit while, for building improve-
ments, the lower limits run from $500 to $1,000. Outlays
for assets lower than these limits are not capitalized in
the General Fixed Assets Group, e.g., pencil sharpeners,
paper cutters, small tools.
General fixed assets may be obtained in several
ways--purchase, lease-purchase, construction, eminent domain,
tax foreclosures, and gifts. As in commercial accounting,
the lease-purchase method provides problems in governmental
accounting as well. Under this plan, periodic lease pay-
ments are made to a vendor by the governmental unit with the
option of applying such payments to a total purchase price
at some later date. If the option is exercised, the asset
179
is only recorded as purchased when all payment is complete.
It is entered on the books as if one lump sum had been paid.
The question remains, however, as to who gets to use the
depreciation? Since the seller did lay claim to at least
part of its useful life, is he entitled to the depreciation
until the last payment is made or just until the time the
option eas exercised? No publication has adequately dealt
with the topic.
When fixed assets are donated, they are recorded at
fair cash market value. All other assets are recorded at
cost, and these amounts are retained on the books without
depreciation until the assets are finally disposed of as
GAAFR suggests. However, there is talk, if not some offi-
cial action, of changing cost over to market value. This
will play havoc with the books each year as revaluation
18
ensues.
10. General Long-Term Debt Group of Accounts
Bonds and other long-term indebtedness, which are
backed by the full faith and credit of the governmental unit
and supported by general revenues, are accounted for in this
self-balancing group of accounts. The distinguishing fea-
ture for these debts is the maturity of the issue. Bonds,
17GAAFR, p. 94.
18
"Municipal Accounting," seminar at Peat, Marwick &
Mitchell, New York, New York, 28 April 1977.
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time warrants, and notes -must have a maturity of more than
one year from date of issuance. Debt not qualifying is
accounted for in the General Fund, which processes most
"current" one-year operations.
Usually, long-term debt will only appear in the
financial statements under this fund and not as liabilities
of any other funds. The two exceptions to this are, first,
general obligation bonds, which are issued exclusively as
general obligation debt for the benefit of a governmental
enterprise but which, as a matter of discretionary financial
policy, are actually serviced by earnings of the enterprise.
Full disclosure of the nature of the liability involved is
recommended, and it should be included in both the affected
Enterprise Fund and the General Long-Term Debt group of
Accounts. Second, special assessment bonds, which, in addi-
tion to the special assessments levied against benefited
properties, carry a secondary pledge of the governmental
unit's general credit. GAAFR recommends that the contingent
liability on the general credit of the government be indi-
cated by a footnote in the Statement of General Long-term
Debt. An example as put forth in GAAFR would be:
In addition to the long-term debt exhibited in
this statement, the City of has a contingent
liability against its full faith and credit on $
of special assessment bonds recorded in the Special
-Assessment Fund. The general credit of the municipal-
ity is obligated only to the extent that liens fore-
closed against properties involved in the Special
Assessment district are insufficient to retire
181
outstanding bonds.1 9
Since the purpose of the Long-term Debt Accounts is
to fairly present the liability at any time from date of
issuance to date of maturity, it is most important that the
liabilities be properly valued. Generally accepted account-
ing principles stipulate the proper valuation of this lia-
bility is the sume of (1) the present discounted value of
the principal payable at some stipulated maturity data in
the future and (2) the present discounted value of the peri-
odic interest payments to this maturity date. If the effec-
tive rate of interest remains unchanged to the maturity
date, the sum on any given date will be equal to the princi-
pal amount of the debt obligation.
This group of accounts, more so than any other fund,
is extremely important as an indicator of the fiscal stabil-
ity of the municipality. How much debt and its maturity
timing is crucial to determining the amount of revenues
needed in the future? Because these costs are known and
fixed they serve as a base to which operating expenses are
added for a total sum of costs.
Summary
This discussion of funds and accounts should be seen
as an overview and not a definitive work on municipal account-
ing. It is easy to see from this, though, how confusing the
19 GAAFR, p. 101.
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manipulation and issues being displaced elsewhere. A care-
ful analysis of the amount and timing is again stressed.
Notes and footnotes throughout the entire set of financial
statements should be scrutinized for any additional debt not
listed in this set of accounts.
The financial statements are intended to coordinate
all eight funds and two groups of accounts into a cohesive
reporting package to reflect the financial status of the
governmental unit. Each fund must have: Cl) a balance
sheet, (2) a statement of revenues and expenditures, (3) a
statement of changes in fund balance, and (4) for enterprise
funds, a statement of changes in financial position.
It must always be remembered that it is to the
city's advantage to reflect its financial operations in
these statements as solvently as possible. Most anything
written in these reports can be understood if the assump-
tions underlying the framework are stated. Because of
recent disclosure laws, municipalities are now being more
diligent in producing the methodology for their accounting
practices. This is usually stated in the footnotes and in
the Notes to the Financial Statements section. Therefore,
it is recommended to look in these places first before any
reading or analysis is done on a city's financial statement
or bqnd prospectus.
As discussed throughout the paper, the warning sig-
nals for individual funds and accounts are located in the
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notes and footnotes. .The increasing uniformity of state-
ments across cities is making it easier for the reader to
detect irregularities through these footnotes. In general,
particular attention should be paid to Encumbrances, Reserve
for Bad Debts and Contingent Liabilities or for anything
that sounds like these. Rates used in determining effective
taxes and the Reserves for Bond Debts should also be checked
for historical accuracy.
This paper is just a broad overview of how munici-
palities should be accounted for. The intricacies and
actual accounting (debits and credits) are highly interest-
ing and another paper in itself. It has been made clear
through all the readings and the seminar I took in Municipal
Accounting that the field is almost new, and efforts to
write and organize information are just now being made.
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